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Abstract
China's economy has enjoyed rapid development in recent decades. Its achievements in
innovation, however, are far from satisfactory. So why is it the case that innovation has
not followed? The mining industry is chosen as the research target. Above all, it is
indispensable for China's future energy security and some materials can be used and
have no replacement for the manufacture of a constellation of high-tech products.
Secondly, mining is a difficult case for the study of innovation. Finally, this study is
located at the overlap between development studies and political economy.
This research adopts a qualitative method. Its aim is to find the mechanism through
which innovation outcomes can be determined as the qualitative method can be
beneficial in presenting such a mechanism clearly. The data is collected mainly through
interviews. This research is first illuminated by System of Innovation(SI) theory. SI views
concrete innovations as the outcome of a System. This research adopts the Triple Helix
approach to organise interviews and conduct fieldwork. This approach focuses upon the
interaction of universities, governments and industries. The Innovation Ecosystem is
also utilised to produce systemic research results.
The empirical finding of the research recognises that, compared with the prospecting
and manufacturing stages, the mining and mineral processing stages are more
innovative. One theoretical finding is that the triple helix displays in different forms
under different circumstances.
More work ought to be done to further discern and update the evolution of a
Chinese National System of Innovation and a comparison of the different forms of
Triple Helix is also a rich vein for scholars.
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Abstract 
 
China's economy has enjoyed rapid development in recent decades. Its achievements in 
innovation, however, are far from satisfactory. So why is it the case that innovation has 
not followed? The mining industry is chosen as the research target. Above all, it is 
indispensable for China's future energy security and some materials can be used and 
have no replacement for the manufacture of a constellation of high-tech products. 
Secondly, mining is a difficult case for the study of innovation. Finally, this study is 
located at the overlap between development studies and political economy. 
 
 
 
This research adopts a qualitative method. Its aim is to find the mechanism through 
which innovation outcomes can be determined as the qualitative method can be 
beneficial in presenting such a mechanism clearly. The data is collected mainly 
through interviews. This research is first illuminated by System of Innovation(SI) 
theory. SI views concrete innovations as the outcome of a System. This research 
adopts the Triple Helix approach to organise interviews and conduct fieldwork. This 
approach focuses upon the interaction of universities, governments and industries. 
The Innovation Ecosystem is also utilised to produce systemic research results. 
 
 
 
The empirical finding of the research recognises that, compared with the prospecting 
and manufacturing stages, the mining and mineral processing stages are more 
innovative. One theoretical finding is that the triple helix displays in different forms 
under different circumstances 
 
 
 
More work ought to be done to further discern and update the evolution of a 
Chinese National System of Innovation and a comparison of the different forms 
of Triple Helix is also a rich vein for scholars. 
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1. Research Question 
 
China's economy has enjoyed a high rate of development in recent decades, enabling 
it to become the second largest economic entity in terms of GDP in the world. Its 
achievements in innovation, however, are far from satisfactory. Meanwhile, China is 
not home to a group of globally competitive firms (Nolan, 2004).This phenomenon 
becomes all the striking if we take the following figures into account: the speed of 
growth regarding R&D investment is faster than GDP growth; over the last 10 years, 
the Beijing government has dramatically increased expenditure on R&D, which has 
risen from 0.6% to 1.6% of GDP from 1999 to 2011 (Hannas et al., 2013, p.53),and 
this figure rose to 2% in 2013 (Boeing et al, 2016, p.159), and China also produces a 
large number of researchers to staff these research units, ranking second in the 
world after the United States and ahead of Japan in the number of researchers over 
the past decade (OECD, 2008). In addition, from roughly 2006 onward, "Indigenous 
Innovation" has become one of the slogans of the Chinese government, being 
popular and often mentioned by officials at different levels. The outcome of this 
movement, however, is not desirable. Most of the R&D labs established over the past 
decade belong to multinational firms, not Chinese firms (Hannas et al.,2013). Hannas 
et al (2013, p.56) point out that the R&D intensity of high-tech industry in China 
remains much lower than that of developed countries. In 2008, China’s high-tech 
industry only invested 1.15% of its revenue to R&D. This was much lower than the 
2006 ratio for the US (16.41%), the UK (11.01%), Japan (10.64%), Germany (8.34%), 
and the Republic of Korea (5.98%). Not only has China failed to enhance innovations 
rapidly but the innovation activities being implemented in China lack an indigenous 
dimension. So why is it the case that innovation has not followed? It is of great 
significance for China. As is widely known, China is going through a transitional period 
and its aim is to transform a labour-intensive economy into a capital-intensive 
economy, and finally into a knowledge-intensive economy. Whether China can realise 
this goal or not hinges on whether the country can address the underlying problem 
which impedes the promotion of Chinese industry and undermines the pursuit of 
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innovation. In fact, China is trying hard to bolster its companies’ investment in R&D. 
According to the 2016 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard: ‘As in the past few 
years, companies based in China continued to show the best performance in terms of 
R&D growth (up by 24.7%)’ (European Union, 2016, p8). Among the 2,500 companies 
being calculated, there are 327 Chinese companies, and China is ranked third, only 
beaten by America and Japan. The following table reveals figures for the top 10 
Chinese companies on this scoreboard. 
 
    R&D   
    15/16   
World   (€million R&D 1 year (CAGR-3y, 
rank  Name Industrial sector ) growth (%) %) 
       
 HUAWEI     
 INVESTEMENT     
 & HOLDING Technology Hardware &    
8 CO. Equipment 8,357.9 46.1 26.3 
   Technology Hardware &    
65 ZTE Equipment 1,954.1 34.1 12.4 
79 PETROCHINA Oil & Gas Producers 1,677.6 -9.4 -6.4 
 CHINA     
91 RAILWAY Construction & Materials 1,454.7 5.9 17.0 
   Software & Computer    
93 BAIDU Services 1,444.5 46.2 63.3 
96 CRRC CHINA Industrial Engineering 1,407.9 92.0 48.0 
   Technology Hardware &    
106 LENOVO Equipment 1,284.7 20.2 31.3 
 CHINA     
 RAILWAY     
 CONSTRUCTIO     
111 N. Construction & Materials 1,239.4 0.9 10.0 
116 SAIC MOTOR Automobiles & Parts 1,184.5 22.5 13.3 
117 TENCENT Software & Computer 1,177.4 19.9 25.8       
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Services 
 
Table1: Top 10 Chinese companies on The EU Industrial R&D Investment 
 
Scoreboard 2016 
 
Source: http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/10180/1030082/World 
2500 companies ranked by RD. 
 
 
Based on the foregoing, why has China been unable to improve its companies' 
innovativeness, despite investing a large sum of money in R&D institutions and 
employing an increasing number of R&D personnel? 
Year Total Basic Applied Experiment % of GDP 
  Research Research al  
    Developme  
    nt  
      
2011 868.7 41.2 102.8 724.7 1.78 
      
2012 1029.8 49.9 116.2 863.8 1.91 
      
2013 1184.7 55.5 126.9 1002.3 1.99 
      
2014 1301.6 61.4 139.9 1100.4 2.02 
      
2015 1417.0 71.6 152.9 1192.5 2.07 
       
Table2: China’s Intramural Expenditure on R&D Units by billion yuan (during this 
 
period one dollar approximately equalled 6.3 yuan) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology, 2016. 
 
 
Item 2006-2011 2007-2012 2008-2013 2009-2014 2010-2015 
      
Percentage 51.7 52.2 53.1 54.2 55.3 
       
Table3: The contribution of the advancement of S&T to China’s Economic Growth 
 
Source: Ibid. 
 
 
 
This question is rather important and timely for China. After enjoying around a 
decade’s economic growth at a staggering speed, China's Gross Domestic Product 
growth rate has slowed down, especially in the past two years to a rate of lower than 
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7%, although still very high compared with other countries. It is time for China to find 
a new way to boost its economy again. The reform and opening-up policy has turned 
China into an export-oriented economy. This trend, however, needs to be reversed 
to some extent if China wishes to build its economy on a more concrete foundation. 
Not long after the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, domestic-need stimulation 
policy won the support of both the populace and the officials. The outward economy 
depends upon whether the commodity-receivers' economy is prosperous or not, 
thereby always relying upon other countries. If a large proportion of the economy is 
closely linked with exports, this economy shares the fate of the world economy and 
is vulnerable to downturns in major economies. As a consequence, reducing the 
reliance of the Chinese economy upon exports and increasing the percentage of 
domestic consumption is considered as a prescription. The question is how to make 
domestic consumers purchase Chinese products, which are often regarded as low 
quality and have shoddy after-sale service. To resolve this issue, innovation is an 
unavoidable topic. Only by encouraging Chinese firms to engage in indigenous 
innovation and attach more importance to in-house R&D can these companies 
salvage their images and attract more consumers. Responses to this issue will largely 
determine the development trajectory of China in the first half of the 21st century. 
At this stage, China is still a technology follower. There are various ways to do: "By 
learning from the best and focusing innovation efforts on design and cultural change, 
firms from the unlikeliest places can catch up and then move ahead of world 
leaders"(Forbes & Wield,2002). Chinese firms can draw upon the experiences of 
other countries. But no matter which method they choose to use, innovation is a 
prerequisite. 
 
 
Before probing deeper, I would like to clarify one fundamental concept, e.g. 
innovation. This concept had its own colloquial meaning many centuries ago, but the 
person who saw its academic significance and made the greatest contribution to a 
new discipline is Joseph Schumpeter. In his masterpiece Business Cycles, Schumpeter: 
 
simply defines innovation as the setting up of a new production function. This covers the  
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case of a new commodity, as well as those of a new form of organisation such as a merger, 
of the opening up of new markets, and so on (Schumpeter, 1939, p.87). 
 
He also mentions that:" innovations entail construction of new plant, embodied in a 
new firm and are always associated with the rise to leadership of new men" 
(Schumpeter, 1939, p.93-96). Countless scholars have made their contribution to this 
important academic stream, but different researchers have different understandings 
of innovation. Nelson defines innovation rather broadly, referring to the: "process by 
which firms master and get into practice product designs and manufacturing 
processes that are new to them if not to the universe or even to the nation" (eds 
Nelson, 1993). Meanwhile, Edquist defines innovation simply as: "new creations of 
economic significance" (1997). These definitions overlap to some extent and by using 
different criteria we have different typologies. As a result, I need to make it clear at 
the beginning of my research what innovations I study. I use the concept of 
innovation to refer to the commercialisation of new ideas or new designs, including 
the adoption and creation of innovation, and I mainly discuss technological 
innovation. In the meantime, I give more credit to “Indigenous Innovation”. The 
landmark document which officially announced the campaign of encouraging 
indigenous innovation is “The National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the 
Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020)” (now known in the West as 
the MLP). It defines indigenous innovation as: “enhancing original innovation through 
co-innovation and re-innovation based on the assimilation of imported technologies” 
(quoted in McGregor, 2010, p4). According to Lu: 
 
Indigenous innovation here refers to a kind of strategic principle or policy adopted by a 
firm or a state. Under the guidance of the philosophy of indigenous innovation, the firm or 
the state will insist on technology learning and treat the ability to develop technology as 
the main source of competence or the motivation of economic development. (Lu, 2006, 
p.36). 
 
Zhou and Liu (2016, p.46) argue that: “the ‘indigenous’ translation is somewhat 
misleading, as indigenous in Chinese is 自主, which literally means self-directing, and 
does not necessarily describe technology that has to originate in China or be free of 
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foreign contribution”. I agree with Zhou and Liu. In this research, the term 
 
“indigenous innovation” will be retained as it is quite popular, but it needs to be 
stressed that Zhou and Liu’s clarification is useful in helping western readers 
understand the true significance of this term. 
 
 
I also wish to distinguish science and technology because these terms are often used 
together but most people fail to notice the essential difference between them. 
Mokyr discusses two kinds of knowledge: 
 
one is the knowledge that catalogues natural phenomena and regularities (‘knowledge of 
what’), which I will call propositional knowledge. The other is the knowledge that 
prescribes certain actions that constitute the manipulation of natural phenomena for 
human material needs (‘production’) and which I will call prescriptive knowledge (2002, 
p.4). 
 
In fact, propositional knowledge is science, knowledge about interpreting the world, 
while prescriptive knowledge is technology, knowledge about changing the world. 
Faulkner proposes a common understanding that: "science is about understanding 
nature through the production of knowledge and technology is about controlling 
nature through the production of artefacts". (1994, p.431). In short, science and 
technology are interlinked but have different functions. 
 
 
As far as development studies is concerned, innovation is the essential part of every 
successful development story. When Alexander Gerschenkron first proposed late 
development studies (Gerschenkron,1962), capital accumulation was the main task 
for developing countries who pursued industrialisation and innovation was ignored. 
Scholars of that era did not care too much about innovation as if innovation is a 
concomitant of industrialisation. As time went by, the function and value of 
innovation was gradually recognised by most, if not all, scholars. A country unable to 
contribute with a world-famous brand will not be respected, even though its 
aggregate economic figure is significant. Since Schumpeter's masterpiece first related 
that the significance of innovation is creative destruction (Schumpeter,1942), this 
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phenomenon has attracted huge attention from a variety of disciplines. Numerous 
schools of innovation have been established. Although the discourse of innovation is 
inclusive, developing countries are by no means the prime concern of this academic 
stream. My research is relevant to innovation studies and development studies. I 
hope to bridge the two and bring development studies into the core research domain 
of innovation. 
 
 
The diversity and knowledge-intensity of the world economy has grown 
exponentially in recent years. As the engine of economic growth innovation has been 
acknowledged globally, and the emerging economies will not sustain their 
development unless they participate in innovation-creation or diffusion activities 
wholeheartedly. It is predicted that innovation will penetrate into every sphere of 
the economy and serve as one of the main criteria to evaluate the performance of a 
specific economic entity, be it a firm or a country. 
 
 
China's economic miracle is unparalleled whereas it will be less shining if we take its 
innovation performance into consideration. China's case provides a great many 
opportunities to researchers. Academic studies of China should be a rewarding 
process as they not only benefit scholars involved but also offer an excellent testbed 
for a wide range of competing theories. Moreover, by helping China to tackle the 
problems facing it, the whole world will benefit. 
 
 
In the academic community, innovation is generally considered to be the outcome of 
a number of players. In consequence, the whole system which leads to the creation 
and adoption of innovation will be looked at rather than focusing upon one node in a 
larger network. Only by giving innovation its due credit in society can its function be 
correctly exposed. After all, it is the interaction between innovation and social 
development that matters. The significance of innovation lies in its integrating role, 
linking different parts of society and binding them together, thereby accelerating the 
production of useful knowledge. Based on the foregoing, a systemic approach will be 
 
15 
 
adopted in this research. 
 
 
 
In order to narrow down the scope of my research, the mining industry is chosen as 
the research field. According to the broadest definition, mining includes discovering, 
extracting, and processing of all non-renewable resources up to the point at which 
they are used as inputs for fabricating or producing energy. A much narrower 
definition of mining includes only crude or non-processed mine products such as 
mineral ores and coal, and excludes petroleum and natural gas (Mikesell & Whitney, 
1987). This research mainly looks at specific mining industry. Coal mining, non-
ferrous metal mining, and mining equipment manufacturing were selected in order 
to focus this research. 
 
 
The reasons why the mining industry was chosen is because it has the following 
features: 
 
 
Above all, it is a strategic industry as it is indispensable for China's future energy 
security and some materials are indispensable to a constellation of high-tech 
products. The coal mining sector alone is quite important, although it is not the 
mainstay of Chinese industry any longer. In the mid-1990s China became the largest 
producer of coal in the world (Thompson, 2003). Now coal consumption provides 
nearly 70% of the total energy needed by the country. In 1978 the mining and 
quarrying industry had 6.52 million workers. Then with reform and opening-up, this 
figure increased significantly. In both 1993 and 1995, the mining industry employed 
9.32 million workers, an all-time high. This figure slowly fell. In 2014, among 182.78 
million urban workers, 5.97 million worked in coal mining, ranked the eighth largest 
industry, and exceeded by manufacturing, construction, education, public 
administration and so on (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015). 
 
Unit Total Mining Manufacturing Construction 
 
10,000 persons 
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2012 15236.4 631.0 4262.2 2010.3 
     
2013 18108.4 636.5 5257.9 2921.9 
     
2014 18277.8 596.5 5243.1 2921.2 
      
Table4: Urban Units Employment by Sector 
 
Source: China Labour Statistic Yearbook, 2015. 
 
Negative factors have also attracted attention, such as the notorious accidents which 
claimed hundreds of people's lives. As for the non-ferrous metal industry, in 2014 ten 
kinds of non-ferrous metal (copper、aluminium、nickel、 lead、zinc、tungsten、
molybdenum、tin、antimony and mercury) reached a production quantity of 48.11 
million tons, 7.1% higher than in 2013. The same year, investment in the fixed assets of 
the non-ferrous metal industry was 695 billion yuan (US$113.2 billion),4.4 % higher than 
2013. State-owned and large non-state industrial enterprises in the non-ferrous metal 
industry enjoyed a revenue of 5.29 trillion yuan (US$861.6 billion), 8.3% higher than 
2013 (The Yearbook of the Chinese Non-Ferrous Metal Industry, 2015). 
 
 
Second, the mining industry poses problems for innovation study. When scholars 
look at China's innovations, the industries they focus upon are information and 
communication technology or the aircraft industry, few looking at mining. By 
demonstrating the pivotal role innovation can play in promoting the Chinese mining 
industry, the importance of innovation can be understood to provide a credible 
backdrop. The outcome of this research might be an extension of innovation studies 
and contribute to a finer appreciation of innovation. Meanwhile, to a large extent, 
most theories and analytic framework of innovation were developed based on the 
laws of manufacturing. Thus, a study of the mining industry has the potential to 
articulate novel ideas. 
 
 
Lastly, this study is located where development studies and political economy 
overlap. The former's key theme is capital accumulation, while the latter's is the 
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interactions between political factors and economic sectors. The mining industry 
counts upon huge capital investment and is always under strict government 
regulation in China. The extraction of primary resources can be an important source 
of capital for developing countries, and during this capital accumulation process the 
government's behaviour is critical. The mining industry is salient insofar as it 
integrates the logic of the two academic branches. 
 
 
In addition, mining equipment manufacturing is chosen as a large proportion of the 
innovations in the mining industry are generated by equipment makers. Meanwhile, 
mining companies themselves are mainly responsible for the commercialisation of 
new mining or processing methods rather than mining equipment. Only by taking 
equipment companies into account can this research cover most innovations in 
relation to mining. 
 
 
In short, this study looks at innovation in the Chinese mining industry via a systemic 
approach and tries to answer the question: What factors determine the success and 
failure of innovation in the Chinese mining industry? It is expected that these factors 
are also useful to explain the innovation performance of other Chinese industries, as 
these industries constitute elements of a National System of Innovation. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
The central role of firms in the creation and diffusion of innovation has been recognised 
by almost all scholars in the field. No firm, however, can finish the task of innovation by 
itself. Firm acts as the striker in a football match, as it were, who gives the final kick but 
without assistance from his teammates, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the 
striker to score. Various kinds of organisation take part in the innovation process and, 
together with firms, they constitute a system. In order to comprehend the real 
innovation process, it is imperative to look at the whole system. From the 1990s onwards, 
a theoretical approach called the National System of Innovation has been widely 
adopted by the academic community and policy-makers. This research is also informed 
by this approach.1 Meanwhile, shortly after the birth of the National System of 
Innovation, similar approaches were proposed, such as Regional System of Innovation 
and Sectoral System of Innovation. This System of Innovation school will be introduced 
first, and its strengths and weaknesses discussed.The 21st century has seen the rise of 
two competing theories, i.e. Triple Helix and Innovation Ecosystem. Both of these 
theories' supporters agree with the systemic feature of innovation whereas they also 
have differing views regarding some issues. The Triple Helix theory will be reviewed after 
the System of Innovation theory, 
 
 
1 Prior to talking about innovation systems, I will throw some light on a similar term, 
‘Technological System’. This concept was developed by Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991). They 
define the Technological System as: "a dynamic network of agents interacting in a specific 
economic/industrial area under a particular institutional infrastructure and involved in the 
generation, diffusion, and utilization of technology" (1991, p.93). This Technological System is a 
sub-system of the National System of Innovation. Whilst it is widely accepted that innovation 
takes several forms, such as the creation of new markets, new products, and new organisations, 
all of the above-mentioned forms have technological ingredients. Furthermore, essential as 
technological innovation is, it is definitely not the whole of innovation. In some aspects, however, 
this technological system has a larger scope than the National System of Innovation, as some 
technology is transnational or even global. What I wish to stress here is that this concept is no 
different in nature from NSI but varies in the facet they attach most importance to. The prime 
concern of this research is technological innovation so this concept would be very relevant to the 
research too. In debt to Carlsson and Stankiewicz, this research can be redubbed a study for the 
System of Technological Innovation of the Chinese mining industry. 
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as it will guide this research. The selection of cases and potential interviewees were 
decided in the light of this approach, while the conclusion of this research takes note 
of some lessons drawn from this approach. In this section, one case will be presented, 
that of Huawei. Huawei is the most successful Chinese company in terms of 
innovation. An introduction to Innovation Ecosystem follows. Finally, research into 
the mining industry, especially the Chinese mining industry, will be reviewed. 
 
 
 
 
2.1 System of Innovation 
 
2.1.1 National System of Innovation (NSI) 
 
According to Christopher Freeman (1995, p.5), the first to use the term 'National 
System of Innovation' was Lundvall. However, in published form, the term was first 
used by Freeman himself in the book Technology Policy and Economic Performance, 
Lessons from Japan (Freeman, 1987). As a result, the academic community credits 
Freeman with coining this expression. In fact, the concept goes back to Friedrich List 
(1984) who at the time, was thinking about the method Germany might use to 
overtake Britain. He was in favour of infant industry protection policy, a major part of 
which was about learning new technology and applying it. 
 
 
In the 1990s, there were two influential monographs concerning the National System 
of Innovation, one is National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation 
and Interactive Learning, edited by Bengt-Åke Lundvall (1992), and the second is 
National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis, edited by Richard Nelson 
(1993). In 2008 the book Small Country Innovation Systems, Globalization, Change 
and Policy in Asia and Europe, edited by Charles Edquist, provides the latest approach 
to studying NSI. The three books articulate different perceptions of the same term, 
but they do not contrast with each other. In fact, they complement each other in one 
way or another. 
 
 
As for the National System of Innovation literature, first of all, regarding Freeman's  
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ground-breaking study of this area, it may be argued that it is more of a case study 
about Japan, the country which, at the time the book was published, was still the 
world technology leader. Freeman defined the National System of Innovation as" the 
network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and 
interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies" (1987, p.1). His 
study concerns some features of a Japanese System of Innovation and its implications 
for other countries. Freeman describes the four most important features of Japanese 
NSI, including the role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the role of 
company R&D strategy in relation to imported technology and 'reverse engineering', 
the role of education and training and related social innovation, and the 
conglomerate structure of industry (1987, p.4). In short, Freeman's methodology 
identifies major actors in this system and studies them respectively. Its advantages lie 
in its comprehensive depiction of the system and systematic framework-building. 
Compared with previous theories, it put innovations in a wider purview, thus 
contributing to a better understanding of innovation. By paying attention to the 
innovation network, the nature of innovation can be demonstrated more clearly. 
 
 
Freeman also discusses changes in industrial leadership throughout history, leading 
to the conclusion that a nation cannot become a world technology hegemon or 
overtake the current technology pioneer unless its NSI efficiency or performance 
surpass that of the current leader. Just as: 
 
when Britain opened up a major technological gap in the first industrial revolution, this 
was related not simply to an increase in invention and scientific activities, important 
though these undoubtedly were, but to novel ways of organising production, 
investment and marketing and novel ways of combining invention with 
entrepreneurship. Similarly, when Germany and the US overtook Britain in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries their successes were also related to major 
institutional changes in the NSIs. In particular, they developed new ways of organising 
R&D activities as specialised departments within firms, and employed graduate 
engineers and scientists (Freeman, 1987, p.31). 
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This idea is very illuminating. Previous studies merely emphasized one specific sector 
of the economy, thus failed to explain the leapfrog of late developers. If a country 
intends to outperform its competitors, this country's NSI overall performance should 
excel. From the very beginning of the study of NSI, this has had policy implications. 
Government policy plays a pivotal role in shaping a country's NSI and many countries 
have experienced this. This policy implication offers new rationales and new 
approaches for government technology policies (OECD, 1997). To sum up, as the first 
attempt to use NSI to approach innovation, whilst very rudimentary, Freeman's book 
was a pioneer. Almost all later studies in this area make reference to it. 
 
 
Lundvall's is a more theoretical study. It first makes a distinction between a System 
of Innovation in the narrow sense and a System of Innovation in the broad sense. The 
narrow definition includes "organisations and institutions involved in searching and 
exploring" (1992, p.12), while the broad definition "includes all parts and economic 
structure and the institutional set-up affecting learning as well as searching and 
exploring" (1992, p.12). The core concepts in this book are knowledge and learning; 
Lundvall argues that: 
 
the most fundamental resource in the modern economy is knowledge and accordingly, 
that the most important process is learning…it is assumed that learning is predominantly 
an interactive and therefore, a socially embedded process which cannot be understood 
without taking into consideration its institutional and cultural context (Lundvall, 1992, 
p.1). 
 
The outcome of innovation is new knowledge, not new products or new methods of 
production, and the process of making innovation is learning. This perception is very 
accurate. It points out that products are carriers of knowledge, in other words, the 
materialisation of knowledge. Viewed from this perspective, the main activity in an 
NSI is collective learning. All parts of the system should contribute to the 
accumulation of useful knowledge, otherwise it should be excluded from the system. 
The most effective systems of innovation are those which create the largest amount 
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of knowledge. This interpretation of NSI is also helpful in the sense that it gives 
researchers a conceptual tool to evaluate each NSI. Furthermore, Lundvall stresses 
that the process of learning is interactive and innovation is gradual and cumulative. 
Thus, he mentions that learning takes place in connexion with routine activities. He 
points out the possibility that even workers and sales representatives influence the 
agenda, determining the direction of innovative efforts, and that in this way the 
learning base is enlarged. 
 
 
Lundvall's book provides a theoretical groundwork for incoming NSI studies, and 
exposes the nature of innovation. Although lacking empirical evidence, the 
theoretical coherence of the book holds every chapter together. Furthermore, the 
inclusive style of the book is beneficial for delineating a panorama of innovation. 
While which part of the picture is more relevant in specific cases, it cannot be 
predetermined. “A problematic aspect of learning organisations as well as the 
learning economy in general has been its focus on catching up learning base on 
incremental innovations and not on radical innovations requiring the creation of new 
knowledge” (Asheim & Coenen, 2005, p.1175). Learning is about diffusing innovation 
throughout the economy. In the short term, it might be very efficient in adopting 
innovation but in the long term it is difficult for the learning economy to abandon 
this development pattern. 
 
 
Nelson's and Lundvall's book differ in many ways. Nelson’s consists of 15 case studies 
ranging from large high-income countries such as the US, Japan, and the UK to low-
income countries, i.e. South Korea, Brazil, and Argentina. It is much more empirical 
than Lundvall’s. In the first chapter, Nelson gives his definition of 
 
‘innovation’, ‘systems’, and ‘national’. The system concept, according to Nelson, is: 
"that of a set of institutional actors that, together, plays the major role in influencing 
innovative performance” (eds Nelson, 1993). No matter which country is discussed, 
the authors are mainly concerned with formal actors. In other words, it is the formal 
institutions that catch the attention of the contributors, unlike Lundvall's work. By 
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talking about the 'major institutional actors', the book mainly discusses firms, 
industrial research laboratories, universities, and public laboratories. Each chapter 
only sheds light to the important formal institutional actors. 
 
 
There are some other valuable lessons and striking features of NSI which are 
demonstrated by Nelson. First of all, history matters. It does not ignore the outside 
world, it is an open system. As described, the international environment and the time 
of industrialisation influence the structure of NSI. Even though we are talking about 
NSI, it does not mean we can ignore the international context. Most countries whose 
governments invest heavily in the R&D sector probably do so because these 
countries face severe military threats. As the national defence industry is different 
from civilian industry, the commodities of this industry cannot be brought to market, 
thus government intervention is in high demand. Apart from this, the size of the 
economy and its geographical location also have important impacts on the country's 
NSI, especially during its formation process. As Nelson lucidly depicts, most smaller 
economies have similar features, reminding us that a vision cannot be formed 
without noticing real world constraints. Furthermore, variation in size and location is 
hard to change so that some experiences are unique to one country or its 
counterpart, while other countries cannot simply copy these successful models. In 
other words, best practice does not exist. All in all, this book uses plenty of case 
studies and comparisons to show the similarities and differences between NSIs. It 
laid the foundation for future progress. 
 
 
As for Edquist, his book is quite different from the two above. Edquist classifies 
Nelson’s and Lundvall's way of studying NSI as traditional approaches (Edquist, 2008). 
The approach Edquist adopts is called 'An Activities-based Framework for Analysing 
SI’. To be more specific, “the main or overall function of SI is to pursue innovation 
processes: to develop and diffuse innovation” (Edquist, 2008, p.7). Activities here 
refer to those factors that influence the development and diffusion of innovations. 
Compared with Nelson's and Lundvall's work, Edquist: "focuses strongly on what 
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happens in the systems—rather than on their constituents2—that it thus uses a 
more dynamic perspective” (Edquist, 2008, p.7). Traditional approaches focus 
strongly upon components within the system. Because it is extremely difficult to 
distinguish which activities are linked with innovations, Edquist adopts ten activities. 
They are divided into four categories: Provision of knowledge inputs to the 
innovation process, including provision of R&D and competence building; Demand-
side activities, including formation of new product markets and articulation of quality 
requirements; Provision of constituents of SI, including creating and changing 
organisations needed for developing new fields of innovation, networking through 
markets and other mechanisms, creating and changing institutions, and Support 
services for innovating firms, including Incubation activities, financing of innovation 
and provision of consultancy services. This perspective helps readers understand the 
function of different components of an NSI better because it deals with actors in 
motion not static actors. Even different NSIs have the same components, while these 
components might not serve their functions the same way. Sometimes a component 
is designed to perform a specific task but in reality, it often deviates from its basic 
task and takes on other responsibilities. Only by observing and analysing acting 
components can we gain meaningful knowledge of these components. Meanwhile, 
activity-based studies are more conducive to show the interactions between 
constituents of the system, which are as important as the constituents themselves, if 
not more important. The so-called traditional manner of NSI study approaches are 
weak in this respect. However, by concentrating on activities of the system this 
approach is not strong in introducing each component clearly. If, for example, some 
components engage in less activities there will have less chance that they appear. 
The significance of these components, however, is not necessarily less noticeable 
than others. 
 
 
 
2 The constituents and the components of a System of Innovation refer to the formal 
institutions and organisations of this system, such as firms, universities, banks, governments, 
and legislative systems. 
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Based on the foregoing, it can be seen that the two kinds of approaches have their 
own strengths and weaknesses, which make them complement each other.3 
 
Some concluding remarks needed to be made here. Initially, some of the features of 
this framework which capture the essential rules of innovation are worth noting. 
Above all, it reminds scholars that innovation is by no means a completely 
technological phenomenon. You cannot grasp the essence of innovation until you 
place it into a larger socio-economic picture. In his book Forces of Production, A 
Social History of Industrial Automation, Noble clearly and eloquently states his point 
of view: 
 
Technology determinism, the view that machines make history rather than people, is not 
correct; it is only a cryptic, mystifying, escapist, and pacifying explanation of a reality 
perhaps too forbidding (and familiar) to confront directly. If the social changes now upon 
us seem necessary, it is because they follow not from any disembodied technological logic 
but from a social logic-to which we all conform (Noble,1986, p.324). 
 
Noble uses one case study to illustrate the decisive power of social rules in solving a 
seemingly technological problem. Among the two competing machine tools, the one 
with lower quality won the day. The reason is that, by adopting the lower quality 
model, the managers could continue to control the production process. The law that 
guides the advancement of technology is not a technological one, for the same 
reason that the law that guides scientific discoveries is not a scientific one. In 
addition, Lazonick compares shop floor relations between workers and employers in 
Britain, the USA, and Japan (1990). He argues that in Britain, senior workers control 
the production process; in America, professional managers decide what goes on at 
 
 
3 Along with the national System of Innovation, another concept is worthy of mention, that is, 
the National System of Entrepreneurship. It is a: "fundamental resource allocation system that 
is driven by individual-level opportunity pursuit. In contrast with the institutional emphasis of 
the National Systems of Innovation frameworks, where institutions engender and regulate 
action, National Systems of Entrepreneurship are driven by individuals, with institutions 
regulating who acts and the outcomes of individual action" (Ácsa et al.,2014). National Systems 
of Entrepreneurship focus upon different aspects of innovation and I will regard them as a 
complementary approach to NSI. 
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the assembly line; while in Japan, the shop floor workers are integrated into the planning 
of production. The vicissitudes of the three countries in world industry can be explained 
by this relationship (Lazonick,1990). Both Noble and Lazonick attempt to link 
technological innovation with human activities. Technology is a means, not an end. 
Broers' view, expressed in his book The Triumph of Technology,is highly doubted here. 
Broers said "Technology, I repeat, will determine the future of human race…My fervent 
belief is that technology holds the key to sustaining our banishment of these ills, 
everywhere and for ever"(Broers, 2005). The NSI approach is beneficial in helping people 
bear in mind that innovation is created by mankind and thus succumbs to human rules. 
The NSI approach does not pre-exclude any kind of human activities. The forces that 
push innovation forward are joint forces of social, political, economic as well as cultural 
forces. A single-minded focus upon agencies directly engaged in technological activities 
will definitely miss overriding forces. 
 
 
Second, this research framework helps form a panorama of innovation, its wide scope 
is conducive to address the researchers that innovations are possible everywhere. 
Innovation is the outcome of a network, not the finishing point of a straight line. It is 
not only about R&D and will not only be produced by R&D; it means much more than 
that. Pavitt asserts in his article that some small firms’ innovative activities and some 
private sector firms have made contributions to the development of software 
technology (Pavitt,1999). Innovation is created and diffused in the system in various 
ways. The formal R&D sector only occupies a small portion of this. The R&D sector 
cannot monopolise that comes from innovation. This approach is also a forceful 
refusal of the linear innovation model. In Stokes' book he described this model as: 
“Basic research→applied research→development→production and operation”. 
(Stokes, 1997, p.10). A System of Innovation consists of numerous such lines, along 
with lines of different sorts, and none are one-way streets. Feedback from both sides 
of the line can be a source of innovation. It confirms the idea that different 
components of the system all have their unique functions and contributions. Stokes 
uses a categorisation to distinguish three kinds of research, that is, pure basic 
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research, pure applied research, and use-inspired basic research, arguing that use-
inspired basic research yield most economic significance and economic returns for 
investors (Stokes, 1997). More often than not, research interests aroused by practical 
concerns could lead to the establishment of a new discipline. This model is reconciled 
with NSI. Technology and science cannot determine the trajectory of innovation. The 
system's input is not only wrought in scientific breakthroughs but teems with 
problems in real life. All kinds of input can be transferred to the output, e.g. 
innovation. 
 
 
Finally, this approach is quite inclusive and multidisciplinary. As Pavitt points out in 
his book: "the blind spot of many economics in ignoring what goes on inside 
innovating firms is often matched by the blind point of many management specialists 
in ignoring what goes outside" (Pavitt,1999). While NSI helps both groups reduce, if 
not remove, their blind section it always set the whole economy as the backdrop and 
will not gratuitously exclude any part. By adding more elements in the system, the 
framework opens doors to scholars from a wide range of subjects. 
 
 
While I am going through NSI literature, I always encounter complaints which claim 
that the 'national' background has become obsoleted in a globalising world. Some 
scholars propose an open innovation approach. They argue that: "firms which do not 
co-operate and which do not exchange knowledge reduce their knowledge base on a 
long-term basis and lose the ability to enter into exchange relations with other firms 
and organisations" (Koschatzky, 2001, p.6). Meanwhile, others argue that national 
differences still matter. Pavitt and Patel measure the uneven (divergent) 
technological accumulation among advanced countries (Pavitt & Patel, 1998), finding 
that technological abilities among developed countries are far from following a 
convergent process. This can be explained in local inducement mechanisms, the 
volume and rate of increase of aggregate innovative activities by differences in 
systems of corporate governance, and in the level and composition of workforce 
education. All these are still quite local. Every book on NSI allocates one sub-chapter 
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to the 'national'. Lundvall argues that innovation entails complex communication 
between different parts. The exchange usually has a tacit or uncodified part, parties 
from the same national environment will facilitate the discourse (Lundvall, 1992). 
Freeman defines a System of Innovation at different levels in his article Continental, 
national, and Sub-national innovation systems-complementarity and economic 
growth. He believes that: "the major phenomena of forging ahead, catch up and 
falling behind in the 19th and 20th centuries can most plausibly be explained in terms 
of national systems albeit in an international context and recognising uneven 
development at the sub-national level" (Freeman, 2002, p.209). Apart from 
innovation studies, Variety of Capitalism theory offers more intellectual evidence of 
the important national dimension (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Liberal market economy 
(LME) and coordinated market economy (CME) use different mechanisms to deal 
with problems in their own economies. In a globalising world, they might copy some 
so-called best practice from countries of the other category, but this is only individual 
policy learning and will not change the fundamental principles of the economy. The 
opposite trend is also obvious, as some speak highly of prominent regional systems 
of innovation, such as Silicon Valley. These science parks organise innovative 
activities in a much more efficient way than the institutional set-up at the national 
level. 
 
 
Meanwhile, some scholars propose the idea that sectoral features are more 
important than the geographical or political dimensions. Different sectors have quite 
different features so it might be more possible for the same sectors in different 
countries to strike a chord than different sectors in the same country. 
 
 
Based on the foregoing, it is necessary to review the literatures on the regional 
System of Innovation and the sectoral System of Innovation. 
 
 
2.1.2 The Regional System of Innovation 
 
This academic stream goes back to Alfred Marshall’s Principle of Economics (1922) in  
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which he discusses the development and features of industrial districts, or as the 
author calls the phenomenon "the concentration of specialised industries in 
particular localities". Most contributors to this field share the underlying idea that 
territorial agglomeration provides the best context for an innovation-based 
globalising economy owing to localised interactive learning processes and sticky 
knowledge grounded in social interactions (Allura, Galvagno & Li Destri, 2012). The 
stickiness of knowledge is an important concept here. It was developed by von 
Hippel (1994), who discusses the relationship of sticky information and problem-
solving: "Often the information used in technical problem solving is costly to acquire, 
transfer and use in a new location" (1994, p.429). If most of the innovative activities 
concentrate on one region, the problems caused by [sticky information] will be less 
severe. The barriers that need to be removed in the process would require less 
labour, and technicians do not bother to move rapidly from one place to another in 
order to detect the problem. At least in theory, the existence of a Regional System of 
Innovation (RSI) is possible. 
 
 
When NSI, RSI are compared: "a key question concerns the extent to which they are 
indeed 'systemic'” (Cooke et al, 1997, p.478). At least when reviewed by Edquist 
(1997), the NSI approach is being used more on operational systems. This approach is 
more likely to attend to what is being done in the system: "this then give rise to a 
serious problem of what, indeed, an innovation system actually is" (Cooke et al, 1997, 
p.478). A National Innovation System might include something purposely designed 
and something not. The question becomes: “Are they going to be involved in an intra-
system conflict? Because of the massive complexity of research this at national level, 
we think there are justifications both for beginning the study of systems with a 
conceptual rather than operational emphasis and also doing this at regional level in 
the first glance" (Ibid, 479). The above discussions are theoretical. Whether the NSI or 
RSI approach is chosen depends upon the characteristics of the targeted area. If this 
area has strong local features, such as its own educational and training systems, 
public procurement by the regional government, universities, and research 
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laboratories related to this region, RSI might be a more effective approach. 
Sometimes national initiatives in large countries do not work as well as in small 
countries (Cooke et al., 1997). Consequently, RSI is a better choice to study them. 
Scholars have tried to open the black box of region, and distinguish two kinds of RSI 
according to their knowledge bases. Asheim and Coenen use the terms ‘analytical’ 
and ‘synthetic’ knowledge base to categorize RSIs. In its philosophical meaning, 
 
‘analytical’ refers to the way of reasoning by which the truth of a proposition 
independent of fact or experience involves inference from a general principle. 
 
‘Synthetic’, on the other hand, pertains to knowledge having a truth value 
determined by observation or facts (2005, p.1176). In RSI where the knowledge base 
is analytical, science is important and knowledge creation is often based on cognitive 
and rational processes. Whereas in RSI, where the knowledge base is synthetic, 
innovation takes place through the application of existing knowledge or new 
combinations of knowledge. Asheim and Coenen argue that: “in case the following 
two subsystems of actors are systematically engaged in interactive learning, it can be 
argued that a regional innovation system is in place.(1)The regional production 
structure or knowledge exploitation subsystem which consists mainly of firms, often 
displaying clustering tendencies.(2)The regional supportive infrastructure or 
knowledge generation subsystem which consists of public private research 
laboratories, universities, etc” (Asheim & Coenen, 2005,p.1177). 
 
 
All these theories are quite useful when researchers are contemplating whether 
there is an RSI in a specific region and choosing which aspects to stress. 
 
 
Apart from those theoretical building works, several case studies are also worth 
mentioning. Saxenian studies the performance divergence between Silicon Valley 
and Route 128 which are world renowned high-tech regions (Saxenian,1996). Her 
explanation is a typical RSI one: 
 
Silicon Valley has a regional network-based industrial system that promotes collective 
 
learning and flexible adjustments among specialist produce] a complex of related  
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technologies. The Route 128, in contrast, is dominated by a small number of relatively 
integrated corporations. Its industrial system is based on independent firms that 
internalize a wide range of productive activities. It reinforces a regional culture that 
encourages stability and self-reliance (1996, p.3.). 
 
Kirk and Cotton's recently published book The Cambridge Phenomenon,50 years of 
Innovation and Enterprise is also a typical RSI study although they do not use this 
term explicitly (Kirk & Cotton, 2012). They depict the thriving business and academic 
community in Cambridge, consciously describing the interaction between the 
University of Cambridge and the science parks around the university. They eloquently 
point out that: "no cluster is an island." They then analyse the function of different 
components of this small RSI. They conclude that 'Cambridge spirit' is a particular 
feature of the overall culture in this place, an attitude of willingly helping others 
without expecting anything in return which cannot be found anywhere else (Kirk & 
Cotton, 2012, p.200). Maybe this is because, in its embryonic stage, the environment 
in Cambridge was hostile to setting-up in business so that the entrepreneurs had to 
find help from their counterparts. This study is an illustration of the whole 
development process of an RSI. It chooses one special area, and shows the RSI in 
operation and the historical path through which the RSI reaches its current position. 
 
 
By and large, RSI can be seen as a System of Innovation at a sub-national level. In 
recent years, using the region as the analysis unit has aroused more interest in 
Europe (Storper, 1995). Mainstream economics fails to recognise regional differences 
thus it is insufficient to explain the real world. Bringing regions back into research 
purview will help to address important issues. RSI is useful when it deals with special 
regions which have the following features: (1) even when you isolate this region, it 
can survive because it almost performs all innovation activities and production 
activities for a group of products; (2) this region has a special model and the 
performance of innovation is much better than other regions of the country. In most 
cases, these regions are located at the core of the relevant NSI too. The essential 
position of the region is worth examining. As for the mining industry, the regional 
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features are especially striking. The geological structure of the mines, the relative 
isolation of each mining region from the pre-reform era - all these make the Chinese 
mining industry demonstrate unique local features which is exactly what RSI attends 
to. 
 
 
2.1.3 The Sectoral System of Innovation 
 
Given sophisticated division of labour, sectoral differences have become increasingly 
obvious. In this epoch of globalization, firms belonging to the same sector learn from 
each other thereby create a Sectoral System of Innovation (SSI). Pavitt paved the way 
for creating such a framework, categorising three kinds of firms: (1) Supplier-
dominated firms. They can be found mainly in traditional sectors of manufacturing, 
agriculture, housing etc. They are generally small and weak in in-house R&D. Most 
innovations come from suppliers of equipment and materials; (2) Production-
intensive firms. Firms in this category tend to enlarge in order to utilise economies of 
scale. They produce a relatively high proportion of their own process technology. 
They are generally big; (3) Science- based firms. They are to be found in the chemical 
and electronic/electrical sectors. In both sectors, the main sources of technology are 
R&D activities, based on rapid development of the sciences in universities and 
elsewhere (Pavitt, 1984). A commonly accepted definition of SSI is: 
 
“a set of new and established products for specific uses and the set of agents carrying 
out markets and non-markets interactions for the creation, production and sale of 
those products” (Malerba, 2002, p.248). Malerba points out several basic elements in 
an SSI, they are agents, knowledge and learning processes, mechanisms of 
interaction both within and outside firms, processes of competition and selection 
(Ibid, p.250-251). He points out that the central concern of an SSI approach is overall 
dynamics in the population of firms active in a sector and is different from a 
technological system. In addition, the SSI perspective gets to grip with the 
geographical boundaries of innovative activities, which are taken as given in the NSI 
or LSI (Local System of Innovation) (Breschi & Malerba,1997). Geels adds user 
feedback to this system and turns it into a socio-technical system (Geels, 2004). His 
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theory makes this systematic approach more complete and the demand-side factors 
enable this system to evolve. Geels' also discusses the mechanism through which one 
system transfers to a new system. Normally, a system is relatively stable due to the 
inertia of the actors and various restraining forces. Path-dependence also plays a part 
because history matters. But it is always possible for radical innovation to enter the 
niche market. Disruptive innovation is a case in point. Generally disruptive 
technologies underperform established products in mainstream markets. But they 
have other features that a few fringes (a generally new) customers value (Christensen, 
1997). This kind of technology, will create a new set of criteria to evaluate different 
products. Lead users at the time this disruptive technology was put into the market 
tended to ignore or even treat it with contempt. But it will serve as the paradigm 
breaker because, although in its embryonic stage it was technologically inferior, 
during its maturity customer support empowered it to overthrow the current 
hegemonic technology. This is one way to transform the whole system, and it is 
conducive to illustrate that the instability of an SI might come from any direction. It 
might cause some tensions, mis-alignment, and instability in the system. This will 
finally cause the whole system to go through a transformation process (Geels, 2004). 
In general, the theory of SSI is similar to NSI or RSI. What makes it unique is its 
practical or empirical importance. 
 
 
A number of scholars have studied industrial competitiveness through the lens of SSI. 
In Malerba's book Sectoral Systems of Innovation: Concepts, Issues and Analyses of 
 
Six Major Sectors in Europe, he offers a rough definition: "a sector is a set of activities 
that are unified by some related product group for a given or emerging demand and 
that share some basic knowledge" (Malerba, 2004). The main advantages of using 
the SSI approach is that it can offer a better understanding of: the structure and 
boundaries of sectors; agents and their interaction; the learning and innovation 
process specific to a sector; types of sectoral transformation, and the factors at the 
base of the differential performance of firms and countries in a sector. (Malerba, 
2004). Some parts of the SSI framework overlap with NSI or RSI. If, for example, a 
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sector has a national dimension, it means that this sector's firms are country-specific 
and national institutions and environments are the main focusing device of this 
sectoral study. In some sectors, the locus of industrial leadership is at the level of the 
firm. The chemical industry is a case in point (Mowery & Nelson, 1999). Virtually all 
of today's leading firms in this sector were established many years ago. While in 
other industries technological leadership may reside at the national level, say, 
computer software and medical services, the rate of turnover among ‘dominant 
firms’ is very high but the shifting collection of dominant firms is composed mainly of 
those headquartered in the United States. These features are quite sector-specific. 
Only when you use the SSI approach to study innovation can these features be 
uncovered. In NSI or RSI studies they might be overwhelmed by other factual data. 
 
 
There are some other comments to add here. First, the duration and stability of a 
sector cannot compare with a country or region. A sector is sure to suffer fluctuation. 
In some cases, if this industry has started to decline nothing can reverse this trend. 
For countries, history also witnessed the vicissitudes of hegemons and the boom and 
bust of many economies, but there is always the possibility that a declining economy 
can recover and be revitalized. Second, NSI, RSI, and SSI can join forces on same 
innovative processes. The conclusion as to which SI exerts the larger impact can only 
be answered in an ad hoc fashion. Third, the boundary of a sector is obscure owing to 
the complicated relationship network between different industrial activities. To make 
matters worse, these relationships are constantly changing. To conclude, the three 
SIs all have strengths and weaknesses. They can complement each other. Adopting 
the philosophy of a System of Innovation is on a par with using an SI optic to observe 
all innovation phenomenon. The three approaches discussed above are not in 
conflict with each other, and it is not the case that one can only adopt one of them at 
any one time. SI is an open system, and any man-demarcated line is possible to 
create non-existent barriers. In any SI study, the three approaches will be 
unconsciously used together, although they might be used in an implicit way, as in 
the current research. 
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2.1.4 System of Innovation study in relation to China 
 
As a rapidly growing economy, China's economic structure is undergoing a radical 
change as is China's NSI. There are, unfortunately, not many studies of China's NSI. 
Lundvall and Gu have produced a small chapter regarding China's NSI, but do not 
discuss in detail NSI per se (Lundvall & Gu.,2006). In Asia's innovation systems in 
transition, Lundvall et al. define transition as: "a process where one constellation of 
institutions is turning into a different constellation of institutions" (Ibid). As for the 
implications relating to innovation, transition also: "reflects a change in the 
relationship between knowledge producers and knowledge users or the emergence 
of a new mode of innovation." (Ibid). Combining the SI approach with transition fully 
demonstrates the instability of an SI and the creative destruction nature of 
innovation. Furthermore: "the transition perspective challenges the idea that some 
Asian systems are to be seen as 'models' that can be used as benchmarks for copying 
by other developing countries" (Ibid, p.2). In the chapter on China, Lundvall and Gu 
mention policy learning. It is just like what Deng Xiaoping said groping the stone to 
cross the river. They also discuss triggering factors, sources of policy learning and 
learning ability, mechanisms of transformation, agencies and their networks, 
interest-augmentation versus interest-redistribution transformations, and deepening 
and broadening the knowledge base respectively. By and large, this chapter is a 
sketchy description of China's NSI albeit a stepping stone for future research. In 
addition, in a book edited by Parayil and D'Costa the Chinese innovation system is 
discussed a little (eds Parayil & D'Costa, 2009). They describe the transition of 
Chinese NSI as turning from a research institute-centred to an enterprise-centred 
one. While the industry-science linkage has improved in the past 20 years, 
enterprises in China have evolved from pure manufacturing units to real modern 
enterprises, though still relatively low in innovation capacity. A number of global 
giants choose to do R&D in China for the following reasons: ‘proximity to markets 
and production, utilise Chinese human capital and policy requirement'. These R&D 
activities conducted by multinational firms and the policies encouraging them have 
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elicited criticism. These policies are seen to be biased against domestic firms and it is 
unclear whether this has had a positive effect (Ibid). This partly answers the question 
why, following a sharp increase in R&D spending, Chinese firms are still weak in 
innovation. There is also an article discussing and comparing two Chinese NSIs at 
different stages (Liu & White, 2001). It addresses a fundamental weakness of 
previous NSI studies, namely the lack of system-level explanatory factors. It 
compares different features of the NSI in a command economy and one under 
economic transition. It focuses upon five activities in the SI and defines primary 
actors who undertake one of the five activities and secondary actors whose 
behaviours affect primary sectors and institutions which are a set of rules and 
practices. The authors then analysis the two Chinese NSIs. This research is significant 
since it identifies the transformations of NSI under economic transition. There have 
been more competitions among actors and more horizontal relationships among 
primary actors. Two changes which need to be noted are the change in the legitimate 
criterion for evaluating performance and the decentralization of decision-making 
over both resource allocation within the economy and the operational decisions of 
primary actors. There is also a study about the Chinese innovation network (Trupin & 
Jones, 1997). Trupin and Jones detect a sign that small firms have become more able 
to conduct innovation in frontier technology: "In China the dominance of large state-
owned enterprises in the industrial environment is now being challenged by a rapidly 
growing private sector…The Chinese government has also retreated from directly 
steering academic research” (Ibid,). In general, the relationships between different SI 
actors in China is becoming increasingly decentralised and market-driven. 
 
 
Apart from the study of NSI in China, some studies look at SSI in China. Lu and Feng 
(Lu & Feng, 2005) study the Chinese car industry's innovation performance by 
conducting case studies of three Chinese firms, arriving at the conclusion that only by 
engaging in indigenous innovation can China’s domestic car manufacturers compete 
globally. Expecting to co-operate with foreign firms and imitate their technologies is 
not an effective way to enhance Chinese firms’ technological 
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capability. Nolan and Zhang (2002) conducted case studies concerning Chinese 
aerospace and the oil and petrochemical industries and discussed the problems 
facing Chinese firms after China enters the WTO. In addition, OECD report Managing 
National Innovation Systems discusses some features of developing countries’ NSI. 
They have three similar features. First, the R&D intensity of these economies is 
relatively low, often below 1% of GDP. Second, these countries' innovative activities, 
as measured by an index of technological strength, also tend to be quite low 
compared to high-income economies. Third, the transfer and adoption of technology 
plays a large role in these countries (OECD, 1999). These features also apply to China. 
 
 
In short, studies of Chinese firms and innovation are rare and few of them adopt the 
SI approach. 
 
 
2.1.5 Summary of the System of Innovation approach 
 
I will use the System of Innovation framework to study innovation activities in the 
Chinese mining industry. Factors at national, regional, and sectoral levels will be 
considered in this research. A fundamental principle of the System of Innovation 
approach is to view innovation as the outcome of a system rather than of any 
individual actor. When researchers discuss innovation, in theory they should take all 
the relating contributors into consideration (although this is impossible). In practice, 
any researcher tends to choose the activities which they give most credit to. The aim 
of the research can largely determine the perspective the research adopts.4 This 
state of the art of this approach is still not developed enough to provide a firm 
conceptual foundation for some basic fundamental ideas (Edquist, 1997). This theory 
is still in its infant stage. It needs more theoretical and empirical contributions to 
become more workable. For example, some scholars argue that: "The innovation 
 
4 As I mainly care about technological innovation, another concept needs to be mentioned here, 
namely, the technological innovation system. “This is a set of networks of actors and institutions 
that jointly interact in a specific technological field and contribute to the generation, diffusion, 
and utilization of variants of a new technology and/or a new product”. (Markard and 
Truffer,2008, p.611) 
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systems approach, however, may be characterised as myopic with regard to the 
explanation of technological transitions...The systems perspective, in other words, is 
inward oriented and does not pay much attention to the system's environment" 
(Markard & Truffer, 2008, p.610). This could be partly solved by combining other 
approaches such as the innovation ecosystem which will be discussed later. Just as 
innovation itself is the outcome of a system, the theories will be adopted to explain 
how innovation forms a system too. As this research shows, the SI in question will 
become clearer. By doing this, a more solid foundation can be laid for SI theory. 
 
 
On the other hand, however, there are criticisms of this approach. It is worth 
reviewing this literature in the hope of bearing the flaws of the SI approach in mind. 
However, the criticism of the application of SI to policy-making will be introduced 
here. First of all, Chaminade and Edquist (2006) point out that the SI approach 
adopted by OECD actually only takes activities that can be regulated by the public 
sector into consideration. It fails to give due credit to activities which do not have 
direct links with policy tools. Rogge and Reichardt (2016) contend that not only does 
the System of Innovation expose obvious systemic features, but the relevant policies 
also constitute a system, requiring that the policy makers adopt a systemic 
perspective to view innovation policies as well. For instance, a policy designed to 
augment innovation should not only target the demand side. The supply side is also 
important. Chaminade et al (2012) point out that policies based on the SI approach 
more often than not end up being one-size-fits-all-policies rather than policies that 
take the specificities of the system into account. They argue that one of the reasons 
for this is that we know too little about how to identify and measure specific 
problems in the system (if it is at all possible), despite several fruitful attempts to 
define them (p1476). All these criticisms remind the researchers and policy-makers 
of the gap between theory and reality. 
 
 
 
2.2The Triple Helix (University-Industry-Government) 
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This theory is the analytical tool used for this research, so it will be reviewed first. It 
originated through developing a new knowledge production model which is called 
Mode 2 (See Gibbons et al., 1994). In this mode, not only academic institutes but a 
variety of organisations which do not participate in knowledge-production begin to 
carry out the task of producing knowledge. 
Mode 1 Mode 2 
  
Academic context Context of application 
  
Disciplinary Transdisciplinary 
  
Homogeneity Heterogeneity 
  
Autonomy Reflexivity/social accountability 
  
Traditional quality control (peer review) Novel quality control 
  
 
Figure1: Attributes of Mode 1 and Mode 2 knowledge-production 
 
Source: Hessels and Van Lente, 2008, p.741. 
 
 
 
 
According to Gibbons et al., “Mode 1 refers to a form of knowledge production—a 
complex of ideas methods, values, norms — that has grown up to control the 
diffusion of the Newtonian model to more and more fields of enquiry and ensure its 
compliance with what is considered sound science practice … For many, Mode 1 is 
identical with what is meant by science. Its cognitive and social norms determine 
what shall count as significant problems, who shall be allowed to practise science and 
what constitutes good sciences” (1994, p2-3). While, for Mode 2 knowledge-
production, some new practices were found. Gibbons et al (1994, p3-8) explain the 
attributes of Mode 2 in detail: 
 
1.Context of application, such knowledge is intended to be useful to someone in the 
 
industry or government; 2. Transdisciplinary. Knowledge produced by Mode 2 will 
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normally be beyond any single contributing discipline, and it might be the integration 
of several academic subjects; 3. Heterogeneity. It is heterogeneous in terms of the 
skills and experience people bring to it; 4. Social accountability and Reflexivity. It has 
been influenced by growing awareness of the variety of ways in which advances in 
science and technology can affect the public interest. Individuals engage in 
knowledge-production themselves and cannot function effectively without 
reflecting-trying to operate from the standpoint of-all the actors involved, and 5. 
Novel quality control. Quality is determined by a wider set of criteria which reflects 
the broadening social composition of the review system. ‘Good Science’ is no longer 
limited strictly to the judgements of disciplinary peers’. 
 
 
 
This mode extends the knowledge-production network whereas the role of 
universities in this process are downplayed. Partly as a reply to this mode, the Triple 
Helix approach was proposed. The Triple Helix5 (TH) model relocates universities at 
the centre of knowledge-production networks. In other words, the Triple Helix model 
regards the university as the core producer of useful knowledge and gives due credit 
to the contribution made by the university to the advancement of human knowledge. 
It: 
 
states that the university can play an enhanced role in innovation and increasingly 
 
knowledge-based societies. The underlying model is analytically different from the National 
 
System of Innovation approach, which considers the firm as having the leading role in 
 
innovation (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff,2000, p.109). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 The term ‘helix’ refers to a type of smooth space curve, i.e. a curve in three-dimensional space. 
The two main contributors to the Triple Helix model, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, neither explain 
why they choose this term nor provide a definition. In fact, this term was used due to the 
popularity of the double helix structure of DNA. They deem that the Triple Helix structure has the 
potential to bring change to the real world as opposed to the stability brought by the double 
helix structure. 
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At first, the Triple Helix refers to Academic-Industry-Government relations, then 
‘Academic’ was replaced by ‘University’. According to the two most renowned 
scholars of this area, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1996, p279): “the three dynamics 
can be distinguished: the economic dynamics of the market, the internal dynamics of 
knowledge production, and governance of the interface at different levels”. The two 
scholars also proposed that one implication of the Triple Helix model is the analysis 
of the binding forces among autonomous, yet tightly connected, institutional arenas 
(Ibid, p280). The reason for proposing a Triple Helix rather than a double helix is that: 
“While a co-evolution or a double helix can be stabilized relatively easily, a complex 
and potentially unstable system emerges when three dynamics interact…The Triple 
Helix model is sufficiently complex to accommodate various forms of chaotic 
behaviour in the resulting system” (Ibid, p281). 
 
 
 
The TH model depicts some trends worth considering :(1) "Universities and industry, 
up to now relatively separate and distinct institutional spheres, are each assuming 
tasks that were formerly largely the province of the other". (Etzkowitz & 
Leydesdorff,1997); (2) “The role of government in relation to these two spheres is 
changing in apparently contradictory directions. Governments are offering incentives, 
on the one hand, and pressing academic institutions, on the other, to go beyond 
performing the traditional functions of cultural memory, education and research, and 
make a more direct contribution to ‘wealth creation’” (Ibid.); (3) "In the old days, the 
transfer of knowledge produced by the university to its end-users took place through 
intermediate agents … Nowadays the university has become a direct producer of 
goods and services for end-users” (Ibid). 
 
 
 
Originally, the three components of this Triple Helix each had its own function which 
are wealth generation (industry), novelty production (academia), and public control 
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(government).6When they: “operate upon each other, mutual shaping in a co-
evolution along a particular trajectory is one possible outcome”. (Leydesdorff & 
Meyer, 2006, p.1441). 
 
 
 
 
There are different forms of Triple Helix relations. In 1998 and 2000, Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff published two papers in which they discuss some possible forms of Triple 
Helix. In the 1998 paper they identified three main forms of Triple Helix (Leydesdorff 
& Etzkowitz): 
 
In Triple Helix I the three spheres are defined institutionally (university, industry, and 
government). Interaction across otherwise defended boundaries is mediated by 
organisations such as industrial liaison, technology transfer, and contract offices. In Triple 
Helix II the helices are defined as different communication systems consisting of the 
operation of markets, technological innovations, and control at the interfaces. In Triple Helix 
III the institutional spheres of university, industry, and government, in addition to 
performing their traditional functions, each assume the roles of the others, with universities 
creating an industrial penumbra, or performing a quasi-governmental role as a regional or 
local innovation organiser. 
 
In their 2000 paper (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000), they elaborate three 
configurations of Triple Helix. In the first configuration: “the nation state 
encompasses academia and industry and directs the relations between them” (Ibid, 
p111). The second model consists of separate institutional spheres with strong 
borders dividing them and highly circumscribed relations among the spheres (Ibid). 
The third model: “is generating a knowledge infrastructure in terms of overlapping 
 
6 Leydesdorff (2006, p.23) mentions the: “three functions of the socio-economic system: (1) 
wealth generation and retention, (2) novelty production, and (3) control”. He does not give 
detailed definitions of these functions. In this research, the wealth generation function refers 
to production activities in relation to Karl Marx’s concept of the forces of production. ‘Novelty 
production’ refers to the exploratory work of knowledge- producers, the outcome of this work 
being the new understanding of the world. ‘Control’ refers to the norm-setting work of the 
authorities concerned. 
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institutional spheres, with each taking the role of the other and with hybrid 
organisations emerging at the interfaces” (Ibid). In fact, the reality is always more 
colourful than the theory. The different forms of Triple Helix will be discussed in 
greater detail in the case study chapter, and will be analysed combined with the 
cases I choose. These forms are reflections of wider socio-economic configurations 
and there is no optimum model, there is only a proper model for a specific socio-
economic context. 
 
 
 
The TH model helps scholars deepen their understanding of universities in the 
modern world. Universities shoulder a third mission in addition to teaching and 
research (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1998, p.203). Universities have been involved in 
all kinds of business activities and have made direct contributions to countless 
innovations. Etzkowitz dubs this new form of academic research 'entrepreneurial 
science'. Universities undertaking entrepreneurial science engage in economic 
development or, in other words, the `capitalisation of knowledge' (1998, p.824). It is 
necessary to mention here that there are heated debates about the function and 
nature of universities both in China and the West. A number of prominent scholars 
are strongly against the idea of encouraging academic staff in universities to engage 
in commercial activities. The defenders of the‘Ivory Tower’ stick to the doctrine 
that the sole aim of a university should be pushing mankind’s cognitive boundaries. 
They do not underestimate the significance of business achievements, but they draw 
a clear line between the academic community and industry. Whilst using the 
framework of the Triple Helix to organise this research, I adopt a neutral stance 
towards this debate. No normative judgement is made in this thesis about of 
Entrepreneurial Science. 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, as this model mainly focuses upon the functions undertaken by different 
organisations, the ‘nationality’ of these organisations will not be stressed. It could be 
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a useful tool to undertake a regional comparison study as it complements the 
National System of Innovation framework. In their 1998 paper, Leydesdorff and 
Etzkowitz contend that: “the Triple Helix is mainly a model for analysing innovation in 
a knowledge-based economy. This model accounts for the phenomenon of 
emergence, that is, it helps us to understand how the innovation system is based on 
expectations…More than a single explanation is expected because different 
perspectives are useful”. 
 
 
 
In this research, universities, industry, and government will be regarded as three core 
players in innovation activities, and the TH model will also be adopted as, compared 
to the System of Innovation theory, it can better incorporate the R&D of academic 
institutions. A complete SI study is almost impossible in practice. In most case studies, 
these three core players receive much attention and most scholars agree that a 
successful SI will be sure to include positive and efficient interactions between the 
three. According to Leydesdorff (2012, p.5): “the Triple Helix model enables us to 
consider empirically whether specific dynamics (e.g., synergies) among the three 
composing media7 emerge at national and/or regional levels”. 
 
 
 
There is also research discussing the role of firms, universities, and governments in 
the innovation process, some of which will be reviewed here. 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Firms and Innovation 
 
Firm as one helix in the Triple Helix model, the role it plays in innovation process 
ought to be shed some light. There are many masterpieces about firms, however, 
only two scholars’ works will be discussed here. 
 
7 In this context, the three media refer to power, truth, and money; Luhmann, 1995, quoted 
from Leydesdorff, 2012. 
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First of all, I will look at Penrose’s The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (2009). In this 
book, Penrose raises the question: ‘assuming that some firms can grow, what 
principles will then govern their growth, and how fast and how long they can grow’. 
Penrose answers this question from a resource-based point of view, defining 
‘resource’ as “the physical things a firm buys, leases or produces for its own uses… 
Services on the other hand are the contribution of resources can make to the 
productive operations of the firm”. She also points out that the services that the 
resource can render are the input of a firm’s production process. 
 
 
 
The relationship of Penrose’s work with innovation consists in the observation that a 
firm’s technological capability influences its growth, and that, with the enhancement 
of this capability, firms grow. According to her, one important source of the incentive 
to conduct innovation in a firm are under-utilised productive services. Each firm 
produces unique resources and related services. The impulse to make the best use of 
under-utilised resources and services provides the impetus for a firm to grow. 
Moreover, the accumulation of knowledge gives rise to the discovery of these under-
utilised resources and services (Lu, 2000). Thus, innovation is not only closely linked 
with the growth of a firm, but in fact becomes the prelude for the growth of a firm. 
The more innovative this firm becomes, the more knowledge of how to find 
redundant resources this firm can acquire, the faster this firm grows. In short, the 
outcome of a firm’s innovation process determines its future. 
 
 
 
Chandler’s three monographs followed that of Penrose. In 1962, he published 
 
Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of Industrial Enterprises. In this 
monograph, Chandler concludes that the structure of big business enterprises follows 
a strategy. He defines ‘strategy’ as an overall decision about goals and the allocation 
of resources to attain them. Meanwhile, technological innovation might create needs 
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and opportunities which can alter the strategy of the business. Finally, this process 
will end with a decentralised, multipurpose divisional structure at the top and a 
number of autonomous departments at the bottom. The top managers are in charge 
of co-ordinating, approving, and planning, mainly making long-term and macro 
decisions. The autonomous departments are established for manufacturing, selling, 
purchasing, and research functions. 
 
 
 
The second book which will be discussed here is The Visible Hand: The Managerial 
Revolution in American Business (Chandler, 1977). In this book, Chandler divides 
American business history into two separate phases; pre-1850 and post-1850. He 
contends that the first phase represents the market economy—one characterised by 
what economists call ‘perfect competition’. The second phase, continuing into the 
present, represents what he calls ‘managerial capitalism’. A managerial revolution 
occurred around 1850, which marked the watershed of American business history. 
The significance of this dramatic change is the transfer of the operation of a company 
from the owner or partners to a full-time salaried managerial group. The pioneer 
industry in this revolution is the first truly modern enterprise, the railways. Railway 
companies were the first organisations to have multiple, geographically-dispersed 
units whose operations needed to be co-ordinated. Prior to the railways, market 
mechanisms governed and guided the production process. Once the railway 
companies were established, skilled management took over that capacity. This kind 
of administrative co-ordination is the so-called ‘visible hand’. 
 
 
 
The latest research conducted by Chandler that will be introduced here is Scale and 
Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Chandler,1990). Here, Chandler 
extends his research field to Europe with a comparative study of the growth of 
modern business enterprises in the US, the UK, and Germany. He vividly describes 
the evolution of big business from the late 19th century to the 1930s. According to 
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Chandler, the UK suffered from the weakness of personal capitalism, its business 
system remained under the control of founding families focusing upon personal 
interest rather than the long-term development of the business. While for Germany, 
Chandler argues that it developed a system of co-operative management in which 
cartels dampened competitive pressure. The American system is more competitive 
than that of Germany, although against all odds, the German system proved its 
efficiency and flexibility in developing modern economies of scale and scope. One 
important concept Chandler raises is three-pronged investment, which includes 
investing in plants large enough to realise economies of scale, investing in the 
distribution networks necessary to inputs and disposal of outputs, and investing in 
management at different levels. The lack of three-pronged investment explains why 
Britain was overtaken by America. 
 
 
 
To sum up, Chandler’s work is a fascinating study of organisational innovation, which 
has close links with technological innovation. By depicting the interactive history of 
these two kinds of innovation, Chandler offers a new perspective on innovation. One 
argument which illuminates the current research is that technological innovation 
only creates a potential to increase productivity. It is only a necessary condition for 
the realisation of economic significance, and it is the organisational innovation that 
helps society to benefit from new technologies. He further contends that 
organisational innovation will occur only when the technological advancement which 
can bring economy of speed occurs first, as technological advancement is a challenge 
for the current structure of the firm and entails a radical managerial revolution. 
Chandler ingeniously bridges organisational and technological innovation. Echoing 
Penrose’s work, Chandler proposes that a firm’s organisational structure could be its 
core capability and has played a historic role in the growth of most successful firms. 
This research focuses upon technological innovation in China. In a wider sense, the 
structure of a System of Innovation is essential to bringing out the best of the 
resources and services this system can take advantage of. This will be analysed 
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through Chandler’s lens. Meanwhile, Chandler states in another work, Big Business 
and the Wealth of Nations, that: “Large industrial enterprises have thus been a 
substantial part of this economic achievement mainly through the commercialization 
of new products and new processes which embodied innovating technologies’ 
(Chandler et al. eds,1997, p5-6). Chandler points out that: ‘manufacturing enterprises, 
especially those in capital-intensive and knowledge-intensive industries, have 
historically accounted for most of the R&D which are essential to continuing 
technological innovation in the twentieth century’ (Ibid, p.24). The lesson that can be 
drawn is that innovation studies should focus upon large enterprises as they are the 
prime contributors to innovation. This conclusion echoes Penrose’s theory, that is, 
the growth of a firm and the enhancement of its technological capability are two 
sides of the same coin. This thesis will test this conclusion in the Chinese context. 
 
 
 
A successful Chinese innovation narrative is Huawei, a telecom equipment, software, 
and services company, based in Shenzhen, a city which borders Hong Kong. It now: 
“stands out among Chinese companies for its success in penetrating the world’s most 
competitive high technology markets in the high-income countries” (Nolan, 2012). In 
2012 Huawei overtook Sweden’s Ericsson to become the world’s largest telecoms 
equipment-maker8. Initially, Huawei was an agent for simple imported PBX (private 
branch exchange) equipment. It quickly began to manufacture PBX equipment itself. 
Faced with the near monopoly established by the global giants among urban 
customers, Huawei focused upon the decentralised rural market, selling mainly to 
small local State-Owned Enterprises(SOE) and rural collective enterprises. This ‘rural-
encircling central cities’ strategy was also used by ZTE and 200 other firms in the 
same field (Fan & Gao,2016). Once it had consolidated its position in its rural ‘base 
areas’, it began to compete in urban markets (Ibid). Finally, with the assistance of 
China Development Bank, Huawei started its walking out process and has achieved 
great success. In 2015 Huawei had a revenue of US$60,839 million. Its business 
 
8http://www.economist.com/node/21559922 viewed on 2017-3-7. 
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became quite internationalised, while Chinese domestic revenue took only 42.4% of 
its entire revenue. In the same year, Huawei invested 15.1% of its revenue in R&D, 
having a R&D talent pool of 79,000 employees.9 According to the EU R&D 
Scoreboard 2016, Huawei ranked 8th of the world in terms of R&D investment. 
 
     R&D 1 R&D 3 
    R&D year years 
   Industrial sector 2015/16 growth growth 
World    (€  (CAGR-3y, % 
rank Name Country (ICB-3D) million) (%) ) 
       
1 VOLKSWAGEN Germany Automobiles & Parts 13,612.0 3.8 12.7 
 SAMSUNG  Electronic &    
2 ELECTRONICS South Korea Electrical equipment 12,527.9 -1.7 10.7 
   Technology Hardware    
3 INTEL US & Equipment 11,139.9 5.1 6.1 
   Software & Computer    
4 ALPHABET US Services 11,053.6 22.4 22.2 
   Software & Computer    
5 MICROSOFT US Services 11,011.3 -0.5 4.8 
   Pharmaceuticals &    
6 NOVARTIS Switzerland Biotechnology 9,001.6 -9.5 1.8 
   Pharmaceuticals &    
7 ROCHE Switzerland Biotechnology 8,640.0 4.7 3.3 
 HUAWEI      
 INVESTMENT  Technology Hardware    
8 & HOLDING CO China & Equipment 8,357.9 46.1 26.3 
 
Table5: Top Eight companies in The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard 2016 
 
Source：http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/10180/1030082/World 2500 
 
companies ranked by RD. 
 
 
 
9http://www-file.huawei.com/~/media/CORPORATE/PDF/annual-
report/AnnualReport2015_en.p df?la=zh viewed on 2017-3-7. 
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Huawei’s experience is invaluable. During its early years, as a private company 
without any government support, Huawei’s survival largely depended upon how well 
it served its customers. Huawei tried to be a commercial agent for foreign products, 
but without productive capacity and technological capability it was unable to keep its 
customers satisfied. Most of its founders used to be technicians or engineers, 
choosing to establish an in-house R&D facility for the mere survival of Huawei 
(Zhang,2009). There were companies whose founders had similar backgrounds, but 
what enabled Huawei to prevail over its competitors is that Huawei’s R&D directly 
linked with the market. Huawei’s technological strength was utilised as a powerful 
tool to meet its customers’ requirements. After going through the toughest years, 
Huawei did not hide its ambition of becoming the best. In 1997, it launched a re-
engineering movement which shifted Huawei from a technology-based competition, 
to a customer-based approach. This involved a comprehensive transformation of 
Huawei’s culture. This process was so painful that Ren Zhengfei, Huawei’ founder, 
likened it to: “cutting our feet to fit American shoes” (Nolan, 2012). During this re-
engineering, the technology giant IBM introduced the process of Integrated Product 
Development (IPD) which instilled: “the idea of building cross-functional teams 
focused on particular customers…Teams from across functions now worked 
together on specific projects, coming from all parts of the company, including 
marketing and sales” (Ibid). This re-engineering helped Huawei realise the potential 
of its technological capability and was thus essential to its commercial success 
thereafter. “The IPD approach introduced by IBM tightly linked the process of 
product development from one end of the supply chain to the other. The 
transformation to a system in which the whole process of product development was 
geared to the specific needs of each customer was revolutionary in the Chinese 
business system” (Ibid). In a nutshell, Huawei’s success in technology comes from its 
active participation in market competition, by focusing upon serving its customers to 
survive, while conducting R&D activities became a prerequisite. Being an ICT 
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equipment manufacturer, improving its technical strength and offering a diversity of 
products to meet customers’ needs have become the Huawei ideology. Huawei is 
very good at combining its technological strength with market signals. It never does 
research without market prospects. The IPD introduced by IBM brought pioneer 
management experience to Huawei and further consolidated Huawei’s market-
technology alliance. The most useful lesson we can learn from Huawei is that 
technological innovation will only be a useful tool when the company’s survival 
hinges on its customer feedback vis-à-vis product quality. A firm’s motivation to 
engage in R&D is not endogenous, but comes from fierce market competition. 
Directly facing its customers, gleaning information from the market, marks the 
starting point of most successful innovation narratives. Failed attempt to improve 
technological capability occurring in other Chinese industries might be attributed to 
ignorance of market demands rather than the lack of funding or resolution. 
Technological innovation is led by both the trajectory of technology and customer 
demand. 
 
 
 
In conclusion, as the subject of innovation, the choices made by firms largely 
determine the vision of innovation, and the role firms play in the innovation process 
will be one of the research targets of this thesis. Innovation entails commercialisation, 
and firms are the major actors in this process. Universities and governments can 
directly participate but their roles are only secondary. As one of the three institutions 
of the Triple Helix model, firms might be the only institution that can perform all 
three functions, Chandler shows that large enterprises are the main driving force for 
most influential innovations. As an innovation study, the current research will also 
attach more importance to the contribution of firms. 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Universities and Innovation 
 
Etzkowitz undertook a study of the evolution through which American universities 
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began to participate in commercial activities. He proposes that (Etzkowitz, 1989), 
after the Second World War, the federal government invested a great deal to 
support American universities’ basic research activities. “The lack of significant 
growth in research funding and the effects of inflation made grants increasingly more 
difficult to obtain during the 1970s and early 1980s” (Ibid, p.16). Under such 
circumstances, American universities took advantage of their knowledge base, 
augmented via federal support, to make university-industry relations salient once 
more. A number of universities established links with financial or commercial bodies, 
such as MIT, Columbia, and Harvard. This trend aroused debate over whether this is a 
good sign for the development of science. Etzkowitz argues that: “changes in the 
material conditions of scientific work, along with its particular location in the 
university, are producing changes in the ways scientists and various support 
personnel think science should be done” (Ibid, p.26). He also predicts that a new 
norm about how science should be prosecuted is emerging. 
 
 
 
Etzkowitz’s book MIT and the Rise of Entrepreneurial Science (2003) uses MIT as an 
example to depict the rising process of entrepreneurial universities. He describes 
how MIT successfully established links with industry and how it has assumed a role 
whose scope surpasses the notion of the ivory tower. He also introduces the notion 
of how this model spread to the whole country. He credits MIT with a number of 
innovations in university governance, such as the ‘one day a week’ consulting rule, 
the establishment of a contracts and grants office. Using the Triple Helix model as a 
frame, Etzkowitz argues that universities play an increasing role in economic 
development, and this kind of university-industry relationship can free university 
from relying upon government funding. The conclusion of this book will be tested by 
this research and the university-industry relationship will be used as a powerful 
explanatory factor to answer the research question. 
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While universities undertake more functions, science also takes place in many 
different areas outside universities and research institutes, and is funded by a range 
of different sources (Royal Society, 2011). These two phenomena occur 
simultaneously, as predicted by the Triple Helix model. 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Governments and Innovation 
 
Two works discussing American government and innovation will now be introduced. 
A commonly accepted image of American government is that it adopts a philosophy 
of laissez-faire, in fact it has initiated a number of S&T projects. 
 
 
 
Block (2008) proposes that Europe and America have created a Developmental 
Network State (DNS), “The main focus of the DNS is to help firms develop product 
and process innovations that do not yet exist, such as new software applications, 
new biotech medications, or new medical instruments” (Ibid, p.172). “The difference 
is that most European nations had stronger twentieth century traditions of active 
state engagement in the management of the civilian economy than the Unites 
States” (Ibid. p.174). Block uses one particular office in the Pentagon—the Advanced 
Projects Research Agency (ARPA), as an example to illustrate how American 
government acts as a hidden developmental state. ARPA’s Information Processing 
Techniques Office (IPTO) was chosen as it played a central role in the advance of 
computer technology in the 1960s and 1970s. More specifically, the IPTO provided 
the resources to create computer science departments at major universities and 
funded a series of research project that successfully pushed forward advances in the 
human-computer interface. According to Block, many of the technologies that were 
ultimately incorporated into the personal computer were developed by ARPA-funded 
researchers. In that article Block also presents many other examples to understand 
the huge impact the American state has had on American S&T affairs. 
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Linda Weiss’s work is also illuminating (2014). Over the past 60 years, all the major 
advanced industries have been pioneered in the US, but: “where does this capacity 
for transformative innovation come from? Why the United States?” (Ibid. p.3). Weiss 
looks for the answer in the relationship between high technology, national security, 
and political culture. She provides three arguments: (1) The national security state 
(NSS) is a technology enterprise. The ‘national security state’ refers to: ‘a particular 
cluster of federal agencies that collaborate closely with private actors in pursuit of 
security related objectives’. In the name of ensuring national security, successive 
American governments have engaged in a great many activities which aimed at 
securing American technological supremacy. Governments encourage the R&D in 
military- related projects and the proliferation of these projects’ outcomes to the 
civilian sector; (2)Geopolitics and related threat perceptions have been the original 
catalyst for NSS formation and its evolution as an innovation engine, and (3) Weiss 
argues that: “American anti-statism in the political arena helps to channel 
government involvement (the commercial activism of the national security agencies) 
toward a preference for hybrid organisational forms that merge public and private 
resources in distinctive and often intricate ways” (Ibid,p7). 
 
 
 
Gregg undertook a chronological study of the role of successive American 
governments in the development of the semi-conductor industry (Gregg, 2013). His 
conclusion is that: “rather than pursing a single centralised semiconductor industrial 
policy, multiple entities of the U.S. Government have played nuanced and flexible 
roles in supporting the competitiveness of the U.S. semiconductor industry” (Ibid, 
p121). Gregg discusses the evolution of industrial policy in different periods of 
society. This study depicts an interesting phenomenon, namely, the government’s 
role in supporting economic development might change in different developmental 
stages of a country and an industry. 
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In a nutshell, government or, in a wider sense, the state can do a lot to facilitate the 
creation and diffusion of innovation, and they have done so again and again, even 
the most liberal American government is no exception. However, in a less visible or 
more indirect way, sufficient evidence has proved that the American government (or, 
in Block’s words, a hidden American developmental state), has attempted to wield its 
influence in the industrial and academic communities. Besides, studies of the 
government’s role in the Triple Helix demonstrate the different interactive forms 
between the three helices, which will be further supported in the case study 
component of this research. 
 
 
 
2.2.4 Conclusion of The Triple Helix 
 
After reviewing the extant literature about the Triple Helix and combined with the 
case study of this research, I would like to distinguish two kinds of Triple Helix model, 
one institutional, the other functional. I am indebted to Leydesdorff and Meyer 
(2006). They point out the functions of university, industry, and government in the 
Triple Helix are novelty production, wealth generation, and public control 
respectively. The first three can be regarded as three kinds of institutions, therefore 
we can dub the university-industry-government Triple Helix as an institutional 
example. The question is that, in reality, in some successful innovation stories one or 
even two helices may be missing. For instance, universities have little direct impact 
on equipment manufacture. Under such circumstances, the functional Triple Helix 
works. This focuses upon the three functions of novelty production, wealth 
generation, and public control. As long as these functions can be performed, a 
complete Triple Helix interaction emerges. Sometimes the university as an institution 
is missing, sometimes the government as an institution is missing, but their missions 
have been shouldered by others, which means a functional Triple Helix has been 
constructed. 
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My case studies demonstrate that the second Triple Helix grasps the essence of this 
model. One explanation as to why the institutional Triple Helix is more popular is that: 
“Unlike institutions, functions are not observable without taking a reflexive turn, that 
is, without some specification of selection environments in terms of expectations” 
(Leydesdorff & Meyer,2006, p.1442). Turning the focus from formal institutions to 
necessary functions for the completion of innovations can help a researcher better 
understand the nature of an innovation process. 
 
 
In conclusion, the form of a Triple Helix model varies in different countries, industries, 
and different parts of the value chain. Its nature, however, remains unchanged. All 
Triple Helix models describe how useful knowledge is produced after the performing 
of the three core functions, i.e. novelty production, wealth generation, and public 
control. For proponents of the Triple Helix, these three functions, rather than the real 
performers of these functions, are the quintessence of an innovation action. 
Meanwhile, these three functions are also three dimensions of most, if not all, 
innovation processes. This model can help researchers understand a specific 
innovation process from three different angles provided by the three dimensions. 
What is being created and how it is being created determines the co-ordinate of a 
Triple Helix at each of the three dimensions. Thus, this model is also useful for 
conducting comparison studies between different innovations. Researchers can 
create a three-dimensional co-ordinate system consisting of novelty production, 
wealth generation, and public control, and by locating innovations in this system 
something valuable can be found. One innovation might contain more wealth 
generation elements, another innovation might contain more novelty production 
elements. The structure of the case study in this research will be framed according to 
the idea of the Triple Helix. The two kinds of Triple Helix will also be demonstrated in 
greater detail. 
 
 
Bearing this in mind reminds a researcher that innovations are either being done by  
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at least these three bodies or cannot be completed by performing three functions. 
Meanwhile, identifying which kind of Triple Helix Chinese TH relations belong to is 
also an important task, helping to locate problems thus leading to future progress. 
 
 
 
2.3 The Innovation Ecosystem 
 
“An ecosystem is a community of living organisms in conjunction with the non-living 
components of their environment (things like air, water and mineral soil), interacting 
as a system” (Wikipedia, 2016). Scholars use this concept in innovation studies in 
order to help better understand the dynamic nature of innovation. Adner (2006) 
describes innovation ecosystems as: "the collaborative arrangements through which 
firms combine their individual offerings into a coherent, customer-facing solution" (p. 
98). 
 
 
Innovation is a socio-economic phenomenon features with uncertainty and breaking 
the equilibrium. The general image of a system, however, is stable unlike the real-life 
innovation process. Jucevicius and Grumadaite argue that: "The literature on 
'Systems of Innovation' has been largely dominated by the institutional list 
approaches with emphasis on the structural aspects of the innovation systems" 
(2014, p.125). "However, it is of limited value for achieving a truly functioning 
innovation system because it fails to take into account its complex social dynamics" 
(Ibid). 
 
 
The advantages of the innovation ecosystem's in portraying a dynamic picture of 
innovation are manifold. First of all, innovation ecosystems focus upon the function 
of the system rather than the component. For instance, Fransman (2010) analyses 
the three layers of an ICT ecosystem which are intra-firm, interfirm, and institutional 
environment. He stresses the production, competition, and co-operative functions 
during knowledge-production activities. Moreover, more importance is attributed to 
the environments of innovation. Stanford University's Innovation Ecosystem Network 
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defines an innovation ecosystem as: "the inter-organizational, political, economic, 
environmental, and technological systems through which a milieu conducive to 
business growth is catalyzed, sustained, and supported" (Phlinkiene & Maciulis, 2014, 
p366). This definition stresses the relative independence of the innovation 
environment as it is through the milieu that an innovation ecosystem realises its 
function of facilitating innovation. 
 
 
The flaws of this theory are also discussed by scholars. Mokyr (2002) points out that 
the biological analogy is based on experience and intuition, a solid micro theoretical 
foundation is absent, in fact, the evolution of the ecology is different from 
evolutionary mechanisms of human knowledge and technology. Papaioannou et al. 
2009) argue that the eco-thinking does not adequately capture the distinction 
between innovation events and structures while the environment of knowledge and 
innovation includes complex social interrelations and networks which are historically 
developed. This implies that it does not involve a functional process of adaptation 
but an uneven and contradictory process of both co-operative and conflicting 
relations generated by the separations of the social division of labour. Just as 
Fransman (2010, preface, p17) points out: 
 
Ultimately it is the creative leap of the human mind – as new associations, inferences and 
connexions are made – that constitutes a rupture from the past and causes movement in 
the socio-economic ecosystem. But this creative leap does not have a counterpart in the 
biological or physical worlds. It cannot be equated with the mutations and chaotic non-
linear interactions that drive change in the natural world, even though there may be some 
similarities in their systemic consequences. The human act of creation is not a mutation but 
a regular part of the functioning of the human mind. 
 
 
In summary, systems of innovation, Triple Helix, and innovation ecosystems adopt 
different optics to view innovation. They have their own advantages and 
disadvantages, and this research is indebted to all of them. 
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2.4 The Mining industry 
 
Unlike the common image of mining as a sunset industry, in a project undertaken by 
the Brookings Institute metal ore mining is considered to be an advanced industry 
(Muro et al, 2015). This categorisation is based on two criteria: 1. an industry's R&D 
spending per worker must fall in the 80th percentile of industries or higher, 
exceeding $450 per worker, and 2. the share of workers in an industry whose 
occupations require a high degree of STEM knowledge must also be above the 
national average, or 21% of all workers (Ibid, p.2). The American story at least proves 
the technology intensity of mining. This is not an industry which pays little attention 
to technological advancement. According to the EU R&D Scoreboard, 11 mining 
companies’ R&D investments were ranked the top 2,500 in the world: 
 
World   R&D 15/16(€  R&D 1 year 
rank Name Country million)  growth (%) 
      
      
270 VALE Brazil 438.1  -35.0 
      
896 RIO TINTO UK 95.5  -7.1 
      
1065 ANGLO-AMERICAN UK 76.2  -17.8 
      
1365 BOLIDEN Sweden 54.7  27.0 
      
1434 ZIJIN MINING China 50.7  75.1 
      
1599 DOWA Japan 42.6  5.2 
      
1851 LKAB Sweden 34.6  -26.7 
      
1890 JOY GLOBAL US 33.3  -10.8 
      
1972 TECK RESOURCES Canada 31.2  135.0 
      
2232 HUNAN GOLD China 25.5  10.9 
      
2465 SHANDONG GOLD MINING China 21.9  -7.5 
       
Table6: Mining companies on The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard 2016. 
 
Source：http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/10180/1030082/World 2500 
 
companies ranked by R&D. 
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Mining is mainly about extracting natural resources. Hence many journal papers and 
monographs have discussed the abundance of natural resources together with 
economic growth. Some scholars arrive at the conclusion that natural resource 
abundant countries have experienced slow economic growth and dub this 
phenomenon ‘resource curse’. Gylfason et al, argue that a productive low-skill 
intensive primary sector causes currency to appreciate in real terms thus hampering 
the development of a high-skill-intensive secondary sector thereby reducing growth. 
Moreover, the volatility of the primary sector generates real-exchange-rate 
uncertainty and may thus reduce investment and learning in the secondary sector 
(1999). Other scholars note that resource abundant countries tended to be high-
price economies and that, partly as a consequence, these countries tend to miss out 
on export-led growth (Sachs & Warner, 2001). This point of view, however, is far 
from reaching a consensus among researchers. In a book edited by Lederman and 
Maloney, a group of scholars attack the methodology adopted by previous scholars 
and point out that natural resource is neither a curse nor a destiny. Some natural 
resource-rich countries have become highly developed, such as the USA, Canada, 
Australia, and Nordic countries. Whether countries can take advantage of their 
natural resource endowments hinges on when the natural resources were found, 
whether the education level and infrastructure level is high enough to grasp the 
opportunities (eds Lederman & Maloney, 2007). If the country possesses enough 
human capital, natural resources can be an impetus to the economy. From the 
perspective of SI, if the country's NSI adds more value to the extracted natural 
resources and facilitates their introduction into the innovation process, resources can 
be a blessing. Otherwise, the country can only export the extracted resources and is 
unable to utilise them in manufacturing final products. In this scenario, resources 
become a curse. 
 
 
Mining also has several clear-cut stages, including broad geographical surveys, 
regional and detailed exploration, detailed orebody delineation and evaluation, mine 
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development, plant construction, as well as exploitation (Bosson & Varon, 1977). Due 
to the strategical significance of the mining industry, major issues are seldom purely 
economic but usually political economy issues. As the reserves in developed 
countries are depleted, giant multinational mining companies are exploring new 
mining fields in developing countries, thus the question of property arises. The highly 
unequal distribution only makes the matter worse. Co-operation between developing 
countries with multinational companies are critical. 
 
 
Mining is cross-influenced by NSI and SSI. Innovation. Not too many innovation 
studies have been done in this area. This research could help to fill the gap. This 
industry is also heavily influenced by policy, especially in developing countries. In 
developed countries, mining firms tend to be privately owned while in developing 
countries SOEs are the main players (Mikesell & Whitney, 1987). Different ownership 
influences firms’ business tactics. Meanwhile, as the topic of sustainable 
development is under discussion, the mining industry will bear the brunt because it is 
considered to be the main environmental polluter. All these factors call for a study of 
mining from a fresh angle and literature of this sphere is lacking. 
 
 
When it comes to the Chinese coal mining industry, Nolan studied the Shenhua 
Company (2001a). Shenhua was established to take advantage of Shenfu Dongsheng 
coalfield and is 100% owned by the state. The reserves in this coalfield are large and 
the quality of the coal is high. Nolan discusses the development of the company, such 
as transport problems, finance barriers, and labour productivity. This research is a 
case study for an important coal company in China but it did not touch on innovation. 
Rui also conducted a study of the Chinese mining industry. It examines: 
 
 
how the three parallel challenges from development, transition and globalisation 
determine that reform must be handled cautiously experimentally innovatively and in a 
balanced way, with the state playing a significant and irreplaceable role (Rui,2005). 
 
She uses the development of Township and Village Enterprises, Jixin Mining Bureau,  
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and Shenhua Group to illustrate the gradualist philosophy that underpins Chinese 
reforms. Neither of the two studies, however, choose technological innovation as 
their main target. They discuss industrial policy and the development strategy of the 
mining industry, their analysis is at the macro level. My research is a micro or meso-
level study. I specifically point out that innovation is the key to the industry's 
development, and future industrial policy will give due credit to innovation. Rui, et al 
also discuss the policy of making coal-power bases in China (Rui, Morse & He, 2010). 
The key arguments of their report are that, first, the coal industry faces severe 
challenges despite its impressive restructuring. Second, integrating coal and power 
businesses at key sites is one of the most significant reforms. Finally, the three 
authors predict that coal power integration reform is not likely to bring dramatic 
change in the near future, but it might alter the course of this industry in a 10-year 
time frame (Ibid, p.4). 
 
 
Nolan and Rui (2004) researched the period after China entered the WTO, focusing 
upon how the Chinese government should use industrial policy to support the 
development of its economy. Their paper uses the coal industry and Shenhua as 
examples. It argues the mainstream opinion that it is the market mechanism rather 
than industrial policy that should be regarded as the best way to guide a country’s 
economy. In fact, for China as a developing country, some well-designed industrial 
policy is needed, and Shenhua is the best example to illustrate what a huge impact 
these policies could have on a company’s growth process. It mentions the national 
support for Shenhua is helpful in providing funding for equipment and technology 
purchasing, a theme which is directly related to the current research. 
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3 Methodology 
 
This research is conducted mainly by using qualitative methods. 
 
 
 
3.1 Case Studies 
 
Coal mining, non-ferrous metal mining, and mining equipment manufacture are 
selected as the themes of the case studies. According to Gerring, a case study is an: 
"intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of 
(similar) units. A unit connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon—e.g., a nation-
state, revolution, political party, election, or person—observed at a single point in 
time or over some delimited period of time" (2004, p342). These two branches of the 
Chinese mining industry help me to detect and discover the incarnation of Chinese 
NSI at a much lower level. Also, Gerring describes several merits of conducting case 
studies, some of which are relevant to this research. For example, he states that: (1) 
inferences are descriptive rather than causal, and I intend to acquire knowledge 
about Chinese NSI, which is a typical descriptive inference; (2) insights into causal 
mechanisms are more important than causal effects. I am more interested in learning 
why Chinese firms are not innovative enough; I am not so interested in their 
innovative performance, and (3) when the strategy of research is exploratory rather 
than confirmatory. Few people have done research similar to mine and references to 
my research question are far from reaching a unanimous conclusion. Although I 
would like to know a proposition prized more in breadth (about the whole NSI of 
China), it is impossible for PhD research. So in my research, depth is given more 
credit. Based on the foregoing, case studies seem more apposite. 
 
 
 
 
This study covers the different levels of analysis of NSI described by the OECD report 
(OECD,1999). First, the micro level is considered, w ith a: "focus on the internal 
capabilities of the firm and on the links surrounding one or a few firms" (Ibid,24). 
Then the meso level, which: “examines knowledge links among interacting firms with 
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common characteristics, using three main clustering approaches: sectoral spatial and 
 
functional” (Ibid, p.24). Finally, the macro level, which: "uses two approaches: macro-
clustering and functional analysis of knowledge flows" (Ibid, p.24). I combine the 
three levels of analysis to conduct my research but pay differing attention to each of 
the three. 
 
 
3.2 In-depth interview 
 
Innovations are collective outcomes. A great number of people participate in this 
process, making their own contributions, though varying in degrees. Thus, I 
conducted interviews with R&D personnel, engineers working on the production line, 
managers, workers, research staff in universities or public laboratories, consumers of 
the products, as well as equipment suppliers. I also interviewed science policy-
makers. All of them play unique and indispensable roles in the whole System of 
Innovation. A better SI should be able to provide platforms for these people to 
enhance and smooth their communications, thereby facilitating the flow of 
knowledge within the system. Innovation is the creation of knowledge, and entails 
collective learning, hence the System of Innovation-building should include 
infrastructure building to exchange and diffuse knowledge. By interviewing the 
people involved, I can gain precious knowledge about the SI in operation. 
 
 
With respect to R&D personnel, I asked them to describe their working details, their 
main tasks, whether they have daily contact with the machine users and information 
about the market survey, and whether their technical solutions to the problems 
facing the firm are praised or ignored. Engineers, on the other hand, offer technical 
services. Compared with R&D personnel, they are more directly linked with practical 
work, while R&D personnel are closer to the theoretical work and do not usually 
attend production or go to the factories. I would like to know whom they most often 
turn to for help when they have problems with machines, how they view their 
relationship with R&D personnel and the importance of having in-house R&D, 
whether the engineers care about the complaints and the needs of workers, and 
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whether workers' feedback is an important source of improvement. 
 
 
 
Regarding research staff, I asked them to make comments on their links with industry. 
For example, do they think this is a main funding source? Do they think their co-
ordination with industry is a distraction from their own research or could it increase 
mutual interests? Do they think the basic research they are engaged in can be helpful 
to industry, and if so how? The above three groups of people can be subsumed into 
higher status categories in innovation, in that they tend to be better educated than 
other players. Their view of themselves and their interactions can set the tone for the 
whole system, as it is they who create most knowledge in the system. 
 
 
Workers, meanwhile, are the direct users of any machines and the direct benefactors 
of technological innovation. In the Japanese production model, even these ordinary 
workers are regarded as an important source of innovation. Indeed, some scholars 
argue that this is the very reason why Japan overtook America and Europe after the 
Second World War (Lazonick, 1990). Thus, I visited several factories to witness their 
status and production organisation, and also to consult the workers about their 
understanding of their positions in the firm and their influence on managerial and 
technical staff. In innovation activities, workers constitute most of the population but 
their status is often looked down upon. In some cases, they are treated as fungible 
components. But in other cases, they not only enjoy high social status but also 
actively participate in innovation. My prime concerns are whether the two 
contrasting situations exist in China and what are the possible mechanisms by which 
they influence innovation outcomes. 
 
 
Regarding managers, it should to be noted that they seldom directly participate in 
technological innovation (while they are responsible for most organisational 
innovations), but their governance skills always serve as the catalyst of innovation. 
Without support from the top, be it financial or institutional, innovators do not have 
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sufficient energy to propel innovation. These managers make a firm's strategic 
decisions, and their resolution of problems will determine the firm's development 
trajectory. As innovation will always be accompanied by risk and uncertainty, many 
managers might regard it as the last resort or may not even list innovation in their 
toolkit. In history, only those firms whose managers have strategic intent have 
achieved great success. The strategy is not to copy competitors or reduce production 
costs. The winners ask what must be done differently and planners ask how next year 
be different (Hamel & Prahalad, 2005). Managers' perceptions of innovation are 
pivotal to this firm's attitude towards innovation. Thus, I asked these managers 
whether they give innovation priority when they tackle technical problems, and 
whether they prefer indigenous innovation or to contact experts outside the firm for 
help. 
 
 
Consumers' needs have long been studied by innovation scholars and business 
scholars alike. Likewise, supply and demand seems to be an eternal topic. NSI's one 
theoretical strength is to take consumers' needs into account. During my interviews, I 
tried to gain access to the lead users of the products. As von Hipple argues in respect 
to new products, especially radical new products, lead users (users whose strong 
present needs will become general in a marketplace months or years in the future) 
can serve as a need-forecasting laboratory for marketing research (von Hipple, 1986). 
Hence, I did not conduct too many interviews with average consumers or final 
product consumers but with consumers who have the ability to undertake further 
innovations. Their feedback can put heavy pressure on the supply chain and might 
have a cascade effect on all the participants (Nolan at el., 2007). These interviews 
helped me understand the relationships between upstream and downstream firms. 
Interviews with suppliers bear similar goals and are especially important for firms 
belonging to the supplier-dominated category. 
 
 
Policy-makers are also important actors. They possess the political power to regulate 
industries and should assume the obligation to help firms pool risk and reduce 
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dangers. 'Good' policy should create incentives for firms to undertake innovation, 
while 'bad' policy might impose a soft budget on firms so that they can survive quite 
well without shouldering the burden of innovation. Of course, the terms 'good' and 
'bad' have only relative significance. In this context, they refer to whether this policy 
encourages or discourages innovation. Whilst policy-makers cannot innovate 
themselves, they can use policy to remove barriers which impede innovation and 
establish supporting services to allow innovation to flourish. Historically, any 
successful innovative country must have had an innovation-friendly political 
environment: "The state has played a leading entrepreneurial role in achieving 
innovation-led growth. State-funded organisations have been fundamentally 
involved in generating radically new products and processes, which have changed the 
way that businesses operate and citizens live" (Mazzucato, 2011, p115). For example, 
all the core technologies of the iPhone can be traced back to government agencies. 
In the Chinese context, the government still enjoys unchallenged power in many 
areas and retreating from daily administration work is seen as shirking responsibility. 
Policy-makers ought to be fully aware their historic mission. SI's one aim is to 
produce policy implications. This function's contribution to innovation can never be 
overestimated. 
 
 
All the aforementioned groups of people constitute the core part of an SI, and their 
interactions also belong to an SI. By interviewing them, an SI in operation can be 
clearly portrayed. 
 
 
 
 
3.3 History Studies 
 
In any SI study, history matters, since no SI is created in an institutional vacuum. Even 
though new institutions often supersede old institutions, the older institutional regimes' 
influence still lingers, and understanding the past trajectory can help us predict the 
future trajectory. China is today going through radical institutional change and, just as a 
famous emperor in the Tang Dynasty said: "Using history as a mirror, 
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you can understand the vicissitudes of different regimes." Chinese policy-makers 
have made various mistakes (and many correct decisions), thus learning from them 
will avoid making the same mistakes and leads to best practice. 
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4 An Empirical Study of the Chinese Mining Industry 
 
Mining has a long history in China, whereas only after the reform and opening-up did 
it enjoy rapid technological advancement. During the pre-reform era, the 
industrialisation process in China had given the mining industry a major boost. 
Millions of workers and billions of yuan were invested in this industry. The social 
status of miners in China can be vividly illustrated in the parade at Tiananmen Square 
on National Day. The mining workers’ legions always appear at the front. Some 
miners became national heroes like Stakhanov in the Soviet Union. During pre-
reform period, the foundation of mining was laid, as was the mining industry's 
Sectoral System of Innovation. All the ensuing changes have been based on this 
system. 
 
 
The major discovery of this part of my research is that if we divide the whole industry 
of mining into four stages, an inter-stage innovation performance gap can be found. 
The mining and processing stage are more innovative than prospecting stage and 
equipment manufacturing. The causes of this divergence wil be further elaborated 
with the case studies in the fifth chapter. 
 
 
4.1 The Chinese mining industry in history 
 
This section will be a brief introduction to the history of coal mining and non-ferrous 
metal mining in China. History helps us to understand some seemingly illogical 
phenomena, and as Chinese history, especially the period after the founding of the 
PRC, is quite unfamiliar to foreigners, there now follows some orientation. 
 
 
4.1.1 The history of coal mining industry in China10 
 
4.1.1.1 General Information 
 
Coal mining has a long history in China, but this section will focus upon the PRC 
 
10  The information in this section is based on The History of the Chinese Coal Mining Industry (中 
国煤炭志), 1999. 
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period. It is reported that, around 1950, the PRC owned about 40 coal mining 
companies and 20 open-cast mines, most of which were small and did not have 
advanced technology. In November 1949, the Ministry of Fuel Industry was 
established and put in charge of the construction and restoration of coal mines. 
Some new mining methods, such as the longwall method, were encouraged and 
some old-fashioned mining methods were eliminated. The Ministry did a great deal 
to guarantee the demand of other industries for coal and with the co-operation of 
the coal mines’ cadres, technicians, and miners by the end of 1952, 83% of the state-
owned coal mines had recovered normal production conditions. In that year, the 
total production capacity of Chinese coal mines was 70 million tons, higher than any 
previous year. In the meantime, 13 new mines were constructed in the northeast. 
 
 
 
 
During the first Five Year Plan (1953-1957), the whole country saw an era of large-
scale economic development. Many industries’ demand for coal soared, and the coal 
mining industry entered a period of rapid development. First, a number of new 
mining sites were chosen and new mines were built. Seven coal field geological 
survey bureaus, eight coal mine construction bureaus (companies), five design 
institutes and one coal processing institute were established. Second, in the past 
most coal mines were located in the northeast region. This geographical distribution 
needed to be changed, and new mines were built based on the local need for coals as 
well as national defence considerations. At the end of 1957, the production capacity 
of new coal mines was 75.37 million tons, and prospecting teams did exploration 
work in 72 coal fields. Some mechanised mining methods were also applied and 
productivity grew. 
 
 
During the second Five Year Plan (1958-1962), the main targets of the coal mining 
industry were to strengthen its prospecting, design, and construction workforce, 
accelerate the construction of coal washing factories, and improve the coal washing 
technology. Meanwhile, the range of coal being produced were broadened. During 
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the Great Leap Forward (GLF,1958-1960), however, the coal mining industry suffered 
heavy losses. Only 10% of the coal mines under construction during this period could 
be finished owing to unreasonable design indicators. Only 60 geological reports out 
of 474 were qualified reports. Fortunately, in the wake of the GLF movement, the 
Chinese Communist Party recognised the fault of the movement and adjusted its 
policies. In 1965, the coal mining industry had recovered from the GLF, the 
production capacity of that year was 230 million tons, 20 million tons higher than in 
1962. Forty new mining regions were developed, 423 new mines were constructed, 
and some coal fields were discovered. 
 
 
During the third Five Year Plan (1963-1967), because of the Cultural Revolution, the 
coal mining industry suffered greatly, as had the whole of China. Against all odds, the 
production capacity of Chinese mining industry rose from 354 million tons at the end 
of the third Five Year Plan to 482 million tons at the end of the fourth Five Year Plan 
(1968-1972). During this ten-year period, production plants were moved to the 
hinterland in order to increase their rate of survival during wars, and a number of 
coal mines were built in southern China because the southern provinces needed coal 
to ignite their economies. Following these developments, the lever of coal 
production was not as lopsided as it had been. In 1976, when the Cultural Revolution 
ended, the production quantity of coal was 483 million tons, 92.9% higher than 1966. 
 
 
Shortly after the Cultural Revolution, coal mining entered a new epoch. Technology 
began to play an important role. China bought 100 sets of mechanised equipment 
from western countries and put them to work. A variety of equipment and 
technology were introduced in coal mines, such as fire extinguishers and gas 
monitoring equipment. In 1985 China produced 872 million tons of coal. A more 
humane management style was adopted, canteens, kindergartens, primary schools 
were built in the mining regions, and the relatives of miners who lived in the 
countryside were provided accommodation and other welfare. 
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The theme of the ensuing period is reform, and reforms occurred in many sub-fields 
of coal mining. In the management field, the central plan was no longer the sole 
source of a company’s strategy. The autonomy of coal mines was expanded, the 
salaries of miners were linked with production performance, the production and sale 
of coal were unified. In 1986, China produced 894 million tons of coal. This figure 
ascended to 1.08 billion tons in 1990, helping China become the largest producer of 
coal in the world. The productivity and the safety of miners were improved too. 
Privately owned mines appeared in this period, and by 1990 there were around 
33,000 privately owned coal mines. Tibet even constructed a coal mine at an altitude 
of 5,100 metres. In summary, the coal mining industry had been a fast-track industry 
ever since. 
 
 
4.1.1.2 Science, Technology and Technology Policy 
 
The role science and technology played in the corresponding period also changed, as 
did the attitude of regulators towards science and technology. In early 1950s the 
guiding philosophy of R&D in coal mining was to learn from the master, the Soviet 
Union. Prior to the founding of the PRC, the capitalist owners of coal mines adopted 
an exploited way of mining, and little technology was used during the mining process. 
The capitalists cared only about how to reduce costs and only ran mines at locations 
where the coal seam was thick and the quality of the coal high enough. Shortly after 
the establishment of the Ministry of Fuel Industry, mines were spurred to learn from 
the Soviet Union. A technological reform was launched centred on mining technology, 
through the way of making technology policy, scientific and technological 
development plan and safety regulations. Different kinds of machines were 
introduced such as electric drills and longwall mining equipment. From this period, 
technology and science began to play a greater role in Chinese coal mining. 
 
 
Influenced by the GLF movement, in around 1960 the coal mining regulator set 
unreachable targets for scientists and engineers to fulfil. The popular slogan 
 
‘overtake Britain and surpass America’ was the popular maxim of the day. The results  
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were negative, with even some achievements in the previous period discarded. 
When the GLF was abandoned, a new round of adjustment began, and a new 
institute, the Beijing Coal Science Research Institute, became central to the field. This 
was an institution evaluate scientific and technological achievements in coal mining, 
and the authorities concerned decided to summarise successful experiences of 
adopting new technology all over China. Sixteen advanced rock tunnelling technology 
were selected and introduced to all coal mines in China. A new standardisation 
agency was established, and the productivity of mining tunnelling was improved. 
Besides, the single-minded urge to learn from the Soviet Union was challenged. As at 
that time the PRC had not established official diplomatic relationships with most 
western countries, a series of exchange activities were organised by the Chinese 
Academy of Coal Science. Chinese engineers and scientists came to Britain, Germany, 
and France to exchange information and visited equipment manufacturing 
companies. The basic work done in this period laid the foundation for future 
development. 
 
 
The following period was marked by reforms in mechanisation. As China lacked oil 
and gas, coal became the most important primary energy source, while as the 
Chinese economy grew, the lack of coal would be a severe problem. Following visits 
to European countries, policy-makers and regulators recognised that only by 
launching mechanisation reform could the coal mining industry provide sufficient 
product to other industries. Hydraulic support and coal excavation machines became 
the main foci. In 1973 the coal industry was allowed to purchase equipment from 
West Germany, Britain, and France. Based on this equipment, other equipment was 
designed and manufactured by Chinese engineers and tested on various occasions. 
 
 
The significance of science and technology increased a great deal during the reform 
and opening-up period. The Sectoral System of Innovation in Chinese mining came to 
mimic that of developed countries. Firms were regarded as the subject of 
technological advancement, some policies aimed at encouraging mining firms to 
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attach more importance to technology were issued, and coal mining companies 
gained more autonomy, as did the research institutes. The institutes were freer to 
allocate their funds to sign new contracts with other organisations. Some experts 
formed a group to investigate the current situation in coal mining and proposed 
several suggestions such as encouraging exports, establishing a special fund to 
support mechanisation. In the 1980s, the positive interrelationship between science, 
technology, and economic development was stated explicitly by Deng Xiaoping, and 
coal mining was expected to realise this positive interaction. The technological 
reform of mining firms was supported, in-house R&D agencies were also supported, 
while criteria to evaluate how much a firm relied upon technological advancement 
were designed. Moreover, during this period the Chinese mining industry adopted a 
new import strategy. Relevant manufacturing equipment, technological materials, 
testing equipment and technology were purchased. This change was aimed at 
facilitating the understanding of Chinese technicians towards state-of-the-art 
technology and to shorten the time it took Chinese technicians to produce these 
equipment in China. With the hard work of engineers, technicians, and scientists, the 
technical capability of Chinese coal mining was augmented. 
 
 
During the same period, the form of technological policies saw changes. Prior to 1960, 
there were no written technological policies about the coal mining industry. During 
the 1960s, the State Scientific and Technological Commission11 convened a 
conference on technology policy, and all industries were asked to draw up 
technological development plans. The plan formulated by the coal mining industry 
was a detailed instruction. It set out clear technological goals for coal mines, while 
some advanced technologies were recommended to the industry. However, this top-
down technological route map was not officially implemented. After the Cultural 
Revolution, the plan was discussed, edited, and finally became official policy in 1979. 
Unfortunately, the policy reflected the situation in the 1960s, so it was out of date by 
 
11  The predecessor of the Ministry of Science and Technology. 
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the early 1980s. Some frontier technologies had been used, some new regulations 
regarding the protection of the environment and the ownership of land were issued, 
and they were seen as relevant to coal mining. A new technological policy was badly 
needed. In 1987 a new coal industry technology policy was implemented, some 
technological indicators were updated, opencast mines, environmental protection, 
and the ground equipment of coal mines were added. To sum up, technology policies 
prior to 1990 bore typical features of a centrally planned economy, while coal mines 
had less autonomy to develop technology, but this system was efficient in promoting 
technology or equipment which have proved to be useful. 
 
 
China’s first coal-related research institute was established in Fushun city, Liaoning 
province in 1953. Its research domain was mainly coal mine safety. In 1956, the 
Beijing Coal Science Research Institute was established, its research fields covering 
coal field geology, coal chemistry, coal mine engineering technology etc. Prior to the 
Cultural Revolution, there were seven non-Beijing coal-related research institutes. 
They were under the regulation of the Ministry of Coal Industry12 and the local 
governments. As these institutes served the whole country rather than their hosting 
province or city, in the 1980s the Ministry of Coal Industry was once more 
empowered to regulate these institutes. In 1990 17 research institutes were 
affiliated to the Ministry of Coal Industry, and 4,204 scientific and technological 
employees worked for them. A complete research system was established and co-
operation with America, Japan, Germany was also institutionalised. The institutes 
undertook different research tasks at different times. Until early 1980s, governments 
were in charge of providing funding to the institutes, after that they were 
encouraged to contact coal mines to receive research funding. The government 
branch in charge of managing these affairs was The Department of Technology 
 
 
 
 
12 The Ministry of Coal Industry was established in 1955. In 1970, it merged with other 
ministries to form a Ministry of Fuel Industry, its name has changed several times since then. 
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There are also some universities affiliated to the Ministry of Coal Industry. Prior to 
the founding of the PRC, over 90% of coal miners were illiterate or semi-illiterate. 
The PRC’s coal industry regulation agency opened a number of secondary vocational 
schools to train the miners and seven universities were established. They became the 
vital pillar of coal mining industry, their main task was teaching, not research, which 
is the task of research institutes. All these education institutes belonged to the 
Ministry of Coal Industry and they directly send their graduates to coal mines, which 
can be seen as the basis for the Triple Helix of mining in China. 
 
 
4.1.1.3 Coal Equipment Manufacturing 
 
Coal equipment manufacturing was established from an almost zero basis. In 1949, 
1950, and 1951, three coal machinery firms were established at Jixi city, Zhangjiakou 
city, and Huainan city respectively. These firms paved the way for future coal 
machinery manufacturing and accumulated precious expertise. In 1955 the Ministry 
of Coal Industry was established. From then on, the general-purpose machinery was 
under the regulation of the Ministry of Machinery Industry, while the coal mining 
equipment was the turf of the Ministry of Coal Industry. The Chinese coal equipment 
also began to be based on learning from The Soviet Union, imitating Russian products, 
and domestic firms finally possessed the ability to produce implements. During pre-
reform period China could only produce simple machinery such as scraper conveyers. 
Then some new factories were built at Beijing, Shanghai, Xi’an, and other cities. The 
product list became more complete. In 1964 Zhangjiakou and Jixi developed the first 
Chinese designed and made mechanised mining equipment. During the Cultural 
Revolution, a number of coal machinery factories moved to the hinterland and 
normal production was severely affected until they moved back to their original sites 
after the end of that political disaster. During the reform and opening-up period, 
equipment firms got higher autonomy, they actively engaged in international co-
operation and imported advanced production line, testing technology. By the end of 
the 1980s, there were 36 key coal machinery firms. 
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From this brief history, we see that the Socialist Construction, the Great Leap 
Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the Reform and Opening-up are important 
events which exerted enormous impacts on every aspect of coal mining. The relative 
professional management of state agencies set the basic tone and trajectory for the 
future development of the industry. 
 
 
4.1.2 The history of the non-ferrous metal industry in China13 
 
The history of the Chinese non-ferrous metal industry can be divided into two stages, 
the pre-reform and opening-up era and the Reform and Opening-up era. Each lasted 
about 30 years. 
4.1.2.1 General Information 
 
The production history of non-ferrous metal in China can be traced back to at least 
the Shang dynasty (about 1600 B.C. to 1000 B.C), and China used to possess the most 
advanced technology. But like other industries, this industry lagged far behind the 
West in late Qing dynasty (1644-1912), especially after the industrial revolution. In 
1949 the production quantity of 10 kinds of non-ferrous metals was 13.3 thousand 
tons only. After the founding of the PRC, some non-ferrous metal factories and mines 
quickly recovered and from 1952 the production quantity of 10 kinds of non-ferrous 
metal was 74,000 tons. During the first Five Year Plan, the Soviet Union assisted 13 
non-ferrous metal related projects, some new mines were developed and new 
technologies were utilised. At the end of this period, the production quantity of 10 
kinds of non-ferrous metal rose to 215,000 tons. The coming two decades witnessed 
political turmoil and economic upheaval in China. The non-ferrous metal industry 
suffered dramatic fluctuations in its fortunes, although the production quantity of 10 
kinds of non-ferrous metal reached almost a million tons in 1978. The industry’s most 
fundamental achievements during this period were to establish a relatively complete 
industry chain from prospecting to metallurgy, and to foster the ability to produce a 
 
 
13 The content of this section makes reference to ‘The sixty years history of PRC’s non-
ferrous metal industry’ edited by the China Non-ferrous Metal Industry Association. 
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wide range of products, to which all ensuing development would be indebted. 
 
 
 
The Reform and Opening-up period is now regarded as the golden age of non-ferrous 
metal industry. A reform to decentralise the industry was launched, and not only the 
state but the individuals became qualified to run a company. In 1983 the State 
Council agreed to establish a state-owned enterprise to be in charge of regulating the 
non-ferrous metal industry. This year might be regarded as the independent year of 
non-ferrous metal industry, during which aluminium, copper, nickel, lead and zinc 
mining received credit from this SOE. In 1992 the production quantity of 10 kinds of 
non-ferrous metal increased to almost three million tons. In the 1990s the non-
ferrous metal industry, together with other industries, saw dramatic development. In 
the mid-1990s numerous SOEs faced the prospect of going bankrupt, lots of workers 
were sacked, the ‘iron-rice-bowl’ was no longer an employment guarantee, and s 
counterparts from other industries began to invest in non-ferrous metal, which 
boosted the industry. In 2002 the production quantity of 10 kinds of non-ferrous 
metal was 10.12 million tons, and China overtook America to become the largest 
producer in the world. The 2008 figure, was 251.2 million tons. Meanwhile, the 
revenue of the non-ferrous metal industry also increased exponentially. In 1950 the 
whole industry’s revenue was only 26.14 million yuan. This figure soared to 8.43 
billion yuan in 1978, and then further increased to 1.9 trillion yuan in 2007. As for the 
industry’s profit, it was only 8.44 million yuan in 1950, 1.22 billion yuan in 1978, and 
146.4 billion yuan in 2007. The international trade in non-ferrous metals also enjoyed 
sharp growth. In 1949 the total volume of imports and exports of non-ferrous metal 
was US$290 million, the corresponding figure for 1978 was US$810 million, and in 
2008 it rose to US$87.4 billion. In 2008 the structure of the capital volume of non-
ferrous metal enterprises above a designated size was quite diverse. SOEs only took 
up about 44% of total capital volume. Privately owned, Hongkong-based, and 
Taiwanese companies as well as multinational companies all participate in non-
ferrous metal mining in China. Besides, the international status of the Chinese non-
ferrous metal industry is unmatched by any 
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other countries. It produced 40% of the world’s tin, 85% of antimony, 80% of 
magnesium (Mg), and 85% of rare earth. The production and refining of copper, 
aluminium, and lead are also number one in the world. This status confers upon 
China a bargaining power with other users of non-ferrous metal. It also provides 
potential opportunities for China to upgrade its production plants. 
 
 
4.1.2.2 Non-ferrous Metal-Related Research Institutes 
 
The first non-ferrous metal-related research institute in the PRC was established at 
the basis of an old institute established by the Kuomintang government. It was 
established in 1952 and specialised in metallurgy, mining, and processing. The 
institute later developed into the largest comprehensive non-ferrous metal- related 
research institute in China, the General Research Institute for Non-ferrous Metals. A 
series of other relevant research institutes were also established in the 1950s. They 
were located in Beijing, Changsha, Kunming, Shenyang and elsewhere. In the 1960s a 
number of research institutes were established in Chinese the hinterland. Guilin, 
Lanzhou, and Chengdu all had their own research institutes. To sum up, prior to the 
reform and opening-up, a system of research institutes which cover a wide range of 
research fields had been established, working in relevant research areas, providing 
professional consultation, and developing new equipment and technology. Following 
the reform and opening-up, these research institutes were transformed and affiliated 
to different organisations. Some became independent scientific and technological 
SOEs, some were affiliated to other corporations, some were given to local 
governments. Compared with research institutes in other industries, the non-ferrous 
metal industry launched the reform earlier and achieved better results. In 1995 the 
State Scientific and Technological Commission organised an evaluation for different 
research and technological development agencies. Research institutes in the non-
ferrous metal industry ranked third among the 49 sectors in terms of science and 
technology performance and ranked first in operational performance. This 
transformation yielded striking outcomes. Prior to it, in 1985 the revenue of all the 
non-ferrous metal research institutes was 120 million yuan, while in 2008 this figure 
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rose to 12.85 billion yuan. The total assets of all the research institutes in 1985 was 
410 million yuan, while in 2008 it increased to 11.1 billion yuan. Since the reform, 
these institutes have taken on many more research projects and the funding for each 
project has also increased a great deal. 
 
 
In summary, the non-ferrous metal industry could not have grown as fast as it has 
without the assistance of the research institutes for the following reasons. First, the 
research contents of these institutes are closely linked with the production chain of 
the non-ferrous metal industry, and there are institutes servicing every part of this 
chain. Second, the interaction between production and scientific research is 
becoming ever more intensive. This can be seen in the number of research institutes 
affiliated to firms. In 2007 37.12% of the large and medium non- ferrous metal firms 
had research activities, while 22.64% of them established research agencies. This 
system of research is bolstering the further promotion of the Chinese non-ferrous 
metal industry. 
 
 
4.1.2.3 Higher Education of Non-ferrous Metal Industry 
 
Prior to the founding of the PRC, there were few universities in China which had non-
ferrous metal-related majors. In late 1951 and early 1952, the PRC government 
launched a grand reform in higher education in order to make revolutionary and 
professional universities. The first to specialise in non-ferrous metal was established 
in Changsha city, namely Central South Mining and Metallurgy University. This 
university received the relevant majors and professors from Wuhan University, 
Hunan University, Guangxi University and others. Two years later, another university 
specialising in non-ferrous metal was established in Kunming, which was followed by 
a third in 1958 in Ganzhou city. These three universities laid the foundation for the 
non-ferrous metal industry. Some small colleges were also established all over China. 
Most of these universities and colleges did not provide graduate-level education, let 
alone PhD-level education. By the end of 1983, the 10 universities affiliated to the 
SOE in charge of all non-ferrous metal-related matters in China had 15,108 students, 
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among which 11 were PhDs and 374 Masters. They made great contributions to 
Chinese industry. For example, they provided essential materials for atomic bomb, 
hydrogen bomb, and satellite technology. During the Reform and Opening-up period, 
most of these universities expanded rapidly, admitting more students, employing 
more teaching staff, and offering more advanced courses. In the late 1990s, these 
institutions were either put under the control of the Ministry of Education or local 
government, and they established more majors to become comprehensive 
universities. They have been forming a University-Institute-Industry complex with 
non-ferrous metal companies and invest in laboratory construction and training sites. 
 
 
In conclusion, the history of the coal mining and non-ferrous metal industries have 
not been immune to the greater political and economic environment of China but 
were part of it. The Triple Helix of the two industries were formed from their very 
beginning, labelled Triple Helix 1 by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff: “In this configuration 
the nation state encompasses academia and industry and directs the relations 
between them” (2000, p.111). Although this model of Triple Helix lacks positive 
interaction, it did instil the idea that research and production should and could be 
mutual beneficial and, moreover, it sowed the seeds for future interaction by 
constructing channels for government, university, and industry. To some extent, the 
development of the mining industry’s higher education system was meant to service 
this industry. Consequently, the ensuing close relationship between the academic 
community and industry after the reform and opening-up was a natural progression. 
 
 
This industry chain will be divided into the following parts, that is, prospecting, 
mining, processing and metallurgy. These four stages will be discussed in turn. 
Mining equipment manufacturing will also be included in this study as it is an 
indispensable part of the mining industry. Every stage of mining uses equipment, 
although equipment manufacturing itself does not belong to mining. By comparing 
these different stages, the intra-industry divergence can be uncovered. 
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4.2 Prospecting and Mineral Exploration 
 
Prospecting and mineral exploration are different. Prospecting is the first stage of 
geological analysis of a territory. It is the physical search for minerals, fossils, 
precious metals, or mineral specimens, while mineral exploration refers to the 
process of finding ores (commercially viable concentrations of minerals) to mine. 
Mineral exploration is a much more intensive, organised, and professional form of 
mineral prospecting and, whilst it frequently uses the services of prospecting, the 
process of mineral exploration on the whole is much more involved.14 As far as the 
total amount of cash flow to prospecting is concerned, the Chinese government has 
increased its investment in prospecting. From 1950 to1960, the investment in 
prospecting has risen dramatically. From 1961 to 1968, it decreased very fast. The 
following decade (1969-1979) witnessed a stable increase. The period 1980-1987 saw 
a second decline. During 1988-1990, the state transferred part of the sales revenue 
of oil and natural gas to prospecting. The corresponding figure rose, whereas this 
figure decreased continuously from 1991 to2005 (Ge, Xu & Ai, 2007). After 2005, 
China invested an increasing amount into prospecting. The year 2012 saw some 120 
billion yuan invested in prospecting. The central government invested 4.58 billion 
yuan, local governments invested 9.7 billion yuan, the rest was social investment. 
The sum of 78.6 billion yuan was used for oil and gas exploration (The Yearbook of 
the Chinese Mining Industry, 2013). 
 
 
The prospecting stage is often called a Regional Geological Survey( 区域地质调查) 
while, according to General Requirements for Solid Mineral Exploration of the PRC, the 
mineral exploration stage can be further divided into four sub-stages, that is, 
preliminary-exploration (预查), general-exploration (普查), in-detail exploration (详 
查) and Mine Prospecting (勘探). 
 
14 In this thesis, when the term ‘prospecting’ is used, it might refer to the two stages as a whole, 
or specifically referred to the fourth sub-stage of mineral exploration, which will be introduced 
afterwards. 
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The earliest stage, regional geological survey is the systematic investigation of the 
geology beneath a given piece of ground for the purpose of creating a geological map 
or model. The aim of doing this is to maintain the geological inventory and advance 
the knowledge of geosciences for the benefit of the nation. In China, this stage is 
highly confidential. Now only government bodies and private firms which used to be 
part of the government can gain the legal right to participate in prospecting at this 
early stage. The regulation authority in China is called China Geological Survey(中国地 
质 调 查 局 , hereafter CGS), which is a sub-ministry level bureau under the 
regulation of the Ministry of Land Resources. The CGS administers several agencies. 
They can be attributed to a regional geological agency (the CGS has six local branches. 
For instance, The Centre of Geological survey in Tianjin), a professional geological 
survey agency (for example, Qingdao Research Institute of Marine Geology), a 
comprehensive research and service agency (for example, the National Geological 
Library), and a scientific and technological innovation support agency (for example, 
the Chinese Academy of Geological Science).15 The prospecting work at this stage 
cannot directly yield economic benefits. It has more to do with national security. This 
can explain the phenomenon I observed in the Yunnan Provincial Bureau of 
Geological Surveys while conducting an interview. Every laptop has a sticker saying 
internet access is strictly prohibited. In the past China had several waves of geological 
surveys. Prior to the reform and opening-up, the Chinese government put a huge 
amount of money and manpower into drawing an accurate geological map. By 2010, 
the geological map with a scale of 1:1000000 had covered the whole of China. The 
1:200000 scale map has also covered most of the mainland, and even the 1:50000 
scale map has covered 22% of the whole land area (Wang,2013, p.61). 
 
 
Shortly after the founding of the PRC, the Ministry of Geology was also established in 
1952. From the first Five Year Plan to the third Five Year Plan, the Chinese 
 
15  China Geological Survey's website, viewed 2016/11/15, http://www.cgs.gov.cn/. 
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government organised large-scale prospecting activities and the outcome was 
striking. The prospecting investment contributed to the establishment of five coal 
production bases and 10 steel production bases, and a huge increase in the deposit 
of gold. Prospecting work during this period also paved the way for the discovery of 
large oilfields such as Daqing and Shengli. The distributional law of groundwater was 
studied, and the basic geological information which was essential for bridge building 
was collected as well. 
 
 
During the 1980s-1990s, the Chinese government did not invest enough money in 
regional geological surveys. It was not until the early 21st century that regional 
geological surveys regained the attention of the party leaders. There is not too much 
state-of-the-art technology used now in China, prospectors mainly utilise traditional 
ways of prospecting such as combing through the countryside, often through creek 
beds and along ridgelines and hilltops, often on hands and knees, looking for signs of 
mineralisation in the outcrop. 
 
 
The mineral exploration stage has four sub-stages, and successful exploration directly 
leads to the digging of valuable mines. The first two sub-stages link mineral 
exploration with a geological survey. The earliest, preliminary exploration, aims to 
gain rudimentary knowledge of a specific region's mining resources through a 
comprehensive study of the information of this region obtained from the previous 
geological survey, observation, and some engineering experiments. The outcome of 
this stage might be beneficial to the development of the local economy and might 
identify regions with high potential for discovering valuable mines. The ensuing stage 
is general exploration. A region will go through this stage only when in the 
preliminary exploration it has been identified as having high mining potential. The 
prospectors will use geological, physical, and chemical methods to prospect this 
region and take sand and rock samples to conduct further experiments. Compared 
with the preliminary exploration stage, general exploration seeks to narrow the 
scope of the prospective mining area, thus reducing future prospecting investment 
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and adding more detail to the prospecting results. 
 
 
 
The third sub-stage of mineral exploration is in-detail prospecting, or valuable mines' 
deposit geological survey. This work is based on the discovery of the former stages. If 
something unusual is recognised, which foreshadows a potential mining area, more 
prospectors and capital will be invested in this stage. Due to the fact that the 
prospecting outcome of this stage might lead to the discovery of a new mining area 
or the establishment of a new mine, private firms begin to actively take part although 
the power of state-owned prospecting agencies is still unmatched. The aim of the 
prospecting work at this stage is to gain information about the quantity of the 
deposits, the type of the mine, the geological features of this region, thereby paving 
the way for the next stage. The prospectors adopt various methods and skills, 
working systematically and getting more samples, conducting a pre-feasibility study, 
making comments on whether this region has developing value, demarcating further 
prospecting areas, and providing a general plan for future mining activities. 
 
 
The last stage is mine prospecting. At this stage, prospectors work within the area 
which contains valuable mines. The outcome of this stage is usually a report which 
includes almost all the useful information for prospective mine managers: the 
production scale; product plan; mining method; mineral processing plan; mine 
construction plan etc. Most of these areas were identified in the previous stages. This 
part is closely linked to the ensuing mining stage which will yield economic profits, so 
many private firms participate in mine prospecting. 
 
 
In order to prospect at this stage, one has to get the exploration rights from the 
government. The government tends to confer the exploration rights upon 
organisations which belong or are affiliated to the government. Private firms which 
have an apparent government origin, say, the founder of the firm used to be a 
government official, will be more likely to gain the rights. I would argue that this 
might explain the lack of innovation at the prospecting stage, because it is not the 
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technological level but the personal network of a firm that determines whether it can 
get the exploration rights. To some extent, however, it is also a reflection of the 
embarrassing situation facing the government. The current system of prospecting in 
China evolved from the previous history when only governments at different levels 
were allowed to undertake prospecting. In fact, during the pre-reform era no private 
economic organisation is allowed to exist. In the 1980s, the central government 
launched a decentralisation reform, and local governments gained the power to 
make independent plans to boost local economies. Township and village enterprises 
(TVE) thrived thereafter. Since those TVEs cannot obtain primary materials from 
governments, they attempted to do mining themselves. In 1986, China had over 
120,000 township and village mining companies and private mining companies (Su & 
Zhang, 2003). Whilst the practices of those companies were to some extent illegal, 
this is a clear sign that the control of government over exploration rights had 
loosened. Finally, in the late 1990s privately owned exploration rights became legal. 
The relevant legislation also confers upon individuals the right to purchase and sell 
exploration rights to others. The question is that becoming legal is not enough to 
attract private companies to undertake exploration as state-owned-enterprises still 
enjoy a dominant position. As a result, even though market reform has been in 
process for decades, the new spin-off prospecting firms cannot develop too rapidly. 
Sometimes it is less risky to confer the exploration rights upon someone whom the 
officials concerned know or are former colleagues of the officials. 
 
 
Meanwhile, the successful rate of prospecting is quite low, this is the most uncertain 
stage, after all the prospector’s work is to find something valuable from nothing, while 
miners' and engineers' work is different in nature from that of prospectors. This restrains 
the development of prospecting firms and explains why prospecting firms grow much 
more slowly than mining and metallurgy firms. The high sink cost and the risks 
accompanying prospecting give rise to the relative low innovation incentive of 
prospecting technicians. To make matters worse, in China exploration rights are 
separated from mining rights, which means it is possible that the prospector cannot 
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extend its industry chain to the mining stage. The final product at the prospecting 
stage is only a potential mining area. To realise this potential, requires the valuable 
mines underneath this area. Without a reliable promise of the mining rights, the 
prospector will always face the danger of being unable to harvest its own economic 
benefits. Why invest a lot of money in doing R&D to improve the effectiveness of 
prospecting? Based on the foregoing, in the Chinese context, prospectors face a 
tough situation. They either waste a huge amount of capital and manpower and find 
nothing, or cannot obtain the rights to excavate the mining discovered by themselves. 
 
 
Apart from this, the following problem is also detrimental to the development of 
prospecting in China. If a potential mining area is quite large, the exploration rights 
might be given to several prospecting teams. The rationale for doing this is that local 
governments have more bargaining power over the owners of small mines. If a local 
government has to face a mining giant, the situation will be quite different. This kind 
of prospecting feudalism will result in man-made division of small mines, which 
obstruct the utilization of economies of scale thus produce inefficiency. Each small 
mine owner will not be interested in purchasing advanced mining machines because 
large machinery is not applicable to small mines. The decrease of profits in the 
ensuing mining stage will in turn reduce the financial resources the prospector 
gained in the previous prospecting stage. Without sufficient financial support, the 
prospector would feel more reluctant to undertake R&D. 
 
 
Policy-makers in China are also aware of these problems, and have implemented two 
policies to address the issues I mention. One is the encouragement of so-called 
 
‘equipped exploration’ or ‘assembled exploration’( 整装 勘查 ), the other is the 
encouragement of so-called ‘integration exploration’( 整合勘查 ). The former policy 
addresses the time wasted between different stages of prospecting. I divide the 
prospecting stages into five sub-stages, although in fact the reality is more 
complicated than this, and to make matters worse, in most cases the prospector has 
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to apply for the exploration rights for the next stage upon accomplishment of the 
previous stage, which is rather time-consuming and cannot keep pace with the 
rapidly developing Chinese economy. Equipped exploration means the prospecting 
team or organisation, to save time, co-ordinates with the mining firm in a region 
where mining prospects are quite promising. The prospecting team should make a 
comprehensive prospecting plan charting from the very beginning of prospecting to 
the final stage by taking the advice of the mining firms into consideration. Sometimes 
the team even needs to undertake prospecting when the mining firms have begun 
their mining operation. The latter policy, that is, the integration of exploration policy, 
is designed to solve the problem described that a number of large mining areas have 
been divided into numerous small mining areas. The exploration rights will not be 
exercised independently by different prospecting teams, but there is a central 
committee in charge of integrating and allocating all the prospecting resources, 
including human resources, technological resources, and financial resources. By 
doing so, the scarce resources will be utilised in a much more efficient way. These 
two policies have similarities and differences, both were designed to approach a 
specific prospecting issue. This kind of management innovation is conducive to 
enhance the motivation of the parties concerned prospecting technology. We need 
to wait and see if the two policies can live up to the decision-maker's expectations. 
 
 
I now focus upon the technological innovation in this stage. By and large, the level of 
Chinese prospecting technology is still low and there are not enough policies to 
encourage the innovation, creation, diffusion, or adoption at this stage. Before 
continuing, I need to clarify that some type of prospecting work will accompany the 
development of the mine and will not stop after the mining stage. The pre-mining 
prospecting and in-mining prospecting use similar technologies, they only differ in 
accuracy and targets. In-mining prospecting will not be specifically discussed. 
 
 
So, what exactly is the technological level at the prospecting stage in China? It is 
necessary to understand the industry chain and profiting model of prospecting in 
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China. In China, prospecting's upstream industry includes general purpose equipment 
manufacturers, prospecting equipment manufacturers, and the oil and gas industry. 
The first category refers mainly to machine tool makers and diesel electricity 
generator makers, while third category companies are included because prospecting 
consumes a large amount of oil and gas. Prospecting's downstream industry includes 
solid mineral digging and developing companies. Prospecting companies in China 
earn their keep mainly by selling their prospecting report to mining companies or 
selling their exploration rights. Because in China exploration rights are just like 
intellectual property rights, the best result one can get by exercising this right is the 
discovery of valuable mines, and due to the separation of exploration rights and 
mining rights, and the separation of prospecting and mining companies, prospectors 
are unable to appropriate the profits of their own efforts. The relatively closed 
prospecting community preclude the entry of new competitors, thereby leading to a 
low level of investment to innovation. I found that, generally speaking, technological 
innovation is not the most important choice to improve prospecting performance. 
There are some innovations at the prospecting stage but they are not likely to 
become the main engine of prospecting in years to come but may only complement 
the prospectors' work occasionally. 
 
 
Primarily, Chinese scholars’ understanding of the geological structure and 
metallogeny16 is becoming better and better, due to the fact that China covers a 
large land area and has a great variety of geological conditions which provide 
sufficient research materials. Some of my interviewees even claimed that the 
academic level of Chinese scholars in this area is world class. Of course, this is not 
technological innovation but more of a scientific breakthrough, but it can be used to 
identify potential mining areas thus it is just a step away from innovation. I do not 
know if my interviewees exaggerated the academic level of Chinese scholars, but 
 
16 Metallogeny is the study of the genesis and regional-to-global distribution of mineral deposits, with 
emphasis on their relationship in space and time to regional petrologic and tectonic features of the 
earth's crust. 
 
90 
 
compared with other parts of prospecting this part might represent the best aspect 
of the Chinese prospecting industry. As this study focuses upon technological 
innovation rather than pure scientific or theoretical breakthroughs, this 
part(metallogeny) will not be attached too much importance. Second, the 
digitalisation of individual tools is used by prospectors on the front line. In the past, 
prospectors used paper maps and pencils to draw geology maps, which is slow and 
inaccurate. The situation will become worse if we try to compare maps drawn by 
different prospectors and combine them. By using digital tools, the mapping process 
becomes more standardised and it is easier to analyse the data collected by 
prospectors from all over the country. Finally, more frontier technologies are being 
used at this stage. For example, the Chinese BeiDou Navigation Satellite System is 
helping Chinese prospectors to rely upon domestic products rather than foreign 
products. Other advanced equipment is also being used. This is not to say, however, 
that prospecting teems with innovation in China. First of all, these technologies are 
not decisive to the outcome, but prospectors' own ability and talent are. This is not 
like the mining stage in which technologies have to some extent replaced miners to 
become the mainstay of productivity, in prospecting stage technologies are still 
affiliated to its users. Moreover, the political forces separating the prospecting stage 
from the ensuing mining stage thus cut the link between prospecting and its 
economic output, consequently taking prospecting further from the 
commercialisation of its discovery, thus from innovation. 
 
 
In 2016 the China Geological Survey published two reports which introduced around 
100 geological survey technological and theoretical innovations. These innovations 
cover regional basic geology, mineral resource geology, environmental geology, 
remote sensing geology, geophysics etc. In the news conference, the Party Secretary 
of the China Academy of Geological Science, Wang Xiaolie stated that: “in the past 
hundred years, especially after 1999, China made numerous theoretical innovations 
and technological innovations in geology”. For the former, the theory of the gas 
sources condition of gas hydrate formation, the origin of birds, the porphyry Cu 
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deposits in collisional zones, and karst dynamics are some of the representative 
examples. For the latter, aerogravity survey technology, multi-target zone 
geochemistry survey technology, the technology of coring for scientific ultra-deep 
drilling, 4,500-metre deep sea comprehensive survey technology are some of the 
representative examples. The China Geological Survey convened 21 institutes under 
its regulation to collect the most significant achievements in this field. In the end, 96 
geological theoretical breakthroughs were chosen (China Geological Survey, 2016a), 
114 relevant technologies were chosen (China Geological Survey,2016b).17 Before 
the publication of these two reports, another report entitled ‘A hundred 
achievements of the China Geological Survey’ (China Geological Survey,2016c) was 
composed of six chapters and demonstrated 128 achievements. It systematically 
stated the contribution of geological survey agencies and their staffs to China. The 
first chapter is about how geology serves national security by gleaning basic 
information concerning all kinds of mines. The second chapter is about the geology 
survey of oceans. The third is about how the outcome of geology surveys help 
planners make more scientific regional blueprints. The fourth chapter is about the 
contribution geology surveys have made to bolster the building of a more ecology 
friendly civilisation. How to use geology surveys to improve disaster relief work and 
how to enhance scientific and technological innovation as well as international co-
operation are also discussed. This report conveys the message that the China 
Geological Survey is endeavouring to make their outcome mature product which can 
be bought and sold on the market, thereby shortening the distance between 
geological discovery and commercialisation. Together, the three reports constitute a 
panorama of the prospecting industry It is still labour-intensive. Whereas technology 
is becoming increasingly important, the people working in this part of the industry 
chain have been aware of the catalytic function of commercialisation. A qualitative 
change, however, is impossible without the fundamental reform of the regulation 
institution. 
 
17  http://www.mlr.gov.cn/xwdt/kyxw/201611/t20161115_1421760.htm viewed on 2017-2-16. 
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In conclusion, in China, policies and regulations has created a man-made gap between 
prospecting per se and its potential commercial contribution. As I have defined 
innovation as the commercialisation of invention, in the Chinese context innovation will 
rarely occur at the prospecting stage, as for technological innovation it appears even less 
in prospecting stage. Besides, the innovators and the practitioners at the prospecting 
stage are neither the same group of people nor have bounded together as they have in 
the mining stage. Consequently, this separation obstructs interactions between 
innovators and customers, which is vital for innovation in a knowledge economy. From a 
systemic point of view, the relative isolation of prospecting work from other stages is the 
main reason responsible for the low level of technological innovation. The market 
mechanism has not played its role at this stage, while the interrelationship between 
different nodes of the whole prospecting network have not joined together to facilitate 
the diffusion of useful knowledge. Technology has to adopt the form of a product to fulfil 
its task of enhancing social welfare. The product of prospecting, however, is not physical 
product. What is more, the source of its profits, namely, the downstream mining 
companies, always suffer the fluctuating prices of mining products. All these difficulties 
result in an unstable foundation for long- term commitment to innovation, which might 
be the direct cause of underinvestment in prospecting innovation. 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Mining Machine Manufacturing 
 
The mining industry has always been capital-intensive. However, nowadays, it is 
becoming increasingly machine-intensive. I have witnessed many kinds of mining 
machines in different mines and watched carefully how they functioned. Various 
mines have different technical levels and use a great many kinds of mining machines. 
Some mines are more reliant upon machines, others count on the miners. The 
commentaries about Chinese domestic mining machine manufacturers, however, are 
almost the same across China, whether in metal mining or coal mining. Except for 
one or two technological breakthroughs by Chinese manufacturers, all the 
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interviewees deride the technical ability of domestic manufacturers. There seems to 
be a consensus throughout the industry that machine manufacturing is weak. 
 
 
In Inner Mongolia, I visited a mine belonging to the Yindu Mining Group which 
produces lead zinc and some silver. It is not a big mine, but can excavate and process 
3,000 tons of metal on a daily basis. The Yindu Mining Group has several 
stockholders, one of which is a privately-owned company which has been ranked 
among the top 500 private companies in China. The mining technicians showed me 
how the mineral processing machines perform their functions. The degree of 
mechanisation degree is quite high and there were not many workers in the factory. 
The machines include a ball mill, a type of grinder used to grind and blend materials 
for use in mineral processing and some other processes. A ball mill works on the 
principle of impact and attrition. Size reduction is achieved by impact as the balls 
drop from near the top of the shell. I watched from outside the ball mill so I could 
only see the minerals being sent into the mill become smaller or broken into pieces 
after being sent out. The next step is to use a chemical reaction to separate the 
valuable minerals and the rocks and so on. Because the minerals and rocks are 
smashed they will have a larger reaction area which will facilitate and accelerate the 
chemical reaction. I also saw the container the mine used for generating the chemical 
reactions. As at this stage, a poisonous chemical substance is used, while the 
processing machine had been set at the automation mode and only workers with 
masks came across to supervise this process occasionally. 
 
 
The technician stated that they purchase the machines, including the ball mill and 
the container for the chemical reaction, from a joint venture in Tianjin. The machines 
were designed abroad but because Chinese law stipulates that mining firms must not 
buy mining machines whose production process has no Chinese elements; the 
designer has to co-operate with a Chinese firm to establish a production plant. By 
and large, these machines are based on a foreign idea but made in China. The 
technicians also said that, compared with foreign products, machines designed and 
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produced by Chinese firms, are cheaper but not that reliable, which means they will 
have bugs on a regular basis. This will slow down production and cause economic loss. 
Normally, machines made in China are much cheaper but can only be used for a much 
shorter period of time than imported machines. In order to compensate for relatively 
poor reliability, Chinese firms provide timely after-sales services. They often promise 
to send their technicians to the factory when the machines have problems within 24 
hours. If this mine is their lead consumer, some engineers live and work with the 
miners. I visited another mine in Inner Mongolia. There the engineers introduced the 
excavation machine to me. Again, the degree of mechanisation is quite high. Workers 
do not dig up the coal themselves, they control the machines instead. The machines 
are also foreign designs. That coal mine is owned by Yitai Group, which ranked 227th 
among the top 500 Chinese companies and 18th among the biggest coal companies. It 
is also a private company. In Yunnan province, I went to a tin mine belonging to 
Yunnan Tin Group, a century-old company, and is the largest production and 
manufacturing base in the world for tin and the largest production centre for tin 
profiles, tin chemicals, and arsenic chemicals in China. It is a state-owned enterprise. 
The manager of the mine pointed at a giant blast furnace: “when we bought that blast 
furnace from Australia it was the only one of this sort in the world, even Australia 
itself did not own such a blast furnace.” To sum up, Chinese domestic mining machine 
manufacturers are still in a relative disadvantageous position vis-à-vis their global 
counterparts. Chinese mining companies, be they state-owned or privately owned, 
regard domestic products as inferior to foreign products. 
 
Category Price Service Lifespan of Lifespan of Degree   of 
   scraper  Hydraulic Automation 
   conveyor  Support   
       
Domestic Low In time 5-8 million tons 10-15 million Low 
   of coal  tons of coal  
       
Expo High Weak 20-25 million 30 million tons High 
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   tons of coal of coal  
       
Figure2: A comparison between domestic products and imported products. 
 
Source：http://finance.glinfo.com/13/0115/11/65651731A39B3A7F.html viewed 
on 2016-11-16. 
The top five Chinese coal mining machinery manufacturers in 2015 are shown in the 
table below. Other construction machine makers such as Sany and Xugong are 
excluded. 
 Revenue in 
Names millions of US 
 dollars 
  
Tiandi Science & Technology Co. Ltd 1,785 
  
Shandong Energy Heavy Equipment Manufacturing Group Co. Ltd 1,120 
  
China Coal Mining Equipment Co. Ltd 1,034 
  
Pingmei Shenma Equipment Group Co. Ltd 932 
  
Zhengzhou Coal Mining Machinery Group Co. Ltd 555 
   
Table7: The top Five Chinese mining machinery manufacturers in 2015. 
 
Source: http://mt.sohu.com/20160804/n462569724.shtml viewed on 2016-11-16. 
 
 
 
In 2016, The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) issued a 
report on Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP). This index uses three dimensions 
of sub-indicators to evaluate different countries’ industrial competitiveness. The 
three dimensions are: Capacity to produce and export manufactured goods; 
technological deepening and upgrading; world impact (UNIDO, 2016, p.199). Among 
the five most competitive are four high-income countries (Germany, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, and the United States), while China ranks fifth. China's position in 
the ranking is attributable to its high share of global trade, although low per capita 
values indicate that manufacturing has the potential to grow further (Ibid, p.201). 
The Chinese Academy of Engineering also issues a similar report, i.e. Manufacturing 
 
 
 
96 
 
Power Development Index Report. In the latest version, China ranked fourth18.It has 
 
four first-tier indicators, i.e. quantity, quality, structure, and sustainability.  
First Tier 2012 2013 Annual 2014 Annual 
Indicators    Growth  Growth 
       
Quantity  42.93 46.77 3.84 49.22 2.45 
       
Quality  12.76 13.28 0.52 13.40 0.12 
       
Structure  19.32 19.52 0.2 18.78 -0.74 
      
Sustainability 14.48 14.46 -0.02 14.96 0.5 
       
Overall  89.48 94.02 4.54 96.36 2.34 
        
Table8: Changes in China's four first-tier Manufacturing Power Development Index 
 
indicators from 2012 to2014. 
 
Source: http://www.360doc.com/content/16/0604/07/22081874_564896641.shtml viewed on 
2016-11-16. 
 
According to these two reports, it seems that China has become a manufacturing 
superpower. In fact, China's position in these rankings can be ascribed to quantity 
rather than quality. In the second report, other high-ranking countries score higher in 
quality than China. The preference for foreign mining machines is a vivid reflection of 
the inferior quality of Chinese products. 
 
 
One possible explanation of this phenomenon is that history matters. Prior to the 
reform and opening-up era, there were several coal mining machine manufacturers. 
Their task was to offer services to the local coal mines. For instance, Zheng Zhou coal 
mining equipment factory（郑州煤机厂）main customers were the coal mines in 
Henan province. This led to the narrow horizon of each manufacturer, they only 
focused upon local needs, which was not a severe problem in the past but will have 
detrimental consequences in an era of globalisation. The firms which grow more 
 
 
18 http://www.cae.cn/cae/html/main/col34/2016-
07/01/20160701085455818943772_1.html viewed on 2016-11-16. 
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rapidly under globalisation are those that can meet the requirements of different 
customers, especially when the industry in question is mining. As is widely known, 
there is a great diversity of geological structures all over the world. the ability of 
mining machine manufacturing firms to adapt can only be cultivated by designing 
and producing different kinds of machines which can be used on different occasions. 
Those Chinese firms are flirted (quoted Prof Martin Fransman's remarks) by the large 
regional market in different parts of China and, to make matters worse, they used to 
have ‘iron rice bowl’, because the mines in a specific region also have only one choice 
when they made purchasing decisions. This isolated the users and producers of the 
machines. The lack of user-producer interaction kills the potential communication 
opportunities thus blocking the opportunity for innovation. After the Reform and 
Opening-up, especially after the socialist market economic reform, these firms were 
pushed to compete in the market so they have been trying to gradually develop the 
capacity to compete in an environment which they are not familiar with, although 
the pace is slow. In consequence, Chinese mining machine manufacturers lost their 
market share when the global giants came to China. The current mining machine 
market in China is highly stratified. The largest mining companies, such as Shenhua, 
can purchase the most advanced machines, while most other mining companies can 
only select from a list of local or small manufacturing companies. As for relatively 
small manufacturing companies, the tough years after 2012 distracted them. For 
instance, Jizhong Energy Group, one of the largest coal mining companies in China, 
owns a small equipment manufacturing company. According to the report the 
company provided, it has a revenue of 1.53 billion yuan (US$245.6 million). It used to 
manufacture coal mining machinery, but due to the terrible condition of coal mining 
after 2012, it has developed several other business fields. It has begun to produce 
environmental protection vehicles. It has also co-operated with a German company 
and produced military equipment for the People's Liberation Army. The situation 
facing this company epitomises that of the average Chinese mining equipment 
manufacturer. They need to choose either to diversify or to compete with other 
counterpart companies not via quality but via price. Many small mining equipment 
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manufacturing companies have merged with mining companies, but this will not 
make them better off as their mother companies annex them in order to become 
larger, not to help them promote their products. Even after the acquisition, the 
mother company will not promise to purchase their products. If the mother company 
is big enough, it will definitely prefer foreign products. 
 
 
One thing worth mentioning here is that, China is good at manufacturing hydraulic 
support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure3: Chinese made hydraulic support. 
 
 
 
A hydraulic support is a mining support in which the load-bearing elements (pillars or 
props), movement, and the shifting of ceilings, protective coverings, and auxiliary 
units are performed by means of hydraulic devices. Its function is to create space in 
which a mining machine or workers can operate and perform their tasks. The 
strength of Chinese-made hydraulic supports is that its height is higher and can meet 
various kinds of geological conditions. An interviewee said that a great many foreign 
visitors come to China to see the operation of Chinese-made hydraulic supports. 
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I will say something about the policy mentioned above, namely, the encouragement 
to instil Chinese elements into the production process in the hope of improving 
Chinese firms' technological capability. Actually, this policy can be viewed as a 
continuation of the ‘trading market for technology’ (TMFT) policy. China 
implemented TMFT policy from the early 1980s to the late 1990s in the hope of 
simultaneously attracting more FDI and improving domestic firms’ technological 
capability. This policy contributed to the advancement of technology to some extent 
but was not effective in cultivating the endogenous technological capability of 
domestic firms, thus it was finally abandoned (Xia & Zhao, 2012). 
 
 
In my opinion, this policy has had an adverse effect in that it failed to distinguish 
between two concepts - production capacity and technological capability: 
 
The former incorporates the resources used to produce industrial goods at given levels of 
efficiency and given input combinations: equipment (capital-embodied technology), 
labour skills (operating and managerial know-how and experience), product and input 
specifications, and organisational systems. Technological capability incorporates the 
additional and distinct resources needed to generate and manage technical change, 
including skills, knowledge and experience, and institutional structures and linkages. (Bell 
& Pavitt, 1993, p.260-261). 
 
With the assistance of foreign partners, Chinese firms could produce the machines 
rapidly and of good quality, but this is an improvement of production capacity alone, 
while the technological capability will not be automatically achieved. Just as we 
cannot count on frontline workers at Foxconn to acquire knowledge of the design of 
the iPhone, we cannot expect the production co-operators to be future product 
designers either. Technological capability can only be gained by taking part in the 
whole process of designing, merely watching or undertaking processes under the 
supervision of others will not do it. The policy in question, however, involves 
removing Chinese firms' motivation to do their own R&D. Because their foreign 
friends will do it, and they have to establish joint ventures to sell their products, the 
basic technical ability of Chinese firms will finally be eroded, and in the end the 
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Chinese engineers will become salesmen.19 
 
 
In conclusion, the path-dependence of this sector, as well as improper policy, 
contribute to the low level of innovation. The development trend, however, is not 
too depressing. Liefner and Zeng (2016, p99) argue that: “Innovation processes 
typical of mechanical engineering, emphasizing localization and customization, 
ideally match with the current needs of China’s rapidly growing and diversifying 
economy”. Investment in R&D by Chinese companies has increased recently, leading 
companies such as Sany have appeared, the promotion of the manufacturing sector 
is time-consuming, and the inputs need longer to be transferred to output compared 
with other functions of mining. 
 
 
 
4.4 The Mining Stage and the Mineral Processing (Dressing) 20Stage 
 
For most people, it seems to be common sense that all stages in Chinese mining are 
quite low-tech and innovation rarely occurs. This research, however, offer 
contrasting findings. Among all the stages of mining, variability in innovation can be 
seen, meaning that some stages have contributed more innovation than others. The 
fieldwork relating to the mineral excavation stag provides empirical evidence for the 
findings. Meanwhile, the ensuing stage, namely, the mineral extraction stage, also 
demonstrates its achievements regarding innovation. As a result, these two stages 
can be seen to constitute an innovation model in the Chinese mining industry. 
 
19 According to Feng (2010), there are some firms whose development has been independent of 
TMFT advocacy. They relied upon in-house developed products from the very beginning after 
entering the corresponding industries, and succeeded in building sustainable competitiveness. 
He points out four components which form the distinctive differences in organisational learning 
systems between successful firms and those which have failed to build endogenous technological 
capability, i.e. the strategic intent, the authority over strategic resource allocation, the pattern of 
organisational mobilisation and learning integration, and the facilities and institutions for 
knowledge accumulation.  
20 In the field of extractive metallurgy and mineral processing, also known as ore processing, 
that is, the process of separating commercially valuable minerals from their ores. As a result, this 
research uses the term ‘mineral processing’ to refer to the stage following the mining stage. 
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To some extent, these two stages have a symbiotic relationship in China. Most 
Chinese mining firms specialise in mining and mineral processing, and all of the 
mining firms I have been to perform both mining and processing. By performing 
these two operations, the firm can enjoy an economy of scope and by their nature 
the two processes cannot be separated. It is not surprising that the innovation levels 
of the two stages are similar. In this context, their innovation levels are higher 
compared with other stages (mainly prospecting and metallurgy). When I recalled 
the comments of my interviewees concerning the divergence of innovation 
performance between different stages of the Chinese mining industry, the whole 
picture became clearer. They believed that, in the mining and mineral processing 
stages, China performs well, with some technological breakthroughs achieved by the 
Chinese. However, to say that the technological capability of Chinese mining firms is 
effective is wrong because mining firms in China mainly focus upon the business 
operation rather than doing R&D. They are adopters of innovation rather than 
creators of innovation. The position of the stage in the complete chain of the mining 
industry and the distance of its final product from commercial profit exerts a huge 
impact on the motivation to innovate. In other words, the closer the final product of 
a specific stage is to the market, the higher the motivation of R&D staff working at 
this stage. This is because, if the R&D achievement can be commercialised sooner, 
the relevant personnel can witness their commercial contribution more quickly and 
can gain the financial reward more quickly. This could explain the relative lack of 
innovation at the prospecting stage in China and the relative lucrativeness of 
innovation in the mining and processing stages. The final product of processing21 is 
less pure, which means the same amount of the final product contains more valuable 
minerals, be it coal or non-ferrous metal, than the final product of metallurgy. 
Consequently, the final product of the processing stage is sold more easily, while as 
 
21 The final product of mining is the input of processing and just as I mentioned before, the final 
product of mining will not be put into outside market, to the contrary it still inside one mining firm, 
so only the final product of processing will be discussed here. 
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the final product of metallurgy is purer the market needs are less if we take the 
industrial structure of China into consideration. More advanced industries need 
purer metals or coals, but as China is still a country focused upon the lower end of 
the value chain, advanced industry is not that important or the number and the 
output value is not that significant. Based on the foregoing, we must conclude that 
the mining firms’ final product or the processing stage's final product has more 
potential for commercialisation, thereby creating more incentives for innovation. 
 
 
 
This explanation for the phenomenon that relatively more innovations appear at the 
mining stage will be discussed later. For now, the discoveries regarding mining and 
processing stage will be fully elaborated. 
 
 
 
These two stages constitute the major part of the whole mining industry and my 
fieldwork because they are exactly what most Chinese mining firms are engaged in, and 
because of this they are also the main research topic for most scholars in universities and 
research institutes. Scholars in Central South University,22 Kunming University of Science 
and Technology,23 China University of Mining and Technology24 were interviewed, and 
mining firms such as Hunan Coal Mining Group25,Suancigou Coal mine of Yitai 
Group26,Jingmei Group27, Yindu Mining Group28,Yunnan Tin Group29 
 
22 It is located at Hunan Province, central China and good at metallurgy, one of 985 
program university.985 program universities are the top universities in China, this program 
was established at the 100th anniversary of Peking University, aimed at building world first 
tier universities for China.  
23 It is located at southwest of China and is good at metal processing and metallurgy  
24 It is located at Beijing , the best coal mining university in China.  
25 Hunan Province, central China.  
26 Inner Mongolia, north China.  
27 In Beijing.  
28 East of Inner Mongolia.  
29 Yunnan Province, Southwest of China.  
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Jizhong Energy Group30and so on and so forth were visited. These organisations 
scattered around China have their own strengths and weaknesses. 
 
 
 
 
Interviewees were asked the following questions: What role does technology play in 
your firms? Do you have an R&D department? What proportion of your profits do 
you invest in R&D? They were also asked to show the patents they applied for and 
other technological breakthroughs they achieved in the past. Apart from this, I also 
went to their factories to see exactly how the machines operate and I hope that, 
having watched this process carefully, I understand and envision the possible 
directions of innovation and better comprehend the functions of innovation 
performed in production processes. I even went underneath the ground once in 
Suancigou coal mine to experience the daily work of an average coal miner. I will now 
map a rudimentary picture of the work being done in Chinese mining firms. The 
experiences of visiting different coal mines will be referred to in order to depict the 
excavation stage and the experience of visiting a lead(Pb) mine and a zinc(Zn) mine 
will be drawn upon to illustrate the extraction stage. 
 
 
 
Although my father works for a coal mining group, I had never been into a coal mine 
prior to my visit to Suancigou in Ordos, Inner Mongolia. The guide asked me to put 
on an outfit before going down. This mine is privately owned. The popular perception 
of a privately-owned mine is often very negative. The typical image is of miners 
wearing dirty clothes doing strenuous work under the dim light of a bulb. But much 
to my surprise, the mine I visited is very advanced technologically and according to 
my interviewee's narrative the social welfare of the firm matches that of a large SOE. 
The mine owner has done charity work and has been reported on by the Chinese 
media. This is because this private company is among the largest in China. As for 
those below average, the working conditions are still unpromising and they will 
 
30  Hebei Province, north China. 
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not let visitors into their mines. The degree of mechanisation in Suancigou is quite 
high, most of the mining work is being done by machines. 
 
 
 
After donning the clothes and being given some emergency equipment, one worker 
(who has a bachelor's degree) led me to the entrance of the mine and then we got 
into a jeep and were taken to the operation face of the mine. The space in the mine 
was quite roomy, and the air was not teeming with coal dust. After about five 
minutes’ drive, we reached our destination. The first thing I saw there was a line of 
spare machines. As the main operation of the excavation process is done by 
machines, it is imperative that the mine have some spare machines in case of 
machine breakdown. Then we walked to the operation face of the mine. Much to my 
surprise again, I did not witness a large number of miners. Instead, I just saw a 
machine and a few miners who were resting. The workers told me that, because the 
machines are not in operation, visitors were allowed to enter the mine for at that 
time it is safer. A worker introduced the machine. He majored in mining so he is quite 
knowledgeable about the mining machine. He shed light on the function of each 
component. Thanks to his introduction, I could imagine the situation. By and large, 
the work of the miners was easy and safe. Prior to being sent into the mine, they 
were required to go through a training course and the content of the course was 
about how to control the machine. For this group of workers, the expertise is not 
necessary, as is a university education. Most of the workers of this sort are local 
residents. Thus, the firm has contributed to the improvement of the well-being of the 
local people. As regards the minters’ salaries, it is much higher than that of other jobs 
in the region. Besides, there are technicians who repair or service the machines, 
most of which are university graduates. It took us around an hour to finish this quasi-
trip. The guide also led me to the coal mine's processing machine but as he was not 
in charge he sometimes could not provide clear instructions. 
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To sum up, the visit to Suancigou coal mine changed my perception of coal mines in 
China, especially regarding the typical image of a privately-owned coal mine. One 
explanation is that the different level of technology intensity is not determined by 
the type of ownership (State-owned versus privately owned) but by the size and age 
of the mine. The new and large mines tend to use more state-of-the-art technology, 
while older or smaller mines either have heavy social burdens or fall short of money 
to purchase the technology to replace people. As a result, current policies 
implemented by the Chinese government to encourage the merger and acquisition 
between large Chinese coal mines and small coal mines (or even coal pits) does make 
sense. The question, as far as technological innovation is concerned, however, is the 
same as in other industries. Given the increasing adoption of technology or 
technology-intensive equipment, will the technological capability of Chinese 
machinery manufacturers be improved accordingly? I am not going to argue that 
there is no innovation at this stage. On the contrary, I will offer several examples 
later in this thesis. I came to know this type of innovation from conducting two 
interviews, both with individuals with PhD degrees. One is a PhD candidate of China 
University of Mining and Technology, the other is the director of the Technology 
Centre of Jingmei Group. In short, this visit furnished a vivid picture of what is being 
done in one of the most advanced coal mines in China. 
 
 
 
The visit to Yindu Mining Group, a lead and zinc mine, at Chifeng city in Inner 
Mongolia, was earlier than the trip to Suancigou. But, the main reason for my visit is 
mineral processing rather than mineral excavation, I decided to introduce this trip 
after Suancigou. 
 
 
 
As at Suancigou, Yindu Mining Group is also located far from an urban area and the 
mineral processing technology used by Yindu is also quite advanced. I did not watch 
the mining stage, I just came across the original ore pit in which the final product was 
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stored and awaited processing. A technician gave a brief introduction to the 
processing operation. It is divided into two parts, the physical processing stage and 
the chemical processing stage. It is obvious that the first stage is about using laws of 
physics to process the ores and the second is about using chemical methods to 
undertake processing. The mechanism here is that, by using a physical approach, the 
ores will be smashed, so that they do not remain big rocks but become powder. 
There are still many impurities in this powder, therefore, it has to go through 
chemical reactions. During my trip, I watched the whole process and as this is my first 
time in a mineral processing factory, I asked lots of questions to make sure I could 
understand the principle of the machines. This tour, together with the first tour, 
helped me to link the mining stage with the processing stage. In the Chinese context, 
mining and processing are often combined and called Cai Xuan,Cai’ means 
excavation (Cai Kuang) and ‘Xuan’ means processing (Xuan Kuang). Generally 
speaking, the mining stage solves the problem of moving the mines from underneath 
the ground to the surface, while processing removes the impurities. Moreover, 
taking Yindu as an example, during the mining stage the engineers need to think 
about how to facilitate the ensuing processing stage. Using a football metaphor, the 
mining stage is like midfielders whose main task is to pass the ball to the striker while 
the processing stage is reminiscent of striker’s purpose. Consequently, any mine 
design has to take the two stages into consideration. Actually, the mining stage itself 
includes some type of processing. In Yindu, the ores got from the mining stage will be 
put into a machine which separates the ores according to the diameter of the ore 
rock. The bigger pieces will be sent through a smashing process and the smaller will 
go directly to the next stage. When the diameters of the ore rocks are small enough, 
they will be conveyed to the chemical processing stage. A ball mill will further smash 
the ores into powder so as to increase the efficiency of the incoming chemical 
reaction. The whole factory is quite labour-saving and I did not find many workers in 
it. The factory environment is also better than expected and, as temporary visitors, 
we were not required to wear masks. I only found factory workers in masks during 
the later stage of physical processing. This is because, during this stage the danger of 
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breathing in dust is high. The technician told me that the processing machine was 
made by a Joint Venture in Tianjin, but it is designed by a foreign firm. The engineers 
in Yindu made some incremental innovations, such as changing the procedure of the 
machine to make it more suitable to the local surroundings. Technological innovation 
is important to the firm but the firm itself does not focus upon it; they ask the 
manufacturer to do it. What the firm could do to augment its profit is some kind of 
organisational innovation. Apart from that, the firms could also innovate by 
participating in some parts of the processing stage. For instance, Yindu's technicians 
found the chemical reaction designed by a famous scholar did not work well. They 
conducted experiments themselves and finally found a better prescription and 
persuaded the scholar. More often than not, processing firms can only make this kind 
of marginal and incremental innovation. 
 
 
 
The final product of the processing stage is also the final product of the mining, 
which can be sold to the market, sometimes to an end user, sometimes to a 
metallurgy factory. In the past decade, as the profits from mining are very high, lots 
of people have entered this industry. The low entry barrier results in over-production 
and sharp contrasts in the technology level of different mining firms. 
 
 
 
Except for the trips I took to the mines, I also interviewed a number of scholars who 
specialize in mining and processing. I will not go into details of the interviews. My 
general impression of the interactions between scholars and workers in the 
production line is that, unlike the relationships between prospecting scholars and 
prospectors, mining or processing scholars and miners in production units have close 
links with each other. In Triple Helix terminology, two of the three helices interlink 
with each other, creating space for the so-called endless transition. In this context, 
‘transition’ means the change caused by innovation. Meanwhile, the other helix, 
namely, the government, is not absent since it contributes to the formation of the 
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links between companies and universities. First, some examples will be used to 
illustrate the innovations at the mining stage, and then the interactions between 
scholars and mining firms will be further discussed. 
 
 
 
One of the examples is called the longwall top coal caving(LTCC) method. The picture 
below is a Chinese mining machine. It is produced by the China Coal Zhangjiakou Coal 
Mining Machinery Co. Ltd. ( 中煤张家口煤矿机械有限责任公司 ). The picture 
appears in a brochure published by the firm to promote itself in a conference in 
Australia. The machine is an example of top coal caving equipment. There is also a 
paragraph in the brochure which introduces what longwall top coal caving is. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure4：A long top coal caving machine. 
 
Longwall top coal caving is a special type of longwall mining applicable to very thick 
seams (greater than 4.5m) where good quality coal is left because conventional 
longwall equipment has not yet been designed to operate successfully beyond 
around a mining height of 5m. It enables increased recovery for an incremental 
additional cost.31 
 
 
 
 
31  http://undergroundcoal.com.au/fundamentals/07_caving.aspx viewed on 2016-11-17. 
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The method originated in Europe but has been developed in China in more recent 
years and is used there extensively and successfully. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
LTTC was used to extract thick coal seams in the former Soviet Union, France, and the 
former Yugoslavia (Wang et al, 2015). Given the progress of hydraulic support 
technology, fully mechanised top-coal caving technology was improved and 
successfully applied in some countries. In the late 1980s, top-coal caving technology 
was not widely applied and its potential was not fully achieved due to competition 
from other energy industries, changes in social and political systems, and the 
difficulties associated with its application in difficult geological conditions. Until 1992, 
fully mechanised top-coal caving faces had been outlawed in all countries, with the 
last site being in Russia. By that time, China was the only country using the LTCC 
mining method to extract coal from thick coal seams (Wang, 2009). In recent years, 
with the development of LTCC mining technology in China, the technology and 
equipment is beginning to be introduced in other countries, such as Australia, and is 
successfully used in underground coal mines. So, what exactly is LTCC? 
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Figure5：Diagrammatic view of the principle of longwall top coal caving 
 
Source: http://undergroundcoal.com.au/fundamentals/07_caving.aspx viewed 
on 2016-11-17. 
 
 
 
The lower section of the seam is cut by a conventional longwall set-up, except that 
the longwall supports have a longer rear canopy extending past the base into the 
goaf32. The extended canopies have a sliding door fitted into them. 
 
 
 
An additional armoured force conveyor (AFC) is attached to the rear of the chocks 
and runs directly below the canopy openings. As the face moves forward, the coal left 
above the section cut by the machine falls onto the extended canopies, providing the 
goaf is caving normally. The sliding doors in the canopies are sequentially opened, 
and the coal falls through onto the rear mounted AFC. The main-gate stage loader is 
extended beyond the face conveyor to enable the rear-mounted AFC to discharge 
coal directly onto it and carry coal to the main-gate conveyor system. 
 
 
 
What China is really good at, according to my interviewees, is not the manufacturing 
of the machine but the way in which the machine is used. The Chinese top coal 
caving method can be used in a variety of circumstances, such as in a mine which has 
high intensity of gas, or a mine which has a very complicated geological structure. To 
some extent, this is a kind of process innovation rather than a product innovation. 
 
 
 
China is also good at other mechanical mining methods for thick coal seams, i.e. a 
method of fully mechanised mining with a large mining height. In a conventional fully 
 
 
32 Also called gob. Mining. waste or barren material. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/gob 
viewed on 2017-7-19. 
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mechanised top-coal caving longwall face, the coal cutting height is normally 3.0–
3.5 m. Based on the rule of a cutting to caving ratio of 1:3, the conventional top-coal 
caving height is 910.5 m. In other words, the maximum thickness of coal extraction is 
12–14 m (3+9–3.5+10.5). In terms of ultra-thick coal seams with thicknesses 
greater than 14 m, if the cutting height remains as 3.0–3.5 m, there will be many 
problems. For instance, the cutting to caving ratio will be too low (1:4.7 if the cutting 
height is 3.5 metre in a 20-metre-thick coal seam). Thus, it is difficult to cave top 
coals, and the coal recovery will be low. At the same time, the increase of coal 
production will result in the increase of gas emission and the difficulties in removing 
gas due to a limited cross-section area at the coal face (Wang et al, 2015). To deal 
with this, the China Coal Technology & Engineering Group, Datong Coal Mine Group, 
and 15 other organisations in China launched a significant project to develop coal 
mining technologies and equipment for coal seams with thicknesses greater than 14 
m. After the completion of the project, a coal extraction method was developed for 
top-coal caving with a large mining height, as well as a ground control theory for 
ultra-thick coal seams. In addition, mining technology for top-coal caving with a large 
mining height, the ground support technology for roadways in coal seams with a 
large cross-section, and the prevention and control technology for gas and fire 
hazards were developed and applied. Furthermore, a hydraulic support with a mining 
height of 5.2 m, a shearer with high reliability, and auxiliary equipment were 
developed and manufactured. Practical application of the technologies and 
equipment was successfully completed at the No. 8105 coal face in the Tashan coal 
mine, China. Few other countries have achieved such a technological breakthrough. 
Furthermore, Datong is not the only case in point in China. In addition to the Tashan 
mine in Datong, currently, technologies and equipment for ultra-thick coal seam have 
been used in 32 coal mines in China, including 13 mining areas such as Datong, 
Pingshuo, Shengdong, Xinjiang, covering eight provinces or autonomous regions in 
China, such as Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Shaanxi, Shandong, Gansu, Anhui, 
and Liaoning. 
 
112 
 
 
 
Compared with the prospecting and manufacturing stages, the mining and mineral 
processing stages are relatively innovative. How do we explain this divergence of 
innovation performance? I would conclude by stating that the dynamics of systems 
of innovation at various stages are different, as are the Triple Helix in operation at 
different stages. Based on the literature review, I mainly utilise a System of 
Innovation and Triple Helix to organise this research. The former theory places firms 
at the core position of the whole system, whereas the latter focuses upon the role 
played by universities in knowledge production. According to my fieldwork, mining 
machinery manufacturers account for the most innovations, other users of this 
innovation system do not make significant contributions. Meanwhile, universities 
and academic institutions are prime contributors of the innovations occurring at the 
mining and mineral processing stages. As a result, the System of Innovation approach 
will be more useful when used to study the innovations of manufacturing firms and 
the Triple Helix approach can be used to explain the higher innovation level of the 
mining and processing stages. The nature of the innovation activities and the 
ecosystem of different stages are different. This contrast might foresee ways of 
improving the existing theory and also remind me of the rationale I might adopt to 
organise my research. 
 
 
 
Based on the foregoing, I would argue that more innovations have been created in at 
the mining and processing stages because we find more interaction between the 
Triple Helix at these two stages. On the contrary, as the firms which specialise in 
machinery manufacturing do not co-operate intensively with other components of 
the innovation system in which they are involved, this leads to their relative poor 
innovation performance. More specifically, one can find numerous laws in China 
which encourage the co-operation of mines with universities and academic 
institutions. This is a vivid positive example of the Triple Helix. All three parts are 
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actively engaged in this interaction. Another difference worth pointing out is that the 
technological innovations at the mining and processing stages are more like process 
innovation, whereas those at the equipment manufacturing stage are more like 
product innovation. The former entails less physical asset input, thus might be 
cheaper and less capital intensive. The latter takes a longer time to be fulfilled, so the 
current situation is also subject to rapid transition. More interestingly, the centrally 
planned economy's historical legacy still lingers on. In the past, China copied the 
Soviet model to establish a higher education system which characterized many 
revolutionary and specialist universities ( 又 红 又 专 ), which have seamless 
relationships with mines, thus pave the way for further and deeper co-ordination 
among the same actors in a novel context ,i.e. the socialist market economy. Unlike 
its western counterpart, the Chinese higher education system per se has an 
endogenous impulse to extend its network to reach the production unit, namely the 
mines. To some extent, this kind of path-dependence explains the eagerness of 
universities and mines to be business partners and the effectiveness of the policy. 
When it comes to manufacturing firms, historically, the equipment once used in the 
mining industry could be bought from either the Soviet Union or Western countries, 
thereby reducing the incentive to innovate domestically. Consequently, interactions 
between manufacturing firms and academic institutes were looser. After the 
establishment of a socialist market economy, no actors involved in this field were 
ready to construct a new bridge to the outside world. In conclusion, the finding of 
this research demonstrates that history matters. The situation formed during the 
inchoate stage of the Sectoral System of Innovation in the Chinese mining industry 
still exerts its influence nowadays. The old policies helped to shape this System of 
Innovation, and the old structure of the system will wield its contemporary influence 
though probably in a new form. What was once thought to be a hindrance to 
innovation could accelerate it when the macro context changes. 
 
 
 
The macro economy has always had an impact on the development of each industry, 
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and mining industry is no exception. In 2015 a large proportion of Chinese mining 
firms claimed heavy losses. It is reported that 50% of the listed Chinese coal 
companies were in deficit. This economic downturn might serve future purposes as a 
sieve to select which firms could survive and what approach they adopt. Some 
positive aspects, at least potential positive aspects, have been found. The number of 
coal companies reduced while the proportion of large companies increased. The 
mines with production capacity over 1.2 million tons account for 68% of the total 
production capacity. This industry's trend towards centralisation trend is becoming 
clear. The top four producers produced 868 million tons of coal, representing 23.5% 
of national production. The corresponding figure for the top eight producers is 
35.5 %. The number of producers whose production capacity is over 100 million tons 
is nine. The contribution rate of science and technology during the 12th Five Year 
Plan is 49%, 10% higher than that during the 11th Five Year Plan. The non-ferrous 
metal industry is going through a similar process. With the closure of old mines and 
the opening of new mines, the part played by technological innovation is sure to be 
larger. The new mining giants are also more eager to invest in R&D. Some companies 
have begun to 'walk out' and compete with their global counterparts. These strategic 
actions need time to bear fruit. The firms devoting more to R&D will excel in the long 
run, but might face big challenges in the short term. This is exactly where the 
government could play a pivotal role. According to China Statistical Yearbook on 
Science and Technology, in 2015 alone the state-owned and collectively-owned 
mining companies employed some 956,000 technical staff, which is large proportion. 
Whether their input can be transferred to effective output remains to be seen. 
 
 
 
 
Based on the history study and a summary of the different stages of mining, we may 
draw a brief conclusion here. The divergence of innovation performance between 
mining companies and equipment companies can be explained by path-dependence. 
To be more specific, historically, mining companies in China have developed close 
relationship with universities and research institutes. As a consequence, this kind of 
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co-operation helps mining companies improve their innovation performance. By 
contrast, the innovation capability of equipment companies was handicapped by 
their loose interaction with the academic community. 
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5. Case Studies 
 
There are several successful innovation stories in Chinese mining, occurring 
throughout the industry chain and across China. Each case has its own features. By 
contemplating such narratives, it is possible that the underlying laws which make 
each unique and valuable can be discerned. 
 
 
In this section, three case studies will be provided. The System of Innovation, the 
Triple Helix, and Innovation Ecosystem frameworks will be referred to. This section 
aims to demonstrate the process through which innovations in the mining industry 
occur and are diffused. The theories mentioned in this research will be tested in the 
real world. As we have seen, these approaches do not contradict each other, nor do 
they substitute for one another. In fact, they complement each other by explaining 
the same case. Their cumulative effect can help to make this story more complete 
and thereby contributing to a better understanding of innovations in the Chinese 
mining industry. 
 
Here is the founding of this chapter:The divergence of innovation performance 
across the different stages of mining identified by the former chapter is informed by 
two factors. First, the distance between final products and market or 
commercialisation, and second, the intensity of interaction between the mining 
company (including prospecting company and equipment manufacturer) and the 
university or research institute. To be more specific, the closer the distance and the 
higher the intensity of the interaction, the better the innovation performance. If one 
of the two factors do not appear, it is possible that this company's innovation 
performance is not desirable. 
 
 
 
The System of Innovation approach entails that the observer focuses upon the 
central role of firms in innovation without ignoring other participants. Therefore, all 
the case studies will pay due attention to mining firms, and try to depict the 
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complicated network through which firms get the assistance and resources they 
need. The components and the relationships which bind them will be discussed. As 
for the Triple Helix approach, the case study will try to describe the role taken by 
universities, research institutes, governments, and mining firms. These players are 
influential in innovation. To some extent, their behaviour shapes the outlook of the 
System of Innovation. The operation of this system and its outcome, namely, 
innovation, cannot be fully understood if insufficient light is shed upon major players' 
interactions. Regarding the Innovation Ecosystem, it attaches importance to the 
dynamics of the system rather than the structure of the system. By displaying what is 
going on in this system, it will not be static. Meanwhile, the ecosystem approach 
focuses more upon the functional provision of a system, rather than focusing upon 
its physical setting. As a result, in the case study the kind of functions the system in 
question provides in order to encourage innovative activities will be elaborated. The 
three systemic approaches lay the foundation for further discussion. At the end of 
this section, the fruits of the three approaches will be discussed, while the 
differences between the three case studies will be analysed by using the three 
approaches. The case studies seek to flesh out relatively abstract theoretical analysis, 
and draw a more vivid and detailed picture of the Chinese mining industry. 
 
 
The chapter contains three case studies. The first is about a regional industry. The 
aim is to clearly depict the role of governments in local development and innovation. 
Government actions in this case will serve as an epitome of all governments at 
whatever level in China. The second case looks at an SOE in mining, and the concrete 
innovation effort of a firm will be introduced. The last case study is about a 
machinery firm, looking at its technological achievements. These three quite 
different cases were chosen in order to increase the validity of this research and to 
cover as wide a field as possible within the limited space. These cases are also useful 
as they provide platforms for NSI, TH, and the Innovation Ecosystem. In a nutshell, 
the diversity of the Chinese mining industry and the System of Innovation can be 
partially demonstrated by the cases presented here. Apart from that, the functions of 
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each player of the System of Innovation and the way in which they perform their 
functions will be illustrated. 
 
 
5.1 The semi-coke industry in Yulin City 
 
Semi-coke is also called Lan Tan (兰炭), which literally means blue carbon in Chinese. 
It got the name ‘Lan Tan’ because, in the 1980s, the locals in Yulin city found that, 
after being burned, this kind of carbon burns blue. The name is more popular in the 
Chinese media, as local people in Yulin prefer this name and Yulin has become the 
largest production base for Lan Tan, although its scientific name is ‘semi-coke’. In this 
research, the more formal name will be used, but in most cases in China (even at 
some academic conferences), ‘Lan Tan’ is used. 
 
 
This case was chosen because of the following reasons. Above all, the case is a 
perfect choice to illustrate the basic logics of System of Innovation, the Triple Helix, 
and the Innovation Ecosystem. It also provides a platform to present the 
fundamental assumptions of these three theories. For the System of Innovation, as 
we have seen, the mining industry used to be subjected to intense state regulation 
and control. It has national features, and the mining industry is quite unique 
compared with other industries, be it manufacturing or services, thus the Sectoral 
System of Innovation can be used to analyse it. One unique feature of Yulin's semi-
coke case is that it also has obvious regional features as the semi-coke industry is 
mainly located in Yulin city, so the System of Innovation theory at different levels can 
be applied. For the Triple Helix framework, this case also offers an exemplary chance 
to put the theory into practice. The government of Yulin, local semi-coke firms, 
universities, and research institutes take part in this industry, each of them playing a 
tailored role in this Triple Helix model. This kind of interaction and co-operation 
contributes to a great many innovations in this industry. These actions will be 
identified and described in greater detail later. As regards the innovation ecosystem, 
the unique symbiosis between the local semi-coke firms and their technology co-
operator, namely universities and research institutes, the dynamic 
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evolution of the relationship between governments, academic organisations and 
business, the functions each part performs, all these phenomena are similar to an 
ecosystem. 
 
 
Second, I did an internship in the Municipal Development and Reform Commission 
(MDRC), thus I have prior knowledge of the semi-coke industry in Yulin and have 
established personal contact with officials there. One special feature of the Yulin case 
is that, after the market reform launched in the 1990s, generally speaking, coal 
mining has gone through a deregulation process. The government still holds the right 
to approve new mines and set production quotas, but seldom do they engage in the 
production process. While in Yulin's case the local governments (both municipal and 
county) act like co-ordinators, they help local firms which are weak in technological 
capabilities to establish contact with universities and research institutes which are far 
from production sites but strong in technology. The active involvement of 
governments in innovation and the relatively successful experience is helpful in 
broadening our understanding of the role governments should and could play well. 
The way through which governments participate in the local semi-coke industry will 
be brought to light. 
 
 
5.1.1 Basic Information about Yulin and semi-coke 
 
As Yulin city is not world renowned and most people are not familiar with semi-coke, 
some background information will be given before discussing this case. 
 
 
Yulin (Chinese: 榆林; pinyin: Yúlín) is a prefecture-level city in the Shanbei (north of 
Shaanxi) region of Shaanxi province, China. It borders Inner Mongolia to the north, 
Shanxi to the east, and Ningxia to the west. It has an administrative area of 43,578 
km² (16,826 square miles) and a population of 3,380,000. 
 
 
Yulin used to be a very poor city. One of its local residents was Li Zicheng (1606-1645), 
a rebel leader who established the Shun Dynasty and overthrew the Ming Dynasty. 
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He became a rebel leader because his hometown was so poor that he would have 
starved to death otherwise. In ancient China, Yulin was always a border city, the 
Great Wall in different dynasties passed through Yulin. It is a dry city and its 
neighbouring regions are all desert or desert steppe. The city to its south is Yan'an, 
which was the centre of the Chinese Communist revolution from 1936 to 1948. 
 
 
Thanks to the discovery of a large coalfield, Yulin's economy began to take off around 
2000. Its GDP grew at a staggering speed, and together with Ordos, it became 
nationally famous for its unparalleled development. In 2000 Yulin's GDP was only 
approximately 10 billion yuan (about US$1.21 billion). By 2010, its GDP had increased 
to about 170 billion yuan (about US$25 billion), 17 times what it was in 2000. This 
can be attributed to the unprecedented development of the coal industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The location of Shaanxi and Yulin 
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As a consequence, when the Chinese coal industry faces severe problems so does 
Yulin's economy. The turning point occurred in 2012. I happened to be in Yulin in 
2012. The annual GDP growth rate of Yulin in 2011 was 15%, while the same figure 
for 2012 was 12%. The figure then began to plummet, and the figures for 2013, 2014 
and 2015 were 8.8% ,9.0%, and 4.3% respectively.33 Yulin's mine owners used to be 
famous (or infamous) for spending money like water. They purchased lots of real 
estate properties in Beijing as well as Yulin and contributed to rocketing house prices. 
As a remote county of Yulin, Shenmu County teemed with millionaires. Before going 
to Yulin, I heard that being in Shenmu County is like watching a car exhibition free of 
charge. You see numerous BMWs or Land Rovers on the roads. All these economic 
achievements, however, are rather fragile due to the fact that the 'golden decade' of 
coal was the driving force behind this miracle. When the price of coal stopped rising 
and began to drop, Yulin's coal industry faced a huge challenge and so would Yulin's 
economy. In 2016 during my second trip to Yulin, I also visited Shenmu County. The 
relatively depressing atmosphere could be felt and it is reported that lots of rich 
people in Yulin have gone bankrupt. 
 
 
This trend was becoming obvious in 2012 while I was an intern in Yulin. The year 
2015 was the most miserable year in the past two decades. But Yulin was not alone. 
Most resource-rich cities, especially those whose cornerstone industry is coal, all 
suffered a harsh year in 2015. In fact, in 2012 the municipal DRC officials organised a 
series of conferences. Their themes were all linked with making diagnoses of Yulin's 
economy and searching for new sources of development dynamics. In 2012 Yulin's 
economy performed quite badly. The once fastest developing city in Shaanxi became 
the last but one place on the GDP growth table. To make matters worse, from 2013 
to 2015 this ranking remained unchanged. Although Yulin was still the second largest 
economy in Shaanxi province and ranked first in terms of GDP per capita, the 
difficulties it faces are hard to overestimate. 
 
33  http://www.yl.gov.cn/site/1/html/0/5/7/38421.htm viewed on 2016-11-28. 
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Based on the aforementioned situation in Yulin, one remedy the people of Yulin 
sought was innovation, more specifically, through the development of the semi-coke 
industry. This strategy has attracted the attention of the Mayor and the Party 
Secretary. Even some high-ranking officials in the central government have been 
aware of the importance of semi-coke for Yulin and for the country. This is because 
the physical and chemical properties of the coal in Yulin make it the perfect raw 
material for producing semi-coke and other related products. 
 
 
According to Merriam-Webster, semi coke is: "the solid residue obtained by 
carbonization especially of coal at a relatively low temperature (as below 700 ° C) 
that is in general softer and more friable than coke from carbonization at higher 
temperatures, that gives a hot smokeless fire, and that can be used as a domestic 
fuel."34According to Wiktionary, semi-coke is: "Any of a range of products 
intermediate in composition and consistency between coke and pitch formed by the 
incomplete carbonization of coal."35 In order to obtain semi-coke, the coal needs to 
go through carbonization, which is: "the term for the conversion of an organic 
substance into carbon or a carbon-containing residue through pyrolysis or 
destructive distillation. It is often used in organic chemistry with reference to the 
generation of coal gas and coal tar from raw coal."36 During this process, coal will be 
put into a hermetically sealed container, and heated without air. Compared with 
ordinary distillation, it entails a higher temperature. This process ends with three 
forms of substance, liquid, solid and gas, among which the liquid is mainly coal tar 
and the solid is semi-coke. In other words, semi-coke can be obtained by processing 
coals, and it is one of the three end products of the coal carbonization process. The 
reason why Yulin's coal is perfect raw material for producing semi-coke is that it 
 
34 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/semicoke viewed on 2016-1-28. 
 
35 https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/semicoke#English viewed on 2016-1-28. 
 
36 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbonization viewed on 2016-11-28. 
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contains more coal tar, thus making the carbonisation process more profitable. 
Strictly speaking, all the coal can be carbonised; the question is not a technological 
one but an economic one. During an interview with a coal mine manager in Hebei 
Province, he said that a government official in another province forced the local coal 
mines to produce semi-coke, but the coal in that province does not contain enough 
coal tar, and this project did not yield enough benefits. The logic of bolstering local 
firms to engage in semi-coke processing is to make the best use of Yulin's coal's 
advantage and add more value to the final products. This can help local firms 
augment their profits and broaden their marketing channels. 
 
 
Another scientific concept in relation to semi-coke is pyrogenation or pyrolysis (热解). 
Pyrolysis is the thermochemical decomposition of organic material at elevated 
temperatures in the absence of oxygen (or any halogen). It involves a simultaneous 
change of chemical composition and a physical phase, and is irreversible.37 The 
pyrolysis of coals can be traced back to the 18th century. At that time, people wanted 
to get household fuel through the pyrolysis of coals. Afterwards, they learned how to 
get raw materials for chemical engineering and fuels for engines by processing coal 
tar, a product of the pyrolysis of coals. The development of pyrolysis of coals has 
experiences the changing fortunes throughout history. Shortly after the Second World 
War, this technology enjoyed high speeds of growth, but after the 1960s, as the 
petrochemical industry began to take off, the status of coal pyrolysis dropped 
accordingly. Two reasons explain this, that is, the low price of crude oil and the 
relative shortage of coal in the rest of the world. After the 1990s, the pyrolysis of coal 
saw a resurgence due to the soaring price of crude oil. Scholars made some 
breakthroughs in their laboratories and basic research in this area was pushed 
forward. The question is that only in China did those academic achievements find a 
platform to be put into industrial application. In almost all other countries, they 
 
 
 
 
37  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyrolysis viewed on 2016-12-6. 
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never left the university laboratory38. It is through the middle or low temperature 
pyrolysis of coals that semi-coke can be obtained. To sum up, the pyrolysis of coals is 
not a new scientific discovery but the turn to coal pyrolysis in the hope of obtaining 
semi-coke and realise industrial application is unique in China. 
 
 
5.1.2 A brief history of the semi-coke industry in Yulin39 
 
What is unique in Yulin's case is the intensive involvement of government in local 
development. Moreover, this kind of involvement is not direct control or bringing 
order etc. By and large, Yulin's municipal government orchestrated the co-ordination 
of local firms, state-owned enterprises, universities, and research institutes, in the 
hope of doing the local economy good and finally making the local citizens' lives 
better. 
 
 
Yulin is a resource-rich city. If its natural resources had been found prior to the 
Reform and Opening-up, probably Yulin's municipal government would not have 
been influential enough as most of the regulation functions have been performed by 
the organisation in charge of managing local natural resources. Daqing is a case in 
point. Cities of this sort have relatively weak government compared with their 
resource regulation bodies, as, first of all, natural resources are usually found in 
remote areas. As a result, before the natural resources were found, government 
bodies were not well developed. Therefore, the central government would establish 
a managing body, a special organisation in charge of the development of the 
extraction of the resources as well as the development of this place. This sort of 
organisation has various names across different regions and their names change as 
time goes by. Some were called managing committees, some were called bureaux. In 
the 21st century most of these organisations have become companies, but the 
 
38 One reason is that China is the largest producer of coal and semi-coke.  
39 The information in this section originated in ‘A study of the strategy of sustainable 
development of Yulin’s semi-coke industry’, a government report issued by the Yulin 
Municipal Development and Reform Commission. 
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managers or directors still have quasi-governmental authority and often move into 
government posts. All the ensuing development of this place will proceed according 
to the needs of resource extraction. Under such circumstances, it is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, for the local government to interfere with the operation 
and development of the local mining industry. To some extent, it is safe to say that 
the mining regulation body predated the local government. If we use the analogy of 
the relationship between the Prussian state and the army, the relationship between 
the mining regulation organisation and the local government does not consist in the 
local city owning a coal mine or oilfield. On the contrary, the mine or oilfield owns a 
city. When the Triple Helix approach is used to study these mining cities, one thing 
the researcher should bear in mind is that the Triple Helix in operation in these cities 
is quite different from those in other Chinese cities, let alone those in western cities. 
The government helix and the industry helix in this Triple Helix overlap with each 
other or even merge. 
 
 
Then another question arises. The Triple Helix approach has been developed in 
western contexts, so is it suitable in Chinese contexts? After all, the Triple Helix 
becomes a double helix in the context depicted above. (This will be discussed further 
and in greater detail later.) As for the System of Innovation and the Innovation 
Ecosystem, the local government can do little to improve them. If the mining industry 
or oil mining industry in a specific area is of importance to the country, the 
administrative level of the mining regulation body will be high, sometimes as high as 
the mayoral level or even higher. For example, in Mentougou District,a suburb of 
Beijing, the leader is at the bureau level which is as high as the mayor of a local city, 
while the manager of the local mining bureau is also at bureau level. In Shijingshan 
District, another district of Beijing, where steel giant Shougang Group is located, the 
manager of Shougang is a vice-minister, which is higher than the leader of 
Shijingshan District. In these two cases, the local government cannot order or force 
the mining company or steel company to do anything; they have to negotiate with 
those companies. The case is similar in Daqing. In these cities, the Triple Helix does 
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not exist, or exists in a quite different way. The System of Innovation is relatively 
closed and displays parochial features, while the innovation ecosystem is not very 
dynamic. Consequently, these cities have experienced a process of transition, having 
suffered economic recession in the past. This can be partly explained by their 
innovation model, the less vibrant innovation atmosphere, while the autarkic style of 
knowledge-production gives rise to the scarcity of innovation and the slow pace of 
innovation diffusion. Apart from that, cities or regions of this category tend to have a 
longer mining history than other mining cities. When the decision-makers (the 
manager of the company alone or in co-operation with policy-makers) decided to 
launch a radical transition, the natural resources are going to be depleted, and lack of 
natural resources is tantamount to a lack of financial resources. All this results in only 
a few successful transition stories. 
 
 
Yulin belongs to another category. Its mining industry took off around the 1990s, at a 
time when the municipal government had been firmly established and could 
shoulder all kinds of responsibility. As a result, the resulting development of coal 
mining and related industry in Yulin was under the scrutiny of the municipal 
government. Different branches of the government were each in charge of a specific 
part of the mining development. The Development and Reform Commission, the 
Bureau of Science and Technology, the Bureau of Industry and Information 
technology, the Bureau of Finance 40all played their unique role. Of course, in China 
the party system is more authoritative than the government. The Party Committee of 
Yulin also exerts its influence on the local mining industry. In the mining cities more 
often than not, the government helix is the core of the Triple Helix as it is usually 
stronger than the other two helices. The local firms tend to be small, thereby 
possessing less bargaining power compared with large SOEs. As for research 
institutes, the newly emerging mining cities are always located in relatively remote 
 
40 Those government bodies’ names changed and sometimes new bodies were established, 
while sometimes old bodies were eliminated. In this thesis, the current government bodies 
are the main research targets. 
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areas, thus they seldom have enough human or financial resources to provide for 
research institutes, so they either have rather small academic organisations or, worse 
still, do not have a research institute. Under these circumstances, the government’s 
choice is pivotal in shaping the outlook of the Triple Helix of Yulin. The System of 
Innovation and Innovation Ecosystem in Yulin is also heavily influenced by 
government actions. The government in Yulin tried to diminish the distance between 
local industry and universities and research institutes, namely, create opportunities 
for knowledge users and knowledge producers to communicate smoothly. As a 
remote city, Yulin does not have sufficient knowledge production sites thus inviting 
outside partners is necessary. Most local companies are small and are not far-sighted 
enough to make strategic decisions. The municipal government makes every 
endeavour to bridge this gap. Its effort can be generalised so as to make the System 
of Innovation more open to outsiders (non-local participants), provide the functions 
which are essential for an Innovation Ecosystem, and building platforms for the three 
helices to share experiences and exchange ideas. Not every mining city's government 
does the same, neither have all of them achieved great success, as we will see at the 
end of this chapter. Luckily, at least as far as the Triple Helix framework is concerned, 
Yulin's local semi-coke industry has had periodic success, although it became slower 
due to tough years in the coal mining industry. 
 
 
5.1.2.1 The early period 
 
During the development of the semi-coke industry in Yulin, the municipal 
government played different roles. In fact, it did not directly take part in this industry 
during its burgeoning years, namely, in the 1980s. Around the late 1980s, some local 
coal mining companies attempted to cope with the recession of the coal market and 
the difficulty of transporting coal to other provinces by trying to invent a new 
method to produce coke from coal. The method was not arrived at by careful 
scientific research or accurate laboratory experimentation but by trial and error, and 
the inventors were not well-trained researchers. This is a typical learning-by-doing 
style of innovation and it was inspired by practical concerns. In order to obtain coke 
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or semi-coke, people should put the coals together and pile them up, then burn them. 
After the coal has burnt completely, water is used to extinguish the fire and the semi-
coke can be obtained. This method is easy and cheap, and the semi-coke can be used 
as a reducing agent. This has assisted local coal mines to sell more coal, and develop 
new business partners. It was so popular that in Yulin even people who did not have 
coal mining experience began to be active semi-coke producers. This method was the 
product of a certain period of time, representing the earliest exploration of the semi-
coke industry. The weaknesses of this method, however, are also apparent. The 
technique is too simple and not advanced enough, the quality of the product is 
unstable, and the success rate is not high. As the main product, only the semi-coke 
can be put onto the market. The by-product, namely, the coal tar and coal gas, cannot 
yield any commercial value. Furthermore, this method does not utilise state-of-the-
art equipment so it produces lots of pollutants. 
 
 
The 1990s witnessed the rapid development of Yulin's semi-coke industry. More 
advanced equipment was used, and the backward semi-coke producing method 
introduced in the previous paragraph was eliminated. A new form of tool called a 
vertical furnace 41(Zhili Lu or 直立炉. ) began to replace the older method. 
 
The semi-coke obtained by using the older method is called ‘man-made semi-coke’, 
while that obtained by using the vertical furnace is called ‘machine-made semi-coke’. 
According to the relevant data, by 2006 there were 294 semi-coke factories, annual 
production quantity stood at 20.04 million tons, and over 12,000 people worked in 
this industry. However, because the production of each factory was still small, the 
technology used was not frontier technology, and the geographical distribution of 
the factories was sparse, the semi-coke industry during this era was still considered 
 
 
41 According to an official working for Yulin Municipal DRC, these furnaces were mainly local 
products. Some were produced by semi-coke companies themselves, some were bought 
from other companies. As the semi-coke industry is largely a Chinese industry, few 
international companies design products for it. 
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to consume too much energy and pollution resulted, thereby the method was in 
danger of being eliminated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: A photo of a vertical furnace 
 
That period was unique. Economic development or, in other words, the pursuit of 
GDP, is the most important, even the sole target, of government. As long as it can 
enhance the local economy, the method's dark side was ignored, or at least 
downplayed, by the authorities concerned. Consequently, whilst this method caused 
severe pollution,42 wasted natural resources, and was low in efficiency, there was no 
government interference to curb this trend or to minimise its side effects. In general, 
the semi-coke industry during this period was in a laissez-faire situation, the 
government's role being to try every means to increase the production output of the 
industry so as to accelerate local economic growth. The government acted as an 
invisible hand, retreating from the regulation area, and allowed 100 semi-coke 
factories to flourish. Although it did not do too much to assist these factories' 
development, to some extent the government removed all the barriers and relieved 
 
42 After adopting new methods, the pollution has been reduced but as it is a business secret for 
semi-coke companies, the relevant data cannot be obtained. 
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the factories’ burden. Meanwhile, government officials accumulated precious 
knowledge of semi-coke, which became critical in the upcoming years. 
 
 
5.1.2.2 Post-2007 
 
Government regulation and industrial policy appeared from 2007. In that year, the 
government issued two important policies. The first is ‘The suggestions on structural 
adjustment and the development plan of Yulin's semi-coke industry’, the second is 
about the technology level of semi-coke factories, and it increased the technological 
entry barrier of this industry. Then the municipal government closed all the 271 small 
semi-coke factories whose production capacity was below 600,000 tons a year, built 
17 semi-coke industry parks, and five semi-coke production sites. More advanced 
machines were introduced and spread throughout the city. For example, the SJ-III 
vertical furnace produced by a local company, and the SH2007 vertical furnace 
designed by Shaanxi Metallurgy Research Institute. The scale of semi-coke activity 
was sharply increased and, with the help of the new equipment, not only the semi-
coke but also the other two by-products, namely, coal tar and coal gas, were collected 
and processed. In 2008 the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
approved the industry access criterion of the semi-coke industry, meaning that the 
semi-coke industry was no longer deemed a local industry but would be regarded as a 
national industry. After that, several other state ministries such as the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and the 
Standardization Administration of the PRC, issued regulations for the semi-coke 
industry. The approval Yulin gained at the state level attracted attention from various 
spheres. Several state-owned enterprises began to invest in Yulin's semi-coke industry, 
new factories were built, new technology was put into use. All this made the semi-
coke industry the pillar industry of Yulin. Other locations in China also recognised the 
significance of developing the semi-coke industry and started to catch up. The success 
story of Yulin inspired their imagination and the experience of Yulin laid the 
foundation for the future development of this industry. Other semi-coke production 
bases include Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Ningxia. In 
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2012 China produced 48,100,000 tons of semi-coke, among which Yulin alone 
produced 40%, while Xinjiang produced nearly 30% of total production. In summary, 
as a pioneer of the semi-coke industry, without Yulin's effort, the value of semi-coke 
and its derivative products would not have been accepted at such a speed, and there 
would not have been such a large sum of money poured into this industry. As for the 
future development of the semi-coke industry, Yulin will probably once more be a 
leader. 
 
 
5.1.3 The status quo of the semi-coke industry in Yulin43 
 
After nearly three decades’ development, the semi-coke industry has become the 
largest coal chemical industry in Yulin. It has linked its upstream coal mining industry, 
its downstream chemical industry, and its electricity generation industry together 
and spurred the development of transport and commercial services. 
 
 
In 2012, the year I was an intern in Yulin, the semi-coke industry and its downstream 
calcium carbide, and magnesium (Mg) industries were combined, the total workforce 
was 46,805 employees, and the company realised 27.37 billion yuan (US$4.34 billion) 
output value, 12.9% of the entire output value of the counties which had semi-coke 
industry. Meanwhile, the tax paid by semi-coke companies was 1.24 billion yuan 
(US$197 million), around 12.6% of the revenue of the counties which had semi-coke 
industry. By 2016, there are 83 semi-coke companies in Yulin. The production 
capacity is 49.5 million tons, actual production in 2014 was 26.2 million tons, while 
the corresponding figure for 2015 was 25 million tons. As for the other two by-
products, in 2015 Yulin produced two million tons of coal tar and 13.6 billion cubic 
metres of carbonised coal gas. Consumers of these products include enterprises in 
Inner Mongolia, Ningxia province, and some other provinces of China. Two thirds of 
the semi-coke are used to produce calcium carbide and ferrous alloy. 
 
 
43 The information in this section comes from a series of government reports compiled by 
Yulin Municipal Development and Reform Commission. 
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Yulin first proposed the idea that, before using coal, the coal tar must be obtained. 
Under the guidance of this idea, Yulin has established a complete industry system 
which aims at utilising coal with a high efficiency and in a clean way. This has 
something to do with China's natural resource endowments. China has a rich coal 
deposit but lacks oil and natural gas, so if oil can be obtained by processing coal, the 
profit can be greatly augmented. By now, Yulin's Making Oil from Coal programme 
has a production capacity of 3.42 million tons a year. Because of the shrinking market 
(the coal and crude oil markets), however, in 2015 the actual production capacity 
was only about 588, 600 tons. 
 
 
The semi-coke industry in Yulin has a complete industry chain. Around the 1990s, the 
semi-coke industry in Yulin could only utilise the solid product, which was the semi-
coke. Regarding the other two forms of products, the local factory had nothing to do 
with them and let them go. With the advancement of machines and updated thinking, 
coal tar and coal gas have been attached more importance. The following industry 
chains have been highly developed, that is, coal-semi coke-calcium carbide, coal-semi 
coke-ferrous alloy, coal-semi coke-coal tar-fuel oil, and coal-semi coke-carbonised 
coal gas-magnesium. Some new discoveries led to the extension of this chain. For 
example, the cost of producing magnesium can be reduced by 25% or so by using the 
coal gas obtained during the semi-coke producing process. As a result, the Mg 
production factories swiftly moved from Shanxi, a neighbouring province of Shaanxi. 
Now Yulin has become the largest Mg production base in China, perhaps even the 
world. The Mg it produces occupies 41% of Chinese and 36% of world output. In fact, 
although this industry is still called semi-coke industry, the semi-coke itself is no 
longer the sole product, sometimes it is not even the most valuable product. As this 
industry is still called the semi-coke industry, this research will follow the same trend. 
However, I would stress that the semi-coke industry points to the whole industry 
chain rather than one part of this chain. 
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Apart from this, Yulin is exploring a more environmentally friendly way of producing 
semi-coke. By now, all the semi-coke companies have adopted a set of equipment to 
protect the environment, such as installing protective net, isolating the coke and coal 
storage warehouses, coal gas collection equipment etc. In the past, water was widely 
used to cool the red coke down. One of the products of this process is ammonia 
water (because there is plenty of nitrogen in the air), and it used to be directly 
discharged into rivers. Now new technology has been adopted to deal with the 
ammonia water, numerous new clean technologies will be tested and utilised. 
 
 
This striking development by no means guarantees the healthy update of the semi-
coke industry, nor does it mean that the challenges facing the semi-coke industry in 
Yulin have been solved. In fact, whilst Yulin’s achievements in recent years constitute 
a big improvement, some newly emerging challenges are quite troublesome, 
entailing more investment and novel ideas. If the grand background of the Chinese 
macro economy and the mining industry are taken into account, to some extent the 
current situation is becoming tougher. After all, Yulin's semi-coke industry, Chinese 
mining as a whole, and the whole country has entered a transition period, and 
nobody knows what it will look like in the future. 
 
 
The biggest challenges Yulin needs to tackle include updating its equipment and 
technology and looking for new markets for semi-coke and its derivatives. The key 
term here is ‘innovation’, both technological innovation and innovation of its 
business model. 
 
 
More specifically, first of all, Yulin's semi-coke industry faces the problem of excess 
production capacity. This problem can be attributed to a historical legacy. Prior to 
2007, governments seldom engaged in the development of the semi-coke industry, 
thus many local citizens opened their mini semi-coke factories which are difficult for 
the government to regulate, while controlling their production capacity is a problem. 
After 2007, the municipal government took action to encourage mergers and 
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acquisitions in this industry in the hope of acquiring the power to control the 
production capacity of semi-coke. This strategy is effective. The problem is that, 
during this industry integration process, the coal mining industry suffered a sharp 
downturn and the semi-coke industry was negatively influenced, thus some semi-
coke factories began to suffer heavy losses while the integration process was still in 
process. Whilst the number of semi-coke companies has been reduced from nearly 
300 to around 80, the total production capacity is still far above national demand. 
The overcapacity problem is still severe. Second, Yulin faces a dilemma, that is as a 
city boasts for its coal production, the local semi-coke industry lacks the coal it needs 
to process in order to obtain semi-coke. This is because most of the coal Yulin 
produces is powder coal ( 粉煤 ), rather than lump coal( 块煤 ). The former type’s 
particle diameter is quite small, usually below 20 mm, while the latter’s is above 
30mm. The SJ-III vertical furnace is the most popular stove used in Yulin. It almost 
accounts for 80% of the whole Yulin market, but it can only process lump coal. If 
purchase lump coal, the cost of producing semi-coke would be increased by at least 
20%. According to a survey, Yulin can sell about 40 million tons of lump coal, which 
only produce 23.5 million tons of semi-coke, which is only 50% of the semi-coke 
production capacity. Moreover, whilst the technological level of Yulin's semi-coke 
industry has been improved, this kind of improvement is not great enough. The new 
environmental regulation has imposed ever higher requirements on the mining 
industry. By 2012, no local semi-coke industry was able to meet these requirements. 
As for the industry access standard set by the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology, only two enterprises in Inner Mongolia have passed it. In summary, 
Yulin's semi-coke industry faces its second shutdown. 
 
 
In conclusion, Yulin's semi-coke industry is at a crossroad. Making the best use of its 
natural resources and realising the promotion of industrial structure is vital for Yulin's 
future. However, crises sometimes reveal hidden opportunities. The following 
section discusses Yulin’s adoption of systemic approaches. 
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5.1.4 The government's role in bolstering the development of the semi-coke industry 
 
The municipal government of Yulin plays a major role in the development of the 
semi-coke industry. This section will introduce the role the government plays. The 
information in this section comes from reports issued either by one government 
branch or co-issued by a number of government branches. I obtained these reports 
from Yulin’s Municipal Development and Reform Commission, as this municipal DRC 
orchestrates all the development of the local semi-coke industry. Some 
documentation consists of speeches at a government conference, some reports to 
superior officials. All the data are in Chinese. 
 
 
It is widely known that in China when the term ‘government’ is used, its meaning is 
different from its use in the West because it also incorporates the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP)'s organisations. By and large, the CCP's organisations are 
mainly in charge of work linked to superstructures, say, the propaganda and the 
grand strategy setting. The government bodies are mainly in charge of local 
regulation and economic development. As a resource-rich city, Yulin’s government 
bodies are relatively strong, while its party organisations seldom directly engage in 
local economic affairs, although the party secretary is still the paramount leader of 
the city. As it mainly focuses upon innovation, a socio-economic phenomenon, when 
the term ‘government’ is used in this research it refers to the administration bodies 
only rather than party organisations. The most important policy-making organ in 
Yulin is the standing committee of the Communist Party, and the development 
strategy of semi-coke industry has to be approved by this standing committee. Apart 
from that, the party organisation in Yulin seldom directly engages in the 
development of the industry, although most of the decision-makers in government 
are Party members themselves. 
 
 
The remaining part of this section will shed some light on what the municipal 
government of Yulin does to assist its local semi-coke companies or semi-coke 
industry to grow. These two are different. As some non-Yulin companies have built 
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their plants or laboratories in Yulin, the municipal government supports them as well. 
 
 
The term ‘government’ has been used countless times, but what exactly it means in 
Yulin's context will be elaborated here. Above all, there is no one single entity called 
 
‘government’. In China, there are various kinds of administrative branches that 
constitute a complete government. In these case studies, the relevant government 
bodies include the Municipal Development and Reform Commission (MDRC), the 
Bureau of Industry and Information Technology (BIIT), The Bureau of Finance (BOF), 
The Bureau of Science and Technology (BOST), The Municipal Government Office 
(MGO) and so on. These government branches each perform their function in the 
development of the semi-coke industry, and their co-ordination has produced a 
series of government documentations. They either issue policy together or they issue 
different policies in the same area respectively. These outcomes reflect the fact that 
each government branch still has its own turf as, for the fields in which multiple 
branches need to co-operate with each other, they need to issue policies jointly. 
Consequently, each government branch's role will be illustrated respectively in this 
part of the chapter. Only when the branch being discussed plays a leading role will 
this procedure be attributed to this branch's action. In fact, most of these projects 
were undertaken by the BOST and the BIIT. When it comes to the MDRC and BOF, 
they almost participate in every single project. The National Development and 
Reform Commission is often dubbed a mini state council. Similarly, the DRC at the 
municipal level is like a mini municipal government. It often acts as the initiator of 
the co-ordinator of a project, as does the MGO. As for the BOF, as long as the project 
requires government financial support, without the approval of the BOF, this project 
will not get the required funding. Based on the foregoing, some concrete projects 
organised by the BOST and the BIIT will be introduced first, and then the financial 
support of the BOF will be described. Finally, the MDRC’s and MGO's roles will be 
introduced. In some cases, the government's main task is to build bridges between 
local companies and universities or research institutes, and the research projects 
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undertaken by these academic organisations will also be introduced. Another reason 
why it is more proper to introduce the work of these academic organisation is the 
technical or scientific nature of their work. This is not an engineering or natural 
science thesis, so it will not go very deep into technological details. Therefore, it is 
not useful to allocate one independent section to the role of those academic 
organisations. Their role is to provide technical services to the local semi-coke 
companies which lack in-house R&D facilities. Besides, as the local semi-coke 
companies in Yulin are relatively weak in technological capabilities, it is difficult for 
them to find a strong technological partner. In most cases, Yulin's government 
establishes communication channels for the local companies. Naturally, many 
government actions are tightly linked with academic organisations. 
 
 
5.1.4.1 The Bureau of Science and Technology (BOST) 
 
When discussing issues related to technological innovation at the municipal level, the 
BOST cannot be bypassed. It is the most professional government body in charge of 
formulating scientific policy. All the parties involved have arrived at a consensus 
about the significance of innovation in the development of the semi-coke industry. 
The BOST's main responsibility is to follow each scientific co-operation project and 
evaluate its performance. Sometimes BOST officials need to provide guidance to local 
businessmen or look for appropriate partners for universities or research institutes. 
The BOST in Yulin has done a lot of work to make Yulin's semi-coke industry more 
prosperous. This includes the following: 
 
 
First, identifying the key technologies which are essential for the future development 
of the semi-coke industry. BOST has identified four groups of key technologies: the 
updating of the current vertical furnace; the powder coal's carbonisation technology; 
the extension of the coal tar processing industry chain, and improving the efficiency 
of utilizing coal gas. Each group of technologies can be further divided into different 
technologies. Horizontally, they cover a wide range of technological areas. Vertically, 
they start from the selection of semi-coke raw materials and end with the processing 
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of the final products of the semi-coke industry. One can draw a detailed technology 
route map by reading through this list. Most local semi-coke factory owners are not 
well educated. They are just local residents. Some became rich through coal mining 
in the past decade. They do not hold a university degree in STEM 
(Science,Technology,Engineering and Math) subjects, but with such a list to hand, 
they feel safer and more confident. By comparing the technology their factories 
possess with the promising technologies identified by the BOST, they can decide 
where to invest their money and bear in mind their own strengths and weaknesses. 
This list is like a benchmark for all the local companies. It aims at channelling scarce 
resources in the right direction. Other government bodies also make reference to 
this list when local semi-coke companies apply for financial funding to support their 
technology updating programmes. When someone wishes to build a new semi-coke 
production plant, getting the approval will be decided by whether the technologies 
they are going to adopt meet the requirements of this list. 
 
 
This strategy has seen good results. By now, Yulin's semi-coke industry has applied for 
214 patents (in 2015 alone, 52 patents were applied for), among which the invention 
patents category44 numbered 57, 26% of the whole number applied for. A total of 
162 patents have been granted (in 2015 alone, 41 patents were granted), among 
which the invention patents numbered 49, accounting for 30% of the whole number 
applied for.45Valid patents number 117, among which a quarter are invention patents. 
Compared with other industries, the semi-coke industry has become the model in 
terms of the drafting of patents. 
 
 
Second, by communicating with semi-coke companies, BOST hesitate to adopt new 
technologies. One of the reasons for this is that they are heavily taxed, thus any 
 
44 In China, there are three categories of patents. They are the invention, utility model and industrial 
design. The invention patent is considered as having the highest technological element.  
45 Some patents are held by companies. In some cases, companies and co-operative 
research institutes are co-holders of the patent, while a few patents are held by individuals. 
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increase in investment represents a risk for these companies. According to Yulin 
municipal government’s calculation, when all the taxes and regulation fees are put 
together, a semi-coke company should pay 67.5 yuan for each ton of semi-coke, 
while by selling one ton of semi-coke the company only receives 390 yuan. BOST 
report this issue to the municipal government, hoping that by taking the pressure off 
semi-coke companies, the technology can be diffused at a higher speed. 
 
 
Third, BOST plays an active role in the planning of new semi-coke industrial parks. 
During the early development period of the semi-coke industry, as there was almost 
no government planning, the semi-coke factories were scattered in different places 
such as Yulin. As long as a mine owner had enough money and wanted to transfer to 
the semi-coke industry, he could just do it and would not encounter strong resistance. 
To some extent, this situation was similar to what economists describe as the ‘perfect 
market’. The outcome of this dispersed decision-making process is the small scale of 
each production unit and the geographical dispersion of semi-coke factories. The dire 
consequences of which include underinvestment in R&D and environmental pollution. 
For example, if a stove is too small it becomes uneconomic to install environment 
protection equipment. BOST participated in the planning of 22 semi-coke industrial 
parks, while the roads and other infrastructure were all built by the government. 
Semi-coke companies were encouraged to move into these parks. It facilitates the 
formation of industry cluster and industry intensification. The upstream and 
downstream of the semi-coke industry also moved into the parks, reducing the whole 
industry chain's costs. 
 
 
These industrial parks have relatively strict entry requirements. They must have an 
annual production capacity of over 600,000 tons, and must have an automation 
control system. These policies point to the drawbacks of the old-fashioned and small 
semi-coke companies. They sometimes count on experienced technicians to control 
the temperature of the stove and the carbonisation time length, which leads to the 
unstable quality of their products. The construction of the industrial park aims at 
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eliminating backward production units and creating advantageous conditions for 
factories using state-of-the-art technology. The companies in the parks are also 
required to abide by modern company law. The management effectiveness and the 
safety and profit levels all have been lifted. Some large SOEs such as Shaanxi Coal and 
Chemical group and Yanchang Petroleum group have expressed interest in investing 
in the development of the semi-coke industry. 
 
 
Finally, the BOST has also helped local companies establish long-term co-operation 
with academic institutes. Over 20 university research institutes and large SOEs have 
become technology partners of Yulin's semi-coke companies. The BOST also 
proposed to establish a semi-coke engineering technology and research centre in 
Yulin. This centre has developed a whole set of semi-coke clean production and 
resource utilisation equipment, possessing the intellectual property of this 
equipment. At the moment, this centre, together with other semi-coke companies 
and academic organisations, are doing R&D in various kinds of critical technologies. 
More than 20 projects have been approved by the national, provincial, and municipal 
governments. 
 
 
5.1.4.2 The Bureau of Industry and Information Technology (BIIT) 
 
At the national level, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) was 
established in 2008 as an outcome of the so-called large department reform(大部制
改 革 ). Its main body and personnel was made up of the former Ministry of 
Information Industry. Its functions and authorities lie in regulating various industries, 
setting industry access standards, supervising the daily operation of the industry, 
pushing forward the development of critical equipment and indigenous innovation, 
and protecting national information security etc. 
 
 
A BIIT is the MIIT at the municipal level. The functions are almost the same, so as the 
pillar industry of Yulin, after 2008 when the MIIT was established, the semi-coke 
industry never lacked the involvement of BIIT. It is one of the most important 
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government bodies for the semi-coke industry. 
 
 
 
Similar to what the BOST has done, the BIIT also help local semi-coke companies find 
strategic allies. The difference is that the BOST is more technology- driven while the 
BIIT is more project-driven. The aim of BOST is to help local semi-coke companies 
enhance their technological capabilities or accelerate the adoption of a new 
equipment. All the activities BOST participate in must have something to do with 
technological advancement or scientific discovery. The mere expansion of a business 
or the increase of production quantity is not the prime concern of BOST. While BIIT, 
focuses more upon the industry's output, pure Science & Technology issues are not 
its prime concern. 
 
 
One of the most influential business partners BIIT found for Yulin's semi-coke 
industry is Shenhua Group, one of the largest coal mining companies in the world. 
The BIIT contacted Hebei provincial Development and Reform Commission, and got 
the three parties to sign a strategic contract. This contract aims to utilise Shenhua's 
transport capacity to sell cleaner semi-coke to Hebei. One of the disadvantages of 
Yulin's semi-coke industry is the lack of transport. The infrastructure is not developed 
enough in Yulin and some semi-coke factories are far from the urban area46, In order 
to transport semi-coke to its end users, expensive transport costs will be incurred by 
semi-coke producers. By developing an alliance with Shenhua, this problem can be 
largely mitigated. Shenhua has its own trains and its transport network covers a large 
area. This makes it a perfect partner. As for Hebei's provincial DRC attendance, this is 
because Hebei needs clean fuel to support its steel industry and reduce pollution. 
One partner is a provincial government, the other is a giant SOE. Without the work of 
the BIIT, tiny local semi-coke companies cannot get in touch with the other two 
parties. This agreement can definitely make the three parties better off, whereas it 
 
 
46 Because by now the semi-coke producing process still produces a large amount of pollutant 
substances 
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might not have happened without the active role played by the BIIT. 
 
 
 
Second, one task which can only be performed by the BIIT is to lobby national 
authorities to establish semi-coke industry access standards. This work is one of the 
functions of the MIIT. It will only establish national industry access standards for 
industries considered to be strategic and significant to the country. At the very 
beginning, only Yulin produced a statistically significant amount of semi-coke, so this 
industry was regarded as parochial, and at that time the special physical 
characteristics of semi-coke had not been widely recognised. Thanks to the efforts of 
the BIIT in Yulin, officials in the MIIT began to pay attention to semi-coke. Of course, 
Yulin's BIIT did not do this alone, but it was the leading agency. Setting a national 
industry access standard has several merits. First, it means that this industry is no 
longer local and is deemed to be linked with national interests. Moreover, as Yulin is 
the most active driving force behind this process, some of its own interests will be 
reflected in the standard. Finally, the bringing together of national authorities enjoin 
many gifted people and thereby compensate Yulin’s brain drain. After all, it is only a 
third or even fourth-tier city. With this access standard to hand, the national 
authority is like the backup force of local government. It can be used as a weapon to 
encourage technological investment or the shutdown of unqualified plants. To sum 
up, this access standard has gained for Yulin's semi-coke industry a ticket at the 
central theatre and it has become a business card for Yulin. 
 
 
Meanwhile, the BIIT is an endeavour to help local semi-coke companies search for 
new uses for of semi-coke. Understanding of semi-coke is become deeper and more 
comprehensive. This can be attributed to, first, more scientific discoveries which 
have exposed the features of semi-coke more thoroughly, and second, as the semi-
coke industry has left Yulin, those who work in this industry are keen to look for a 
more promising downstream industry in the hope of digging for more potential 
consumers. Two examples will be given here. 
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The first is the co-operative experiment between Shaanxi Provincial Department of 
Industry and Information Technology and Xi'an Thermal Power Research Institute. 
They conduct research to understand semi-coke's physical characteristics and 
chemical characteristics better. The ultimate goal is to test whether semi-coke can be 
used in power plant stoves. Through this research, the advantages of semi-coke as 
power plant fuel have been identified. Semi-coke has is more environment friendly, it 
contains less pollutant elements, and it has higher thermal value. At the same time, 
its disadvantages have also been identified. It may be harmful for the stove and it can 
lead to slag bonding. The conclusion of the research is that, in order to make the best 
use of semi-coke, a power plant can combine it with other kinds of fuel and the 
researchers give concrete suggestions to the power plants in Hebei about how to use 
semi-coke. The aim of embarking upon such research is to rely upon a third party to 
prove the benefits a power plant can obtain by using semi-coke. No single semi-coke 
company in Yulin is able to finish this task, as they have scarcely had the chance to 
develop personal networks with the scholars. The contribution of the BIIT (contacting 
its superior agency DIIT at the provincial level) cannot be ignored. 
 
 
The second example is the experiment to test the effect of using semi-coke in steel 
production. Shaanxi Steel group and the University of Science and Technology Beijing 
participate in this project and have each done their own experiments. In Shaanxi 
Steel's experiment, semi-coke was found to have the economic advantage. It 
increases the proportion of fuel but as it is cheaper than anthracitic coal (when burnt, 
anthracitic coal does not give off smoke), the total cost of fuel is reduced. The 
University of Science and Technology Beijing47 arrived at a similar conclusion. It 
points out that, as the cost of fuel in iron-making takes up 90% of the whole cost, 
semi-coke can help steel and iron makers reduce their costs. Although semi-coke's 
technical quality is worse than the fuel it replaces, the reduction in cost can 
compensate for the drop in technical quality. These two organisations are also invited 
 
47 It used to be a university specialised in steel-making. 
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by the BIIT. 
 
 
 
In summary, the BIIT's participation in the semi-coke industry is largely based on the 
projects it selects. These are carefully chosen for the sake of Yulin's semi-coke 
industry. It has given rise to the increasing demand for semi-coke. If we compare this 
with the behaviour of the BOST and the BIIT, the following conclusion can be drawn. 
The BOST assumes that the demand for semi-coke is a given. The best way to make 
Yulin more competitive is to improve the quality of its semi-coke products, while the 
BIIT take the technological level of semi-coke as a given, and try to enlarge its 
demand pool. In this light, the two agencies are indispensable. 
 
 
5.1.4.3 The Bureau of Finance（BOF） 
 
The Bureau of Finance is in charge of drafting an annual budget and allocating the 
revenue of the municipal government. No government plan can be implemented 
successfully without the support of the BOF. The BOF seldom directly engages in a 
specific semi-coke project, whereas it possesses the decision-making power 
associated with providing government funding. 
 
 
The role of the BOF in the development of the semi-coke industry is more indirect 
than the MDRC, the BIIT and the BOST. It does not push a single project itself, but in 
most cases, it co-operates with other government agencies and when discussing the 
total amount of money the government needs to invest it usually has the final say. 
Viewed from this angle, its influence is by no means less than other government 
agencies. Government investment is an obvious sign of political will It is never simply 
a figure as it tells the market and other parties, say, a university, what the 
government wants to achieve and to what extent. 
 
 
In order to support the local semi-coke industry, the BOF has approved the 
establishment of a special fund established in 2014 and called: 'the special fund for 
the update and transition of the semi-coke industry'. Each year the BOF allocates 50 
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million yuan (about US$8.14 million) to this fund. Meanwhile, the Bureau of Finance 
at the county level is required to invest the same amount of money in supporting the 
semi-coke industry. This fund is granted to the following projects: 
 
 
A. Market expansion. This mainly refers to the expansion of semi-coke products, 
new brand-building, and the management of local semi-coke products. 
B. Industrial update. This refers to the technological transformation project and 
current companies' industry access, the diffusion of advanced and mature technology, 
and the update of critical equipment. 
 
C. Science and technological innovation. This refers to the R&D of critical and 
general-purpose technology in semi-coke and other relevant industries, the 
introduction of large coal pyrolysis equipment, the establishment of Science 
&Technology centre etc. 
 
D. Basic research. This refers to basic theoretical research by the semi-coke industry, 
research into industrial policy, the compilation of development plans, standard 
setting, and technology consultation. 
 
E. Environment Protection. This refers to the construction of environment protection 
equipment and R&D in environment protection technology and its diffusion. 
 
 
As for the fund’s selection process, the municipal government has established a 
committee of experts. Some of the most influential figures have been invited to join 
this committee, each year the municipal government sends the applications to each 
expert and asks for their feedback, and their choices determine who can get this fund 
and the amount they get. This process is seen to be fair to all the applicants. The 
selection criteria is whether applications meet the direction of technological 
advancement, while the judges possess expertise in particular areas, guaranteeing 
that the limited funds go to the right place. In fact, even after this fund has been 
granted, it is still under strict supervision. In 2014 the committee decided that 19 
projects would be supported and the total amount of fund was 19.4 million yuan 
(about US$3.16 million). But only 17 projects obtained the fund and the actual fund 
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granted was 14.22 million yuan (about US$2.32 million). The BOF advised allocating 
the remaining fund to the next financial year and the performance of these projects 
was evaluated before granting the fund. 
 
 
Besides, in order to encourage the sale of semi-coke products, the BOF would award 
semi-coke companies which achieved an increase in revenue and taxation. 
Companies which realised a 30% increase in revenue and taxation would receive 
300,000 yuan (about US$48,900), those which realised a 20% increase in revenue and 
taxation would receive 200,000 yuan (about US$32,600), and those which realised a 
50% increase in revenue and taxation would receive 500,000 yuan (about US$81 400). 
 
 
The BOF uses this financial support as leverage to adjust the development pace of 
the semi-coke industry. This policy has achieved partial success, some companies 
using the money to purchase new equipment, invest in technology updates, while 
these actions in turn increase government revenue. 
 
 
5.1.4.4 The Municipal Development and Reform Commission (MDRC) 
 
The Development and Reform Commission has always been dubbed a mini-
government, for it is regarded as a mini State Council. Everything in relation to 
economic development falls in its domain. Although the functions of the DRC at 
different levels are not the same (the trend is that the lower the level the less 
functions a DRC has), it often serves as a pilot agency in economic development. The 
functions of the DRC cover almost every aspect of daily life. It makes economic plans, 
regulates industry access and exit, adjusts prices of some special goods, authorises 
the construction of railway and highway infrastructure, and is also in charge of 
proposing reform plans and supervising the macro economy. In short, where there is 
an economy, there is the DRC. Without the co-operation of the DRC, other 
governments can hardly achieve anything. In this section, the role of the MDRC in the 
development of the semi-coke industry will be introduced. 
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As mentioned, I undertook an internship in the Yulin MDRC in 2012, and it was in 
around 2012 that the coal mining industry began to suffer an abrupt downturn. 
When I worked for the MDRC, terms such as ‘transition’ and ‘innovation’ kept being 
used by different people. Of course, ‘semi-coke’ was also a catchword at that time. 
Anxious officials of the DRC went to different factories in the hope of getting first-
hand information about this industry. During an interview with the Chief Engineer of 
Yulin's MDRC, he apprised me of the work done by the MDRC to bolster the semi-
coke industry. Most of the big projects were proposed after 2012. The role of the 
MDRC during this arduous process is like that of the BOF. They are each singly 
responsible for each project. The BOF realise this goal through control of the 
allocation of government funds, this way for DRC has the authority to decide which 
project can get approval. 
 
 
One of the biggest advantages of the DRC is information. First of all, compared with 
other government branches, the DRC is much more comprehensive and concrete. 
This can be seen even in the names of each government branch. Most other 
branches are professional, say, the Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of 
Agriculture - they specialise in their own turf. The DRC, however, has turfs which 
overlap with most other government bodies. This puts the DRC at the centre of an 
information network. No other agency is as equipped as the DRC to glean 
information about what is going on in other parts of China or even the world, or what 
is happening in other industries. There is a famous proverb in a Chinese poem. The 
reason why you cannot see the real appearance of the mountain is that you are on 
this mountain yourself. If the semi-coke industry is a mountain, the DRC can observe 
it from the top of other mountains, and it can go to many mountain tops, thus the 
policies it designs should be more accurate in grasping the overall trend. 
 
 
Second, compared with local semi-coke companies, DRC officials tend to be better 
educated and think strategically. Many newly established semi-coke factories were 
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constructed in industrial parks, but most old production plants are still scattered 
around the whole city. Even companies in the park are not prepared to open them 
up to their competitors. One of the direst consequences is that the semi-coke 
companies do not know what other companies are doing. Sometimes one company 
was found to be doing what had been proved to be wrong by other companies. 
Under such circumstances, DRC officials help semi-coke producers exchange 
information. DRC officials get useful information by going to factories, universities, 
and research institutes themselves. The local companies do not have perfect 
information collecting systems. They probably specialise in one part of the semi-coke 
industry chain. The managers of those companies might not have the chance to visit 
other companies. Being fully aware of this situation, the DRC established an 
information exchange centre providing useful and almost free information to local 
semi-coke companies. 
 
 
Recently, the MDRC of Yulin has found 'a new continent' for semi-coke. As is widely 
known, Beijing and its neighbouring province Hebei are notorious for being heavily 
polluted. Much research has been done to find the cause of the soaring PM2.5 and 
numerous methods have been tried to reduce the pollution. Yulin MDRC found that 
semi-coke can make a contribution to Beijing’s, Hebei’s, and Tianjin's environment. 
The fact is that there are many sources of air pollution. The pollutant gases given off 
by the stoves in steel plants used to be regarded as one of the main sources, as a 
result, the national government imposed strict requirements on all the steel plants. 
After several years’ effort, it is reported that a further reduction would be very 
difficult, if not impossible. Another source of pollution is the civilian warming stove. It 
has not received the attention of government thus it has major reduction potential. 
The production process makes semi-coke a perfect burning material for household 
use. A large proportion of the pollutant substances contained in coal have been 
removed through carbonization. If households can use semi-coke rather than coal to 
keep warm, the air would be fresher. The DRC organised a group of scholars and 
contacted the Chinese Academy of Science to conduct relevant research. They 
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published a report in which the technological and economic feasibility of replacing 
coal with semi-coke for household warming were studied. The result is quite positive 
for semi-coke. The provincial government of Hebei and Yulin municipal government 
has signed semi-coke using contract. The government would subsidise households 
who agree to use semi-coke to replace coal, as semi-coke is more expensive. If 
millions of households use semi-coke, the downstream market could be expanded 
and air pollution in Hebei could be improved. One interviewee said in2016 that the 
price of coal almost doubled, which caused semi-coke's price to increase as well. 
Consequently, many households gave up the use of semi-coke. This partly explains 
the heavy pollution which appeared at the end of 2016. 
 
 
The MDRC showed up in almost any critical moments of semi-coke industry. It 
launched petition to the Mayor of Yulin and the Municipal Party Secretary and 
successfully persuaded the leaders of Yulin to paying special attention to the semi-
coke industry. Some new ways of supporting the semi-coke industry occurred to the 
DRC officials and the strategic significance of the industry for Yulin was first 
recognised by DRC officials. Arguably, the blueprint of Yulin's semi-coke industry was 
drawn up by the MDRC of Yulin. 
 
 
The roles of various government branches in the development of the semi-coke 
industry in Yulin have been fully elaborated. Some other agencies' roles, such as that 
of the Bureau of Environmental Protection and the Government Office, are quite 
similar to one of the agencies introduced above. Whether the government should 
directly engage in economic development is always controversial among scholars. It 
is safe to say that the government's role in this case is worth appreciating. They do 
not enshrine the magic power of the perfect market and do not shirk their 
responsibility. The game between Yulin's government and the semi-coke companies 
is definitely positive sum. 
 
 
5.1.5 Some case studies of the semi-coke industry  
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In this section, some specific cases will be presented. In the last section, what the 
municipal government did was reviewed. The co-ordination work and strategy of 
governments are of significance in the development of the semi-coke industry. It is a 
reflection of political forces. Ideas, however, cannot change the world. The semi-coke 
companies' reaction is worth looking at, as without the change in the behaviour of 
the local semi-coke companies, government efforts will be in vain. Yulin's semi-coke 
community is a diverse family. There are mini -semi-coke production units, there are 
also semi-coke companies backed by large SOEs. Their reactions and their 
relationships with governments and universities will be studied here. 
 
 
5.1.5.1 Jingfu （京府）Coal Chemical Company 
 
 
 
This company was established in 1998 and it is a typical semi-coke company. It is 
considered typical because it is an average company, neither too small nor too big, 
and the business it operates is also a classic semi-coke business. 
 
 
Jingfu purchases coal from mines, and processes the coal by using its own equipment. 
It first washes the coals, then put the washed and selected coal into vertical furnaces. 
The coal in the stove will be carbonised, and decomposes into semi-coke, coal tar, 
and coal gas. The coal gas will be used to generate electricity. The company itself can 
use electricity generated by this method, and if there is still surplus electric power, 
the company will sell it to someone else. Besides, Jingfu Coal Chemical Company also 
uses coal gas to produce Mg and sell it. 
 
 
The other two products semi-coke and coal tar, are the main products for almost all 
semi-coke companies. Jingfu is unable to further process coal tar so it directly sells it 
to a company which has the equipment to process coal tar. As for semi-coke, Jingfu’s 
most important product, it can either directly sell it or use semi-coke to produce 
calcium carbide. The business model described above has been adopted by almost all 
the semi-coke companies in Yulin. It is the classic model. Big companies or small, 
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their business models are somewhat similar. What distinguishes an advanced 
company from others is the processing technology. When the MDRC officials in Yulin 
advised me to visit Jingfu Coal Chemical Company, the reason they gave is that this 
company has government funding to update its coke quenching method. 
 
 
Jingfu used to use the coke wet quenching (CWQ) method, not in order to meet the 
stricter requirement on environment protection but because it has invested in 
adopting the method: 
 
Coke Dry Quenching (CDQ) is an alternative to the traditional wet quenching of the coke. 
Coke is cooled using an inert gas in a dry cooling plant, instead of cooling by sprayed 
water which results in high CO2 emissions and thermal energy loss. This process allows 
the recovery of the thermal energy in the quenching gas which can then be used for the 
production of steam and electricity, for district heating, and/or for the preheating of 
coking coal. CDQ also improves the quality of coke and enables reduced coke 
consumption in the blast furnace. As the product quality is improved, CDQ may also allow 
for the use of lower cost non-coking coal in the process, thereby reducing costs.48 
 
The CDQ process is essential to semi-coke production. Yulin's government has 
decided to encourage the semi-coke companies in Yulin to adopt the CDQ method. 
Jingfu reacted to the government's appeal, as a result both the municipal and county 
governments have offered a generous subsidy to Jingfu. This update does not 
destroy the older production plant, it only entails the installing of new equipment on 
the current stove. Using the funding from the government and Jingfu's own 
investment, except for one stove, all other stoves have been updated. 
 
 
In this case, innovation only appears in the last step, which is the selling of the new 
product. The CDQ technology being used at other places was adopted to improve the 
local situation. It is a kind of innovation diffusion, not creation. As the company itself 
 
48  http://ietd.iipnetwork.org/content/coke-dry-quenching viewed on 2016-12-10. 
 
152 
 
is unable to promote technology, it is practical to help it update its technology. From 
this perspective, the company and government facilitate the diffusion of innovation. 
This function is no less important than the creation of innovation. 
 
 
 
 
5.1.5.2 Jinfengyuan（锦丰源） Clean Coal Company 
 
The second company is an experimental production plant. It was established in 2008 
and only has 25 employees. The unique feature of this company is that it is a private 
concern, but The Institute of Engineering Thermophysics (IET), which originated from 
the Power Laboratory of the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS), is one of its stock-
holders. The aim of opening such a company is to test the technology of powder coal 
pyrolysis. Due to the change in the coal mining method, it is reported that a large 
proportion of the coal (about 70%) produced by Yulin is powder coal. The vertical 
furnace is used in the semi-coke companies in Yulin. However, it can only pyrolyse 
lump coals. This has caused a dilemma. The semi-coke company has to choose 
between purchasing more expensive lump coals or pour lots of money into the R&D 
of powder coal pyrolysis technology which might cost more money. Jingfengyuan 
represents one attempt to solve this problem. 
 
 
Jinfengyuan is the fruit of co-operation between companies and research institutes. 
The scientists in CAS live and work in Yulin in summer. They perform industrial 
experiments in powder coal pyrolysis technology as theoretical work is one thing, the 
industrialisation of the technology is quite another. They take three steps to finish 
the whole process. First is the selection and drying of coal, then the pyrolysis of the 
selected powder coal, and finally the coal tar collection and purification process. 
 
 
This experiment has achieved partial success. It can turn more coal into coal tar. 
While common equipment can only turn 7% of the coal to coal tar, the corresponding 
figure for JInfengyuan is 10%. This is an internationally recognised indicator. Besides, 
the coal gas collected as a by-product has higher thermal value, and can be used to 
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produce natural gas. Finally, Jingfenyuan reduces the production cost of semi-coke 
by expanding its raw material from lump coal to powder coal. At this stage, its 
industrial experiment in full load has been tested. The next step is to sell this 
technology to other companies or to establish its own production plant. 
 
 
During this seven-year-long process, the municipal government offer three million 
yuan (nearly US$0.5 million) to support the experiment, while the government of 
Shenmu County also provides three million yuan. Jinfengyuan itself found six million 
yuan in funding. The reason for doing so is that the powder coal pyrolysis technology 
has been identified as essential for all the semi-coke companies in Yulin. Once 
developed, all the participants of the semi-coke industry can benefit. This kind of 
non-appropriated technology needs government support. The government's logic is 
to accelerate the development of such technology and from the beginning, the 
government has taken part in this process. When the experiment finishes, as a 
stakeholder, the government can encourage the company to disseminate relevant 
technology. In the end, the whole semi-coke industry in Yulin get the profits. It can 
be concluded that Jinfengyuan' was set up to test the technology, as it is a large 
industrial laboratory. When I visited Jinfengyuan, as it was cold and all the scientists 
from CAS had returned to Beijing, the site had in fact stopped production. Only 
maintenance work still proceeded. Jinfengyuan is a special way to cope with 
technical problems, and the role each party plays is also worth studying. 
 
 
5.1.5.3 Shenmu Fuyou（神木富油） Energy Company 
 
This company used to be privately owned. It was established in 2006. In 2008 Shaanxi 
Coal and Chemical Industry Group became the largest shareholder, so now it is a state 
holding company. Compared with the companies introduced in the previous two 
sections, this one is much larger. Its mother company, Shaanxi Coal and Chemical 
Industry Group, ranked 416th in the world's 500 largest companies. This is quite different 
from the other companies examined above. During an interview, one of the managers 
stated in early 2016 that the company tested its own powder coal process 
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equipment after some successful experiments in the laboratory and all the 
theoretical problems have been solved. Unfortunately, during the test the equipment 
had some technical bugs. As a result, this experiment failed. The company is 
organising another test. This test is one critical step in the company's blueprint. The 
failure of the test postponed the company's plan to build a complete industry chain. 
At the moment, it still buys lump coal from a coal mining company. The main 
business of the company is the latter half of the semi-coke industry chain, namely, 
the processing of the semi-coke, coal gas, and coal tar. 
 
 
Shenmu Fuyou boasts of its “coal, low to medium temperature carbonisation and 
independent ownership technology of coal tar oil hydrogenation”, and the 
construction of 1.2 million tons of low temperature carbonisation is being accelerated. 
This full-range LCT (low temperature coal tar) fixed bed HDT (hydrotreatment) 
process produces naphtha, diesel oil, and FCC (Fluid Catalytic Cracking) raw material 
(Zhu et al, 2015, pp434). Shenmu Fuyou's Technology for catalytic hydrogenation of 
full range middle/low temperature coal tar to produce intermediate distillates" (FTH) 
was awarded the second prize of the National Science and Technology Progress 
Award for energy. According to the scholars at the Chinese Academy of Engineering, 
this technology is the most advanced in the world. It first purifies the coal tar 
obtained from the carbonisation of coal, then hydrogenates the purified coal tar. It 
can increase the recycle rate of the coal tar and improve its quality. Shenmu Fuyou 
chose to prioritise technology from its inception, its managers often discuss technical 
questions with R&D staff, such unique features distinguish Shenmu Fuyou from other 
small semi-coke companies. 
 
 
5.1.6 Conclusion of the Yulin case 
 
Yulin's semi-coke industry has experienced its ups and downs in history, but from the 
grassroots semi-coke processing method to craftsmanship, the lessons we can draw 
from this case are valuable. 
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From the perspective of the System of Innovation, semi-coke companies themselves 
should be regarded as major contributors to innovation, and innovation entails the 
co-ordination, or even co-evolution, of all the components and the relationships 
between these components. In Yulin's case, during its burgeoning period, the semi-
coke companies themselves accomplished the task of innovation because the 
relevant System of Innovation per se was also growing, and many critical institutional 
settings were lacking at the time. In the following period, the semi-coke industry 
formed an industrial cluster in Yulin, whereas the elements of a System of Innovation 
were still scarce. This could be attributed to the lack of environmental protection 
policy, relatively small companies, and the seemingly infinite supply of raw materials. 
In time, when the significance of semi-coke had been recognised by other provinces 
of China, the first-mover advantage Yulin enjoyed finally disappeared. One way to 
regain a superior market position is to create performance gap, then the formation 
of a System of Innovation begins to seem important. It first became to grow into a 
real System of Innovation. Some components of this system, such as universities, 
research institutes, governments and SOEs, began to participate in the innovation of 
semi-coke-related technologies. Their interactions made this System of Innovation 
more complicated. Besides, this System of Innovation has gone far beyond the 
regional dimension. Any resources in this country that can be utilised to yield semi-
coke-related innovation would not be ignored. The two trends happened 
concomitantly, and they mutual strengthen each other. When discussing innovation 
in the semi-coke industry, the days when only local semi-coke factories can be 
mentioned are long gone. Smooth knowledge flow channels have been established in 
this system, and its core is the semi-coke company. They actively search for the 
solutions they encounter in their production lines, and the government is happy to 
help local firms get in touch with academic organisations which might make a 
difference. This kind of benign interaction has become the new norm. 
 
 
The Triple Helix framework can provide another interpretation. Except for the 
industry helix, the other two helices were lacking in the early period of the semi-coke 
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industry. This sole helix could neither provide stability like a double helix situation nor 
provide room for the creation of innovation. It is very fragile, any slight change in the 
outside world might influence its direction of growth. Then government participation 
not only adds one helix to this interaction, it also lays the foundations for 
participation by universities and research institutes. As previous sections depict, most 
semi-coke factory owners do not care too much about the prospect of this industry or 
Yulin city. They were only interested in taking advantage of Yulin's resource 
endowments, their goals are the same, namely, to grow rich. Government officials 
tried to redirect the passion of those factory owners to benefit the owners and the 
city. Then the semi-coke industry has the government as its driver to guide it., At the 
same time, the imagination and efforts of the industry, as well as its academic staff, 
will determine the speed. The diversity of the interaction between the Triple Helix is 
interesting. The three cases chosen in this chapter belong to different categories. The 
first case, Jingfu, is an established company which sought technical assistance from 
the university and government helix. The second case, Jingfenyuan, is only a testbed 
for a specific technology. It is actually an industrial laboratory and a production unit 
simultaneously. The third case, Shenmu Fuyou, has the strongest technological 
capability among the three, alone playing the role of industry and university. 
Comparing the status quo of the three companies, Shenmu Fuyou is far more 
promising than the other two. It has more talented personnel, more grand blueprints, 
and a more reasonable institutional setting. Using the Triple Helix lens to observe the 
three cases, we may conclude that, for a modern enterprise, the internalisation of the 
university helix into the industry helix seems to be more promising. 
 
 
 
 
The Innovation Ecosystem approach illuminates the idea that a System of Innovation 
should be viewed dynamically and that the increased diversity of an innovation 
ecosystem will make it more robust. Yulin's case vividly justifies these arguments. 
The Innovation Ecosystem of Yulin's semi-coke industry is becoming more complex. 
As more elements are integrated into this system, it can perform more functions and 
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the ever-increasing interactions leave space and create opportunities for innovation. 
Successful intervention by Yulin’s government is due to the fact that most of these 
interventions aim to make this ecosystem more dynamic rather than putting everything 
under the control of government. The small and local ecosystem is trying to make the 
best use of exogenous factors to provide novel functions. The more open, more dynamic 
ecosystem makes the semi-coke industry's development healthier. 
 
 
In summary, the semi-coke industry in Yulin can be analysed by systemic approaches, 
and these approaches complement each other. As a fast-moving innovation event, 
Yulin's semi-coke will keep growing. 
 
 
5.2 The Building of the System of Technological Innovation at Haohua Energy 
 
Company 
 
Haohua Energy Company is a listed company. A constituent company of JIngmei49 
 
Group, it operates all the large and state-owned coal mines in Beijing. Currently, 
Jingmei Group owns 62.3% of Haohua’s stock share, and the joint second largest 
stock-holders of Haohua are Shougang group and China National Coal Group, holding 
1.86% respectively. Recently, Haohua’s practice of building a System of Technological 
Innovation has been awarded second prize in the Science and Technology 
competition organised by the China National Coal Association. Most other rewards 
were given for a specific technological breakthrough, while efforts in the 
improvement of innovation management are rare. As technological innovation is 
becoming increasingly important among mining companies, most firms have 
established technology centres. As a result, it is worthwhile studying a classic case of 
this sort. This case study will contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of 
how a modern Chinese coal company views the significance of innovation and how it 
endeavours to make the best use of technology from both inside and outside the 
company. 
 
49  ‘Jing’ is short for Beijing, ‘Mei’ means coal 
 
158 
 
 
Compared with Yulin's semi-coke case, Haohua demonstrates another facet of the 
System of Innovation in Chinese mining industry. Firstly, this is a case study of a 
company, while Yulin's case is a study of a local industry. A study of a company can 
display more detail than an industry study. A study of a local industry is a meso-level 
study, while a study of a company might be attributed to micro-level study. A meso-
level study is more suitable to demonstrate interactions between innovation subjects 
and the environment but might be weak in describing in detail what the real 
innovation process is within a company. By contrast, a micro-level study is more 
suitable to depict a clear innovation chain, from the motivation for innovation to the 
completion of an innovation, while it might be unable to demonstrate how the 
change of environment exerts its influence on those innovating companies and the 
evolution of a whole innovation ecosystem. 
 
 
Second, in the Yulin case, the role of government in regulating and stimulating the 
semi-coke industry is paid special attention, while company reactions are not paid 
much attention. As this is a study of a company, in the Haohua case government 
policy will not be attached much importance and the company itself will be the main 
actor. In Yulin's case, the municipal government serves as a multi-function 
organisation. Apart from performing the function of government, it also behaves like 
a consulting company, sometimes generating earlier and more accurate analysis 
regarding the vision of a technology or a niche market than local semi-coke 
companies. In Haohua's case, the role of the company will be examined rather than 
government regulation. 
 
 
Third, Haohua is a much more complicated company than the majority of semi-coke 
companies in Yulin. Some semi-coke companies are merely production units or, in 
other words, semi-coke factories. Haohua, by contrast, is a modern corporation. It 
was established strictly in accordance with relevant laws and, moreover, it is a listed 
company. It is obvious that its governance structure is more rationalised than the 
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privately owned semi-coke companies in Yulin. Haohua is also much larger. Although 
in terms of the production quantity, Haohua cannot match a coal mining giant such 
as Shenhua, and the total production of coal in Beijing cannot match that in Yulin, the 
situation is quite different if we compare Haohua with any single semi-coke company. 
Haohua almost incorporates all parts of a coal mining industry chain, from 
prospecting to marketing, while it also gets assistance from its mother company, 
Jingmei Group, which runs a variety of businesses whether relevant to coal mining or 
not. Jingmei is a large coal mining conglomerate, and can provide sufficient resources 
to its constituent companies. The administrative level50 of Jingmei Group is almost as 
lofty as the district where it headquarters are located, which is bureau level, or, in 
other words, as high as Yulin City. To some extent, Haohua company itself can realise 
the Triple Helix interaction with its own boundary. 
 
 
Fourth, what Haohua is doing is typical coal mining while the Yulin semi-coke case is 
more of a study of metallurgy. In a narrow sense, mining is about resource excavation, 
digging. This is just the core business of Haohua. It runs a number of coal mines, and 
its innovations in mining methods enjoy a certain reputation in China. Yulin's semi-
coke is the downstream of coal mining. It is about activity that adds value rather than 
coal mining per se. The companies in Yulin's case are not coal mining companies. They 
buy coal from coal mines and utilise special methods or equipment to process it. In 
Yulin's case, the companies are coal consumers, while Haohua is a producer of coal. 
They belong to different parts of the industry chain. As a result, Haohua demonstrates 
many features that are different from semi-coke companies in Yulin. Its interaction 
model with governments and universities is also different. 
 
 
Finally, Haohua is owned by an SOE located in Beijing and this SOE is managed by the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the People's 
 
50 The administrative level of a company is not stipulated by law, but it is an unspoken rule that an 
SOE does have an administrative level. In the future, de-administration reform will finally cut the 
link between SOEs and governments, but at the moment they are not incommensurable. 
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Government of Beijing Municipality. While most semi-coke companies in Yulin are 
privately owned, whilst Shenmu Fuyou is a subsidiary of an SOE, it used to be a 
privately-owned company which had been purchased by a large SOE. The locations 
are also worth mentioning. Yulin is a city in a remote area. There are plenty of 
resources for Haohua to utilise, but there are also many more strict rules for Haohua 
to abide by. 
 
 
5.2.1 Basic information about Beijing's coal mining industry 
 
It is said that Beijing is the only capital city which still has a coal mining industry. 
(Things will change in three years, as all the remaining coal mines have been ordered 
to close by 2019). Thanks to the tradition of documenting the history of almost every 
ancient Chinese dynasty, it is easy to keep track of the history of Beijing's coal mining 
activity. According to the records, the earliest coal mining activity in Beijing can be 
traced back to the middle of the 10th century. At that time, Beijing became the 
southern capital of the Liao dynasty. Being the capital of a large empire entails much 
higher energy consumption. In order to support the royal family's various activities, 
the coals in Beijing began to be excavated. After the Liao dynasty, coal mining in 
Beijing continued. Interestingly, after the Liao dynasty, except for several decades' 
interval, Beijing continued to serve as the capital city for nearly a thousand years. 
Scholars provide many reasons to explain why all the following dynasties chose 
Beijing as their capital, the rich coal resources are definitely being one important 
reason. Coal enabled the imperial governments and the rank and file to keep warm 
and relieve the heavy burden incurred by the vast population. During the Ming and 
Qing dynasties, as Beijing became the capital of the empire, the demand for coal 
grew sharply, and the number of people who engaged in coal mining also increased. 
During the Ming dynasty, a great many coal workers paraded into the capital city and 
the whole imperial government was shocked51. During the Qing dynasty, foreign 
forces began to control Beijing's coal mining industry. In the 1860s, the British 
 
51 This might be the earliest workers' parade ever recorded in Chinese history. 
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ambassador negotiated with the Chinese government over whether foreign 
companies should be allowed to mine coal in Beijing. Afterwards, some coal mines 
owned by local capitalists invited British technicians to join them and use foreign 
technologies. Around the decline of the Qing dynasty, lots of foreign countries found 
Chinese partners and established joint ventures. They brought in advanced 
technologies and mining methods, thereby improving the technological level of 
Beijing's coal mines. Infrastructure also assumed a central role. Railways and roads 
were built. All these construction works gave rise to the expansion of the coal market 
and improvements in productivity. Before the founding of the People's Republic of 
China, Beijing had approximately 400 coal pits and 13,000 workers (The History of 
Beijing's Industry: The Coal Mining Industry, 2000, p.5). 
 
 
After the founding of the PRC, the scattered coal mines to the west of Beijing were 
nationalised, and the People's Government of Beijing established a regulation agency 
to ensure that coal production was under the control of the government. During the 
ensuing decades, new and more modernised coal mines were designed by Chinese 
engineers and constructed by Chinese workers, and, like other industries, they could 
not avoid being influenced by the political atmosphere. After the end of the Cultural 
Revolution, the development of the coal mining industry in Beijing took a fresh 
course. Investment in science and technology was increased, and some state-of-the-
art technology was adopted. Furthermore, the main regulation body, the coal mining 
bureau had transformed its business strategy from coal mining only to a multi-
product and multi-industry strategy. In 1990, Beijing Municipal Coal Mining Bureau 
realised an industry output value of 224 million yuan. It employed 59,326 workers, 
including 6000 technicians. It owned eight coal mines and produced 6.02 million tons 
of coal. It ranked 333rd among all Chinese companies in terms of sales' value (Ibid, 
p.8-9). To sum up, coal mining in Beijing has a time-honoured history. By 1990, it had 
made a great contribution to the development of Beijing and its more affluent 
citizens. 
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The 1990s need to be mentioned independently, since they are considered to be the 
toughest years in coal mining history after the founding of the PRC. Coal miners used 
to be civil servants, but after Deng Xiaoping proposed a socialist market economy, 
coal miners did not have the so-called ‘iron rice bowl’ any longer. Besides, in the 
1990s the price of coal was extremely low, some mines were shut down, and a great 
many workers were laid off. Coal mines tried every means to increase sales and 
reduce costs. At the end of this tough decade, an organisational innovation occurred, 
which was the establishment of Jingmei Group. The municipal coal mining bureau, 
which produced the coal, and the coal company (in charge of selling the coal) merged 
and the new company was named Jingmei Group. This group has many businesses 
and the business strategy of the coal mining bureau changed. Jingmei Group's 
various businesses reflect this transformation. 
 
 
Regarding Haohua Energy Company, most of the coal mines were under the control 
of Haohua. It is in charge of guiding the development of the coal mines. In other 
words, Haohua has inherited the legacy of the older coal mining bureau. It runs four 
coal mines, three in Beijing, one in Inner Mongolia. In 2010, it produced five million 
tons of coal. In 2015, dubbed the most miserable year for coal mining, Haohua 
produced about 10 million tons of coal, of which the west Beijing area produced 4.5 
million tons, while the mine in Inner Mongolia produced six million tons. It realised 
revenue of over six billion yuan and a profit of 40 million yuan. In the first half of 
2016, the situation became even worse but, fortunately, in the latter half of 2016 the 
price of coal soared and the life of the coal mines has become much better. 
According to government regulation, all the three mines in Beijing owned by Haohua 
will stop producing coal, marking the end of Beijing’s coal producing history. This 
long history is approaching its end so this case study will be written as some sort of a 
memorial. This history began with a pure manual power input and ended with a 
technological model for other coal mines, this dramatic change lending this 1,000-
year story a happy ending, although its legacy and experience will be felt far beyond 
the boundary of Beijing municipality. 
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5.2.2 Haohua Energy Company's efforts to establish a System of Technological 
 
Innovation 
 
 
5.2.2.1 An introduction to the technological innovation agency in Haohua 
 
Nowadays, most mining companies in China have established various kinds of innovation 
management agencies, Haohua is no exception. The agency in Haohua is called 
Technology Centre, and it is in charge of the company’s technological innovation affairs. 
The director of the Centre is the Manager of the company. In China, this kind of 
arrangement is always used as a political signal. It conveys the message that the 
company attaches due importance to technological innovation. In fact, the Manager is 
just a figurehead of the Centre. Seldom interfering in the daily operation of the Centre, 
he is regarded as a representative of the high-ranking managers of the company. The 
real leader of this Centre is the Vice-Director and the General Engineer. Meanwhile, this 
Centre also has four branches in the four mines mentioned above (three in Beijing, one 
in Inner Mongolia). All the directors of the four subsidiary technology centres are the 
administrative chiefs of the mine (the real chief of a state-owned mine in China is the 
party secretary), while all the vice directors are the general engineers of those mines. 
This arrangement is a top-down setting in order to ensure the management of 
technological innovation gets due attention in every production unit. After all, as a coal 
mining company, the Technology Centre at headquarters cannot make any 
improvements if its link with the coal mines were cut off. Most of the innovations 
originated from practical needs, the problems encountered in each mine are the largest 
source of those needs. This top-down arrangement establishes a smooth information 
exchange channel, thereby facilitating interactions between the production line workers 
and the technicians or engineers. Moreover, it leaves space for grassroots innovative 
ideas to be heard by senior management staff, thus making bottom-up knowledge 
dissemination possible. The Centre also has six professional research institutes. Each 
institute is in charge of a 
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specific area. For examples, the Research Institute for Information Technology and its 
Applications, and the Research Institute for Safety Technology and Engineering. The 
directors of these institutes are also the vice managers of the company. These 
organisations are in charge of the daily innovation management. At a higher level, 
Haohua company also has an institution responsible for grand strategy and making 
decisions regarding the direction of the next technological advancement. It is called 
the Technology Commission. It is not only the supreme decision-making agency 
regarding technology at Haohua but also for the whole JIngmei Group. This 
commission has two director members; they are the Chairman of the Board and the 
Manager of Haohua. It also has eight vice-director members, all of which are high-
ranking managers at Haohua, and 17 other members which include the leaders of the 
relevant offices and some professors of Shandong University of Science and 
Technology. According to the company rule, this commission ought to have at least 
two meetings a year. In case of emergency, it can convene a meeting at any day. 
 
 
This organisational arrangement is designed to make technological capability one of 
the core competences of the company. All the paramount leaders of the companies 
hold positions in one innovation management organisation or another. This reflects 
the attitudes of the company towards technological innovation. The company tries to 
bring in outside intellectual resources to bolster its relatively weak technological 
capability. It has established long-term co-operation with some academic 
organisations, including Shandong University of Science and Technology. The inside 
and outside resources have been stimulated to create innovation and augment 
company profits. 
 
 
5.2.2.2 The practice of technological innovation at Haohua 
 
Having established a series of institutions and organisations to provide support for 
innovation activities within the company, what Haohua does to fulfil the tasks of this 
arrangement is also essential for successful innovation. 
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Above all, the company offers financial support for all innovation activities. The grant 
for supporting technological innovation will be allocated to each project according to 
relevant rules. During the 11th Five Year Plan (from 2006 to 2010), Haohua invested 
429 million yuan (US$63.1 million) to conduct R&D activities. In 2010 alone, Haohua 
invested 156 million yuan (US$22.9 million) for R&D, accounting for 3.3% of its 
revenue. During the 12th Five Year Plan (from 2011 to2015), Haohua invested 834 
million yuan (US$128.3 million) to conduct R&D. To be more specific, in 2011 Haohua 
invested 162 million yuan (US$25.7 million) which took up 3.5% of the company's 
revenue. In 2012 its R&D investment was 185 million yuan (US$29.4 million), or 4.3% 
of total revenue. In 2013 200 million yuan (US$32.2 million) was invested in R&D, 
occupying 4.3% of Haohua's revenue. In 2014 Haohua invested 122 million yuan 
(US$20 million) in R&D. Whilst this represented a sharp drop, it still accounted for 
4.6% of the company's revenue. This year's increase in the proportion of R&D 
investment was realised with great difficulty. It can be argued from the 2014 figures 
that, in that year, Haohua's revenue decreased to a large extent. The overcapacity 
problem had been widely recognised by 2014. The price of coal began to plummet, 
which had a huge negative influence on Haohua's business. Regardless of all the 
barriers it needed to overcome, Haohua did not choose to sacrifice its investment in 
R&D. In 2015 the situation became even worse, whereas Haohua had invested more 
than 4.6% of its revenue in R&D. 
 
 
The investment to R&D can be further divided into different usages. These include: 
direct investment, incorporating investment in materials, fuels, and energy; 
personnel welfare, incorporating insurance and housing allowances; depreciation 
charges for R&D; operation fees and rental charges for R&D; testing fees and 
machine purchasing fees and fees for evaluating and accrediting R&D outcomes. 
Besides, Haohua invests even more money in co-operating with universities and 
research institutes when its own technicians or equipment cannot accomplish a 
certain task. These expenditures have special regulation rules and the Technology 
Centre has the authority to either deny or agree the relevant grant. Haohua's own 
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R&D resources can be relied upon to solve some production-related problems, its 
ability shifting to the development part and incremental innovation. As a result, it is 
necessary to look for academic partners outside the company. These researchers also 
need to find business organisations to conduct research if they hope to apply for 
state funding. Mutual demand ties the mining companies and universities together. 
Haohua is a case in point. Its investment in its innovation partners not only solve 
problems but also help scholars. This kind of friendship is by no means established 
randomly. Each mining company faces unique problems determined by the 
geological structures of the mines it runs. At the same time, different universities or 
research institutes also have their own strengths and weaknesses, so they will try to 
find the appropriate partners. In an interview with a member of the technical staff at 
Jizhong Energy Group, I was told that Jizhong has an in-house research institute, but 
it focuses upon a narrow range of research fields, thus might be unable to offer 
sufficient technical support for the company. It would be more economic to find 
other organisations which already possess the expertise to tackle the problem facing 
Jizhong at any given moment than to invest in its own research institutes. Actually, 
this is the current situation facing Chinese mining industry. There are a huge number 
of small technological agencies each specialising in a clear-cut domain. As for the 
large and comprehensive organisations, there are not enough. 
 
 
Haohua actively choose academic projects to support. The staff at the Technology 
Centre collect information from coal mines, and the engineers and miners working in 
the coal pits report to the Technology Centre the most urgent problems they need to 
tackle. Sometimes the R&D personnel go to the coal mine themselves to obtain first-
hand information about the technology being used. They will detect if there is any 
potential opportunity for technological innovation or if there is any threat to the 
safety of the miners or to the sustainable production of the mine. They will make 
predictions and take precautionary measures to prevent some problems from 
appearing. A competition mechanism is also introduced. Haohua employs outside 
technicians and academic staff, evaluates the contributions of these personnel, and if 
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an employed expert receives criticisms during the evaluation, their contract with 
Haohua might be terminated. Apart from punishments, Haohua also design reward 
institutions. One institution worth introducing is a special innovation grant tailored to 
ordinary workers. The aim is to encourage all workers to participate in innovation. 
Whoever makes a contribution to the company through innovation, will receive a 
reward. This conveys the message that the company believes that everyone can be 
an innovator, that innovation will not be monopolized by engineers or university 
researchers. From 2013-2014, a total of 865 projects received the grant, totalling 
1,633,650 yuan. It is not a large sum, but as the main beneficiary of these grants are 
average miners earning several thousand yuan per month, it can still make a 
difference. Except for the innovators, the advisors of these project also receive a 
special reward. They might get 1,000 yuan if the project is at the company level, 
whereas they can get 3,000 yuan if the project is at the national level. Based on the 
foregoing, we may conclude that financial rewards are used as a tool to promote 
innovation at various levels and by people from different backgrounds. 
 
 
Haohua launched six movements to make sure that technological innovation can be 
understood and appreciated by the whole company. First, the company convenes a 
monthly meeting to discuss technological innovation. This meeting has been merged 
with the meeting for all the general engineers. All the participants are general 
engineers (or vice-general engineers) of the company or the coal mines owned by the 
company. At the meeting, all the technical problems will be presented and discussed. 
What should be done the next month will also be decided. This meeting is an 
information collection and exchange platform within the company. When a problem 
attracts enough attention—this may be due to its significance to the whole company 
or its extreme technical difficulty — it will no longer be regarded as a problem 
limited to one coal mine, but will be addressed by the whole company. By attending 
this meeting, the engineers and R&D staff can draw a clear technological route map 
for the company, while the overlapping investment will not be a severe problem. 
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Second, let us look at the masses' technological innovation movement. This 
movement is designed to inspire every potential innovator. The well-educated or 
scientifically-trained R&D staff are by no means the only source of innovation. They 
are key figures in solving big problems and complicated technical bugs, but when the 
miners encounter trivial issues it is neither economic nor efficient to turn to formal 
engineers for help. If the wisdom of the production line workers can be drawn upon, 
they always create technological miracles and bridge the gap between 
institutionalised research and practical studies. Therefore, Haohua organise special 
meetings for these grassroots innovators, their achievements will be demonstrated 
and evaluated, while formal institutions regarding how to award them have been 
established. This meeting is convened every three months. 
 
 
Third, every six months Haohua convenes technological innovation project 
evaluation meetings. There are numerous technological innovation projects 
proceeding simultaneously. In order to make sure the company's investment is being 
used effectively and making real progress, the authorities concerned will launch mid-
term evaluations. This meeting also serves as an experience exchange platform. The 
company might invite university professors to come, they assist the company's R&D 
staff. Meanwhile, the practical problems can also illuminate these researchers. 
 
 
Fourth, every year Haohua will evaluate the outcomes of the technological 
innovation. This evaluation is a continuation of the mid-term evaluation. Some 
innovation projects will be rewarded. 
 
 
Fifth, Haohua will assess the performance of R&D personnel annually. The R&D staff 
conduct the technological innovation, and as a result it is necessary to give each R&D 
person a fair assessment. Those whose performance was admirable over the past 
year will be rewarded, those who do not meet the basic requirements of the 
company will be warned or even punished. This assessment will be the foundation 
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for the human resource management of the company. Innovation in its very nature 
always has a detrimental aspect. The creative destruction metaphor is still suitable to 
describe innovation. This feature entails a dynamic and vibrant environment. One 
way to realise this is through human resource management. By keeping the human 
resources flowing, the company can take in new knowledge and get rid of obsolete 
knowledge. Haohua's assessment activity rates the performance of the technical staff, 
and the most severe punishment is the revocation of contract. This institution 
facilitates the update of the company's knowledge pool and increases the flexibility of 
the company's recruitment policy. By now, Haohua has 3,668 people holding 
academic certificates at or above the junior college level (Da Zhuan, 大专 ),1,026 
workers holding academic certificates at or above the college level, 75 people holding 
master's degrees, and five PhDs. Among all the technicians, 552 engineers have junior 
professional titles, 251 people have intermediate professional titles, and 81 
technicians have senior professional titles. This talent pool publishes over 20 
academic papers in journals at the national level or above. 
 
 
Finally, Haohua has an annual technological innovation meeting. This meeting is both 
a summing-up of the past year's innovation activity and a planning meeting for the 
next year. 
 
 
Haohua fully realises its limitations in R&D and the advantageous position of being a 
company in Beijing. The limited resources it has are not sufficient to ensure Haohua 
solve all the problems it encounters. But being based in Beijing, the hub of Chinese 
higher education and science and technology, Haohua can make the best use of 
extramural human resources. The Triple Helix functions well here. In Chinese 
contexts, policies aimed at enhancing interactions between the Triple Helix are called 
Industry-University-Research Institute integration policies. Haohua actively integrates 
itself into a network consisting of universities, other mining companies, and research 
institutes. Its geographical location is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, 
as we have seen, Beijing is the centre of Chinese higher education. It has the best 
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universities and scholars. It teems with talents from other industries, while its 
expertise and R&D is unmatched by any other Chinese city. On the other hand, since 
Beijing is the capital city, the development of heavy industry is under the strict control 
of central government. Thus, Haohua is restrained by many more regulations than 
other mining companies. Besides, as Beijing is only a city, its land area is much smaller 
than large provinces, and this also restricts Haohua's development. Operating coal 
mines in other provinces is more difficult. Haohua's tactics are clear. Now that we 
cannot persuade the central government to changing its policy, what we can do is 
make the best use of the technological resources and realise potential innovation 
opportunities. Haohua gleans useful information by attending a huge number of 
academic conferences and seminars organised by other mining companies, 
government agencies, and public institutions. These activities assist Haohua's 
technical staff to identify promising technology, look for co-operation partners, and 
search for solutions to problems that cannot be solved by the company's own 
resources. Haohua R&D personnel can communicate with their colleagues from 
different parts of the country or even the world. Although Haohua’s R&D personnel 
themselves might not be the best and the research they conduct is far from the 
frontier of the field, going to these conferences can expand their outlook and help 
them keep track of the latest trends in the academic community. Yulin's semi-coke 
company managers do not enjoy this advantage. Acquiring valuable knowledge is just 
the first step. Haohua grasps the opportunity of establishing technology alliances with 
universities and research institutes, and these will be mutual beneficial to both sides. 
Sometimes Haohua also invite experts from home and abroad as its guest researchers. 
These professors will go to Haohua on a regular basis to give lectures and discuss 
problems with Haohua's technical personnel. Two successful cases are presented 
here. The first is the laboratory co-established with Shandong University of Science 
and Technology. It aims to prevent mine disasters and provide early warning systems. 
The second is the co-operation agreement with China University of Mining and 
Technology's Resource and Secure Mining laboratory, which is a national key 
laboratory. Haohua can utilise the laboratory results and ask the laboratory to help it 
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train its technical staff. 
 
 
 
We can conclude that, with organisational and institutional guarantees, Haohua has 
an Innovation Ecosystem of its own. It opens to the outside world and even invites 
the outside world to join its effort to make this ecosystem more sustainable and 
exuberant. It does not hesitate to welcome outside resources, and it has also built 
many information and knowledge transmission approaches within the ecosystem. 
 
 
5.2.2.3 Haohua’s achievements in technological innovation 
 
The efforts of Haohua's R&D staff have yielded a rich harvest. In 2011 Haohua’s 
Technology Centre was certified ' Beijing's Enterprise Technology Centre'. This is a 
certification granted by Beijing's municipal government. It aims to foster the core 
position of firms in innovation and technological investment. This certification is 
given to technology centres which have strong innovation ability, model-setting 
functions, and have achieved technological success. 
 
  
Revenue 
S&T activity 
Number of Original value of technology 
  
  
investment  
Enterprise Category Million R&D development equipment  
（Million   
Yuan） personnel （Million Yuan）   
Yuan）      
1 Manufacturing 150 5 50 5 
 Telecommunications、     
2 Computer service and 120 5 80 3 
 Software     
3 Architecture 1500 7.5 50 10 
 
Table9: Application criteria of Beijing's Enterprise Technology Centre (2011 version) 
 
Source: 
 
http://www.1633.com/policy/html/beijing/shijingjixinxihuawei/2011/0808/30461.ht 
 
ml. 
 
Other requirements include the independent status of the Technology Centre and 
the establishment of a technology commission etc. In fact, Haohua's Technological 
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Innovation System is established according to these requirements. After receiving 
this certification, the company can apply for financial support from the municipal 
government when it seeks to construct a laboratory, or purchase R&D equipment or 
software. Each year the Technology Centre at the municipal level can get at the most 
one million yuan in funding, while the national level centre can get two million yuan. 
This is like a public announcement that Haohua will attach importance to 
technological innovation. The relevant regulations set norms for newcomers to 
follow and imitate. The change of institution will have an impact on the behaviour of 
members. Not being a typical high-tech company, Haohua's resolution and 
perseverance with pursuing a different path can be seen in this application and its 
actions afterwards. 
 
 
 
In 2013 Haohua was certified as a high-tech enterprise by the Chinese government 
and became the second high-tech coal mining enterprise. In the same year, Haohua 
also received the certification of Zhongguancun High Technology Enterprise. 
Zhongguancun used to be a science park in Beijing, usually considered as the Chinese 
Silicon Valley. Now it has become a quasi-brand. Whatever is related to 
Zhongguancun is regarded as high-tech. These two certifications are both designed 
by the Chinese government. It sets high standards for enterprises, and as long as an 
enterprise receives the certification it can enjoy various kinds of privilege. Take the 
High Technology Enterprise certification for example. According to the latest 
standards set by the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Finance, and 
the State Administration of Taxation, a high-tech enterprise needs to meet the 
following requirements: the enterprise should possess the intellectual property of its 
core products or services: the proportion of its employees who undertake R&D or 
innovation activities should be higher than 10%; for an enterprise whose revenue is 
over 200 million yuan, its investment in R&D should be higher than three percent of 
its revenue, while over 60% of the enterprise's revenue should be related to high-
tech products or services, to name a few. After receiving the certification, a 
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high-tech enterprise can enjoy a tax discount. Before receiving the certification, the 
enterprise's tax rate is 25%; this rate will be 10% less after it gets the certification. 
Meanwhile, the enterprise's investment in R&D can enjoy a tax discount as well. 
Different regions have their own policy for high- tech enterprises. Again, in 2013 
Haohua was awarded the Advanced Enterprise of Coal Mining Industry in Science and 
Technological Innovation. This prize is the repayment for Haohua's endeavours in 
technological innovation. It is also one way the government can permeate its 
influence into targeted enterprises. This indirect tactic will be analysed later. 
 
 
 
In 2015, Haohua enjoyed five important technological achievements. All received the 
second prize in the Science and Technology competition organised by the China 
National Coal Association, three other achievements received the third prize. Among 
the eight technological breakthroughs, three were appraised as reaching the 
international level (approximately over 90% of the top level). From 2014 to 2015, 
Haohua lodged 36 patents with the State Intellectual Property Office. Among the 36 
patents, two were invention patents, the other 34 were utility model patents. The 
latter 34 have been granted. In 2015 two invention patents Haohua lodged three 
years ago were granted. By 2015, Haohua held four invention patents. The co-
operation research project with China University of Mining and Technology about 
how to control falling rocks during the mining process was awarded the second prize 
of the Progress Prize in Scientific and Collective Technology by the Ministry of 
Education. An independent application to the Beijing Administration of Coal Mine 
Safety about safety supervision technology received the second prize of the Beijing 
Municipality safety production competition. Haohua undertook one part of 973 
 
projects.52 
 
 
 
 
52 The 973 project provides comprehensive support to basic research. It was designed in the 
hope of cultivating great scientists. As it was acclaimed in March 1997, it is usually called the 
‘973 project’. 
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Apart from these relatively marginal improvements in technology, Haohua has tried 
hard to change its whole coal digging and production system, and this has influenced 
the entire company. By and large, the geological structure of the coal mines in the 
western suburban area of Beijing is much more complicated than the average level in 
China. Its unstable coal and rock line make the digging and transporting dangerous 
tasks. The quality of the coal there partly compensates the risk of mining, as it 
produces anthracite, and west Beijing is one of most important anthracite producing 
areas. The anthracite produced here has been put onto the list of rare coals, which 
makes its price go up. Prior to the 21st century, coal mining is generally considered to 
be a high-risk industry. The risks, however, were to some extent downplayed or even 
ignored as, for a period, they saw rapid development, while the craze for energy can 
dwarf most other considerations. In the 2000s, governments issued a great many 
acts and regulations regarding the protection of workers in some high-risk industries, 
including coal mining. The precursor of Jingmei Group, Beijing Municipal Coal Mining 
Bureau, was perplexed by its high mortality rate. It is reported that, from the 1950s 
when the coal mining bureau was established to the late 1990s, 5.47 workers lost 
their lives for every million tons of coal produced. Even in 2004, when the mining 
bureau was replaced by Jingmei Group and Haohua, a severe disaster claimed 10 
workers' lives. When Beijing was due to hold the 2008 Olympic Games, all the heavy 
industries within the local land area had to pass strict regulations if it wants to 
continue production. As a result, the pollution caused by coal mining is a key target 
of these environmental regulations. 
 
 
 
Having decided to produce coal in a safer and greener way, Haohua organised a 
series of meetings to unify the ideas of cadres and workers, explaining the 
significance of updating its mining method and reducing the pollutant substances it 
gave off during the mining process. The first conclusion Haohua people arrived at 
was to adopt a mechanised mining method. The merits of this method are many. 
First, it is much more efficient than the traditional mining method, and the 
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productivity of the company can be raised. Second, as it uses fewer workers in the 
mine, it is much more secure, decreasing the mortality rate. Third, the company can 
save money as it will employ fewer workers overall. The difficulty is the complicated 
structure of the mine and the affiliated resistance of the workers as well as some 
engineers. The managers of the company directly discussed with workers and 
engineers, persuading them to support this decision. Then Haohua invested 332 
million yuan in the coming two years to transform and optimise the production 
system of each mine. This is not a micro change but systematic surgery. This effort 
finally paid off. In some years, no workers died, while productivity increased several 
times. Green mining was also a critical task Haohua had to accomplish. The waste 
rock was refilled into the mine, the waste water was recycled and purified, 
sometimes workers can use the recycled water to take showers, the dust was strictly 
controlled, and workers were encouraged to plant trees on the surface of the mining 
area. The twin strategy - mechanised mining and green mining - serve as two sources 
of technological innovation, representing a break with the past and imposing higher 
requirements for technology. 
 
 
 
In the China Statistical Yearbook on the Coal Mining Industry (2013), the experience 
of Haohua was introduced. The lessons other coal mining companies can learn from 
Haohua are that, first of all, Hoahua dared to develop a set of comprehensive 
mechanised technology systems itself though the geological structure of its mines 
serve as a stumbling block; Second, Haohua was good at identifying the evolutionary 
trend of policy and thereby improving its utilisation effectiveness. For the first point, 
Haohua endeavoured to develop a new laneway setting model, a new mining 
method, new tunnelling equipment, and a new hydraulic support system. These 
innovations were all pathbreaking for west Beijing. When it comes to the second 
point, this might be a huge advantage for most companies in Beijing. They have a 
sharp sense of the political environment. As the hub of politics and S&T, companies 
in Beijing can take advantage of their location, getting the relevant information 
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quicker, responding more swiftly to policy. Haohua’s business strategy was in 
accordance with the requirements incurred by individual policies. Its effort to 
develop green mining technology is a case in point. After Beijing was chosen as the 
holding city for the 2008 Olympic Games, a series of policies were designed to make 
Beijing a more environmentally friendly city, Haohua chose the backfill of coal 
gangue53 and the greening work of the mining area as two important tasks. The 
former not only reduces the environmental pollution of coal gangue but also reduces 
the construction cost of the foundation of the mine (Chen & Li, 2014). By choosing 
these fields, Haohua gained benefits from the improvement of technology and were 
able to get government funding. This is a clever strategy. 
 
 
 
In conclusion, as a middle-sized coal mining company, Haohua have established a 
Technological Innovation System which incorporates inside and outside resources. The 
outcome of this system is useful for the company since it is based on its true concerns. 
This system helps Haohua to institutionalise its interactions with its technological 
partners, thus bind all the components of the system together. It creates an information 
exchange mechanism and encourages innovations of all sorts. It is also a component of 
China's National System of Innovation, the mining industry's Sectoral System of 
Innovation, as well as Beijing's Regional System of Innovation. Based on the fieldwork, 
my observation is that, at this micro level (meaning the research target is not a large SOE 
or multinational company), the impact of the National System of Innovation on an 
individual company is not direct. Just as the central government might not have links 
with all average citizens, the regional policy and sectoral regulation that construct the 
framework of each company. Compared with the smaller semi-coke companies in Yulin, 
Haohua has an obvious technological advantage. Consequently, Haohua plays a much 
more influential role in the System of 
 
53 In mining, gangue is the commercially worthless material that surrounds, or is closely mixed 
with, a wanted mineral in an ore deposit. Thus, it is distinct from overburden, which is the waste 
rock or materials overlying an ore or mineral body that are displaced during mining without 
being processed. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gangue viewed on 2017-2-14. 
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Innovation, it is one of the major innovation contributors of the system, and has 
more positive interactions with other parts of the system. It proves again that a 
company's own technological capability, not the company's technological partners', 
determines what it can acquire. 
 
 
 
The Triple Helix in Haohua's case is also different from that in Yulin's case. Haohua 
holds the dominant position in its interaction with governments and universities. 
Government plays the role of providing indirect guidance. It designs policies which 
either encourage companies to invest more in R&D or impose restrictions on 
technological indicators. Yulin's municipal government to some extent understands 
the semi-coke market better than the managers of those semi-coke companies, and 
officials in Yulin's government directly participate in the daily operation of semi-coke 
companies. While in Haohua's case, as it is located in Beijing, first, it is a company 
with a complete modern corporate governance structure, second, managers in 
Haohua have many more avenues to gain relevant information. Under such 
circumstances, officials in the Beijing municipal government seldom give explicit 
orders to companies. Haohua reads through government policies and chooses those 
beneficial to itself. For instance, the certification of high technology enterprise policy. 
Haohua decides to launch a transformation based on the model provided in this 
policy and enjoy the taxation benefits. Besides, Haohua also enjoys higher autonomy 
when it chooses its university or research institute partner. Although it cannot match 
the technical level of a university or a research institute level, it has access to a talent 
pool. This pool can help the company cope with daily technical problems. When 
engineers at Haohua face practical problems which entail a basic research ability, 
Haohua will reach out to find potential partners. Compared with the semi-coke 
factories in Yulin, Haohua's technological capability is far greater, and this 
endowment puts Haohua in an advantageous position vis-à-vis universities, and the 
company possesses more bargaining power when negotiating with its technological 
partners. Yulin's semi-coke companies do not have equal status with their 
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technological partners. In fact, most of the semi-coke companies act as pure 
technology receivers, the universities and research institutes their supervisors rather 
than partners. The university scholars regard these companies as a larger industrial 
laboratory. During this co-operation process, the knowledge flows in one direction, 
from the university of research institute to the semi-coke companies. Or worse, the 
semi-coke companies do not get the technology, they just know how to use it. Much 
like the average consumer purchases electronic devices but has no idea about the 
technology. Haohua plays a much more active role alongside its co-operation with 
universities and research institutes. Of course, there are some large corporations in 
Yulin. Their role in the Triple Helix resembles that of Haohua. This proves that the 
stronger the technological capability a company has, the more it can acquire in its co-
operation with other technology partners. This endogenous technological capability 
is decisive for a company to profit from the outside world, and it cannot be 
substituted by co-operation with any other organisation, such co-operation can at 
best be in the way of compensation. To sum up, in Haohua's case, the company is the 
leading player of the Triple Helix. The government and academic organisations do not 
dictate the interactions between the three players. the knowledge production of this 
Triple Helix is concentrated more on the company's needs. 
 
 
 
Haohua’s Innovation Ecosystem is also worth discussing. It is not only a Sub-
Ecosystem of Innovation in Beijing, but also a Sub-Ecosystem of Innovation in the 
Chinese mining industry. Generally, however, Haohua interacts with other coal 
mining counterparts, be it another coal company or a university or research institute 
specialising in coal mining. The relative simplicity of the ecosystem reduces the 
innovation potential and innovation sources. Meanwhile, Haohua almost 
monopolises the coal production of Beijing, this dominant position makes the 
motivation to innovate suffer. In the past decade, the political input, namely 
government policies, spurred the coal companies to rely more upon technology to 
fulfil diversified goals, such as to ensure miners' safety, increase productivity, and 
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reduce the emission of pollutant gases. Governments at different levels and 
regulating different areas are considered to be component elements of a biocoenosis 
of this Innovation Ecosystem, that is, the evolutionary dynamics can be internalised. 
However, the single source of dynamics renders this ecosystem weak in vitality. A 
complicated innovation ecosystem tends to have more vitality. If most of the 
evolution originated from the same part of the system, this ecosystem always lacks 
future evolution dynamics. By now, the Innovation Ecosystem Haohua inhabits is still 
dynamic, but its prospects depend upon developing other engines to fuel innovation. 
Recently, due to heavy pollution, the government cut the production of coal on the 
one hand and turned to innovation on the other. The total closure of all the coal 
mines within the territory of Beijing will push Haohua to walk out. This might force 
Haohua to do more R&D, as it will definitely face an unfamiliar environment. A new 
mining method design and new equipment are needed. This means Haohua is going 
to be involved in a new innovation ecosystem (or a new Sub-Ecosystem of 
Innovation). New surroundings will give rise to more innovation opportunities. 
Haohua's technological innovation system will be useful in overcoming the difficulties 
which might occur in this new environment. We can summarise by saying that the 
sharp change, however passive it may seem, will bring more chances than risks to 
Haohua. 
 
 
 
Haohua's case has demonstrated a number of divergences from Yulin's case, as 
different players perform different functions and various innovation strategies have 
been displayed. Yulin's semi-coke companies work in the metallurgy part of the 
industry chain. Haohua mainly focuses upon the mining part of the industry chain. 
The next case will be a study of a mining equipment manufacturer. 
 
 
 
5.3 Tiandi Science and Technology Co, Ltd 
 
In terms of annual revenue, Tiandi ( 天地 ) is the largest coal mining equipment 
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manufacturing company in China . In 2015 its revenue was about US$1,785 million. 
My interviewees argued that China was still quite weak when it comes to mining 
equipment manufacturing. The aim of choosing one of the best equipment 
manufacturers in China is to first test if that statement is true and then explore the 
real technological capability of Chinese equipment manufacturers. This case study 
will introduce and analyse Tiandi’s two technological breakthroughs. 
 
 
 
5.3.1 Basic information about Tiandi 
 
Tiandi Science and Technology Co. Ltd is owned by China Coal Technology and 
Engineering Group. It was established in March 2000 by the China Coal Research 
Institute and some other coal mining related companies. Its parent company was 
born of a merger between the China Coal Research Institute and Zhongmei 
International Engineering Research Institute in June 2008. The China Coal Research 
and Engineering Group is a central SOE directly regulated by the state-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). Unlike 
other coal mining SOEs such as Shenhua, it is not directly involved in mining, but 
concentrates on equipment manufacturing and the relevant R&D. Its main business 
includes the production of mining automation equipment, mechanisation equipment, 
coal washing and processing equipment, technological services and consultation etc. 
 
 
 
By the end of 2015, Tiandi had 23,762 employees, among which were 8,647 
professional technicians, two academicians of the China Engineering Academy, 264 
PhDs, 2,839 Masters, and 5,910 BAs. Since its establishment, the company has 
received over 600 science and technology advancement prizes, 1,904 patents (547 
were invention patents). It had been certified as a high-tech enterprise from 2000. As 
a leading Chinese mining equipment manufacturer, it has achieved several striking 
technological merits. One of the recent achievement is Huangling mining company's 
intelligent unmanned mining technology. 
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5.3.2 The experience of developing unmanned mining technology 
 
As a coal mining equipment manufacturer, Tiandi has to foster a close relationship 
with its customers, namely, the coal mines. As a result, whilst Tiandi is the main 
developer of a whole set of unmanned technology, its user, Huangling Coal Company 
(黄陵), is also important thus the decision-making process at Huangling will also be 
presented in order to make this story more complete. In fact, according to the theory 
of the System of Innovation, the interactions between this system's components are 
sometimes more influential on the outcome of the system. Therefore, when the 
actions of equipment manufacturers are under scrutiny, it is always important to 
bear in mind that the key reason why the manufacturer decides to do so cannot be 
found if the mining company is ignored. The Tiandi case will be allocated the task of 
demonstrating these interactions. 
 
 
 
Huangling is located in Yan'an, Shaanxi Province, which is to the south of Yulin. It is 
owned by an SOE, namely, Shaanxi Coal and Chemistry Industry Group. The leading 
coal mine of Huangling was established in 1989 with a production capacity of six 
million tons a year. In 35% of the mining area the thickness of the coal seam ranges 
from 0.8 metre to 1.8 metres. Due to this sharp change in thickness, Huangling's 
equipment cannot be used to dig coal from this area. Consequently, Huangling 
mainly focus upon the area where coal seam is thickest. For low-seam mining, the 
working space is quite limited, there need to be more miners, working conditions are 
terrible, and labour intensity is high. All these factors can lead to accidents. From 
early on, the leading Huangling mine faced a vicious circle. Due to the above-
mentioned difficulties, if the coal seam is low the production task cannot be fulfilled, 
the mine has to invest more miners in the hope of finishing the production task on 
time, the possibility of production accident is even higher, further negatively 
influencing the accomplishment of the production task. This vicious circle used to 
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baffle the managers of Huangling. They tried every possible solution to solve this 
problem but without success. In the past, this problem was not a central issue of the 
company, as it owns high-seam coal mines., But the current management group 
decided to be first one to eat crab, which means they wanted to risk developing a 
technology in order to realise an unmanned coal mine, and they wanted to co-
operate with a Chinese company. This decision is strategic and once circulated in the 
company it encountered waves of protest. Those who were against this proposal had 
good reason. First, some managers thought that developing low-seam unmanned 
mining technology was not urgent, as the company has sufficient other mining areas 
to operate and those areas produce a fair profit. Second, some engineers do not 
trust the Chinese company's technological capability. There had not been any 
precedents in China that a Chinese company successfully designed and installed 
unmanned mining equipment, and it would be safer to import foreign equipment. 
Some workers were afraid of not being able to use the new technology as their 
education level was not very high, thus they would either be sacked or be paid less. 
To make matters worse, 2013 witnessed a dramatic downturn in the coal market, 
and some were afraid that the unmanned technology might only further reduce the 
company's profit level. 
 
 
 
In order to reach a consensus, Huangling's managers' group explained to employees 
the significance of adopting domestic unmanned mining equipment, both in terms of 
its significance to the company and its significance to the country. For the company, 
this task had to be done in due course. It was just a matter of time. After all, the low-
seam mining area has to be mined, and it was high time the company invested in the 
relevant technology to utilise the coal resources buried in the low-seam mining area. 
It takes years to finish. When the construction was completed, the coal market might 
be better (this became the case in 2016). For the country, China's coal mining is a 
labour-intensive industry, which has caused many problems. If Chinese-designed 
unmanned equipment can be commercialised, a vast market awaited. This kind of 
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propaganda is quite useful for engineers and managers. As for the workers, 
Huangling made a promise that their salaries would not be reduced and finally 
persuaded the workers. 
 
 
 
No sooner were these psychological barriers removed than the company launched its 
grand programme. Huangling chose a number of domestic partners, among which 
Tiandi was one of the main contributors. The No.1 mine was chosen to conduct this 
experiment. The working face of No.1 mine is 235 metres in length, and 1.1 to 2.3 
metres high. This programme was formally launched in January 2013, Huangling 
investing over 10 million yuan. After a year’s effort, it was finished in April 2014, and 
a month later it passed evaluation by the China National Coal Association. A touching 
comment on this achievement is that the dream of coal workers to wear white shirts 
in the mine has been realised. The workers need only sit in front of a computer and 
all the work can be done with a tap on the keys. This joint venture between 
Huangling and Tiandi proved to be a great success. The State Administration of Work 
Safety and the State Administration of Coal Mine Safety jointly issued a document 
appealing to all Chinese coal mines to learn from Huangling. 
 
 
 
According to that document, the lessons we can draw can be summed up as five 
innovations. First, idea innovation. The new idea liberates the miners from the 
dangerous environment and strenuous labour input. It also helps to increase the 
equipment manufacturing level of Chinese companies and promote the image of 
miners. A typical image of a miner is dirty and brutish, but the new image is clean 
and tidy. Second, technological innovation. This is also the core concern of this study. 
Unmanned mining technology faces several challenges, such as how to distinguish 
rock from coal. In co-operation with Tiandi and other equipment manufacturers, 
Huangling went to the No.1 mine and in the end designed a set of technology 
including a one button start and shut down control technology and memory cutting 
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technology. They also designed panorama vision and remote interference technology. 
Apart from this general technology, technicians invented special coal-cutting 
technology which can only be applied in No.1 mine. Third, equipment innovation. 
Fully mechanised equipment is a guarantee for unmanned mining. Huangling chose 
Tiandi as the main contractor, and ask the company to design the equipment, 
including the platform and standard design. The final equipment can produce two 
million tons a year. Besides, all the relevant equipment was linked, all the work from 
the operation to the maintenance of the equipment can be controlled simultaneously. 
During the operation of the equipment, 11 technological reforms were completed. 
This is not only a fully mechanised mining face, but also a fully computerised one. A 
variety of high technology was used, rendering human intervention, besides providing 
general instructions and maintenance work, unnecessary. Fourth, management 
innovation. After the new technology was used, three apparent changes occurred, 
above all, from underground to ground. Control of all the mining equipment can be 
finished by ground work, and the relevant payment system and work attendance 
checking system had been changed. There are far fewer workers now. Normally, only 
one worker needs to be at the working face to deal with emergencies. Finally, from 
on-the-spot to remote control. At the outset, some workers still interfered in the 
production process, but this kind of manual work had been strictly prohibited. Fifth, 
training innovation is also a means by which the company seeks to fulfil its promise to 
workers. Only by providing relevant training can the company and the workers 
achieve a double win. A total of 22 seminars and training courses were organised and 
143 workers took part in the training. 
 
 
 
Huangling and Tiandi's co-operation has led to a number of improvements. The 
personnel at the coal face decreased from nine to one and save Huangling five 
million yuan a year. The accuracy of the coal-cutting and recycle rate have been 
improved a great deal. The automation rate is over 95%, and all the equipment was 
produced by a Chinese company. Compared with imported equipment, domestic 
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products save the company almost 30 million yuan. 
 
 
 
 
In 2015, intelligent unmanned mining practice was awarded first prize by the China 
National Coal Association in the Chinese Coal Mining Science and Technology 
Advancement competition. Four companies received the prize - Huangling, Tiandi, 
one of its subsidiaries, Tiandi Marco, as well as Xi'an Coal Mining Equipment 
Company. 
 
 
 
The China Statistical Yearbook on Mining Industry (2013) writes highly of this 
achievement. At first, this project represented Chinese firms’ highest level of 
technological capability. In this co-operative venture, they tried novel ways to realise 
automation mining. The yearbook also summarises some lessons we can learn from 
this project. Above all, the liberation of minds is important. Every innovation entails 
the ambition of leaders; they need to overcome all the mental and psychological 
barriers. Second, so-called ‘top-level design’ is important. Huangling organised a 
group to be in charge of all matters related to this project, and the project became 
the firm’s strategic target, all relevant resources needing to be supplied when 
needed. Disaster management and geological guarantees were also decisive. They 
formed the environment and backdrop of this grand project, and the technologies 
that were used had to match this environment. Personnel training was the last step 
Technology and equipment need personnel to operate it. Training current employees 
will contribute to harmonising labour relations within the company. All these factors 
convey the message that a technological innovation is by no means a purely 
technological phenomenon. It is a reflection of all the social relationships behind it 
and will be better understood when taken as the output of a larger social system. 
 
 
 
This breakthrough is path-breaking. It fills a gap in Chinese unmanned mining 
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technology. According to a survey, there are still hundreds of coal mines in China in 
which miners to do the digging. There are about 900,000 workers working at the coal 
face. Given the proliferation of unmanned technology, an increasing number of 
workers may be freed up. Of course, this is by no means a new thing, and its 
influence should not be overestimated. Numerous mines all over the world owned by 
global mining giants have realised unmanned operations, but it is the first time that 
this idea has been tried out in China. This achievement realised remote control on 
the ground and thus improved the safety conditions of the miners. 
 
 
 
Of course, this technology has not matured, it needs to be improved, and needs to be 
tested in different environments. In this case, the government, to some extent, plays the 
role of the invisible hand. The regulations and ever-increasing requirement for workers' 
safety impose invisible pressure on mining companies, and the financial reward one can 
get by investing in R&D also encourage mining companies and equipment manufacturers 
to closely co-ordinate with each other. Government and university do not directly 
interfere but their impact cannot be ignored. A government decision gave birth to this 
company, and all its initial resources, be they financial or human resources, came from 
government support. This company used to be a research institute, it still has close links 
with academic institutions so it is able to get new employees from universities or 
research institutes. This is an implicit Triple Helix. 
 
 
 
5.3.3 The case of Tiandi-Marco Electro-Hydraulic Control System Company 
 
Tiandi-Marco is a subsidiary of Tiandi and it used to be a Joint Venture with Marco. 
Marco is a German company.54 In order to find a technologically superior partner, in 
July 2001 Tiandi decided to co-operate with Marco and establish such a company. 
 
54 Marco Systemanalyse und Entwicklung GmbH is a German company established in 1982. 
Its main products include dispensing systems, longwall face mining automation, the VisTwo 
scada system. See https://www.marco.de/index.php. 
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Tiandi-Marco (hereafter TM) mainly focuses upon manufacturing hydraulic support 
control systems, the automation equipment in a mine's mechanised mining system. 
TM is also the main contributor to Huangling's unmanned mining technology project. 
From its beginning, TM was established in the hope of learning from a western 
company and finally possessing the intellectual property right of the core technology. 
By now, this task has almost been completed, as it is said that TM does not need the 
technological guidance of Marco and is able to design and produce new products 
without the assistance of the German company. 
 
 
 
The strong technological capability of TM can be traced back to pre-2000. It used to 
be a subsidiary of the China Coal Research Institute, that is, it was a research institute 
before being incorporated. Its employees were technicians and had rich experience 
of doing relevant research in coal mining. Now it has about 335 employees, among 
which there are two PhDs, 50 Masters, 86 B. As, and 94 Junior College Students. 
Most of these employees used to work for the China Coal Research Institute. There 
are five experts getting grants from the State Council. 
 
 
 
In 2014 TM was certified as China's Enterprise Technology Centre and became Beijing's 
High technology enterprise. Just as Haohua did, TM also established a technology centre 
within the company and has an expert consultation commission as well as a technology 
commission. R&D investment took up at least 5% of its revenue, and recently this figure 
has risen to 8%. Apart from this, TM actively applied for funding from the state, the 
provincial government, and its parent company. In the past three years, it has received a 
50-million-yuan research grant. TM tries every means to stimulate its employees' 
innovation incentives. First of all, it allows its employees to purchase its stock. By now, 
32% of TM stock is owned by its employees. Second, TM designs a multi-indicator 
evaluation system to measure its employees' contributions to innovation, and has 
designed a multi-level rewarding system. It also 
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co-operates with some renowned universities such as Tsinghua University and MIT. 
 
 
 
 
TM has had a variety of innovation products, the most significant is called SAC 
Hydraulic Support Electric-Hydraulic Control system. It is a combination of electronic 
technology, computer technology, and hydraulic support technology. Using an 
electric-hydraulic control system to manoeuvre a hydraulic support can increase the 
speed, the degree of automation, the efficiency, and improve the security condition. 
Meanwhile, it can also reduce manual labour. Compared with using personnel to 
control the support, SAC can make the movement of the support more accurate thus 
lead to higher productivity. During the R&D process of the SAC, new technology, new 
materials, new production process were utilised. 
 
 
 
The significance of SAC is that, electric-hydraulic control systems have been adopted 
by western countries for about 20 years. The technology was not entire new to 
developed countries, but China could not produce it by itself. The technological 
success of SAC was soon transferred to a commercial one as it broke the foreign 
monopoly. Moreover, some of its technological qualities were even better than 
Marco’s products. SAC's information rate55 is 33.3k, higher than Marco's PM31's 
19.2k information rate. SAC's security response time is 300ms, while that of PM31 is 
500ms. SAC's service life is about 30,000 times the same as the foreign product. 
Before SAC was put onto the market, all relevant products were foreign, and were 
both expensive and difficult to repair as the seller did not have a base in China. SAC 
can solve these problems with ease. First, the price of the SAC is 40% lower than its 
western competitors, an imported Electric-Hydraulic Control system product is about 
17 million yuan, while SAC's price is only 9.5 million yuan. At present, China has 
about 1,500 mechanised operation faces, only 200 of which use Electric-Hydraulic 
 
55 The information rate is represented as an average number of bits of information per second. 
The rate of 33.3k means SAC can transmit 33.3 k bits every second. 
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Control, so there is a large market. As a Beijing-based company, TM can provide 
timely after-sales service, and it can assist its customers to solve all the technical 
problems much more quickly than western companies. Second, the productivity of a 
mine can be raised after using the SAC. According to TM’s calculation, an SAC can 
assist a coal mine to produce half a million tons of coal a year. Finally, the successful 
commercialisation of the SAC will bring more job opportunities to China and more 
tax will be generated as a by-product. The SAC was put onto the market in 2008, and 
in 2010 the China National Coal Association awarded TM first prize in its science and 
technology advancement competition. 
 
 
 
In fact, the significance of choosing this case is not due to its top-level technological 
capabilities but that it demonstrates Chinese mining machinery makers’ resolution 
to ascend the value chain and provide a successful story of the trading market for 
technology policy. It is a success because the technicians at Tiandi were not satisfied 
with being the pupils of German partners. TM's achievement can be attributed to its 
sustained commitment to R&D. The import-digest innovation favoured by the 
Chinese government has been realised by TM, but this realisation never come true 
automatically. Without continuous investment in innovation, researchers cannot 
grasp the essence of the product design process, let alone create their own way of 
doing things. All similar successful stories, for example, the high-speed train, are 
based on intensive technological learning. Only by learning can a person improve 
their technological capability as opposed to productive capacity. The success of the 
SAC is not due to the generous benevolence of Marco, but the result of the active 
and purposeful technological learning of TM's R&D staff. TM's experience is very 
valuable. Other Joint Ventures in China need to regard TM as a model if they ever 
think of developing their own products rather than relying upon foreign partners. 
 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion of Case Studies 
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In this chapter three case studies have been presented. They almost cover a 
complete industry chain from mining processes to metallurgy, while equipment 
manufacturing is also included. Based on the three case studies, plus the fourth 
chapter, we arrive at the following conclusion. The divergence of innovation 
performance across the different stages of mining is informed by two factors. First, 
the distance between final products and market or commercialisation, and second, 
the intensity of interaction between the mining company (including prospecting 
company and equipment manufacturer) and the university or research institute. To 
be more specific, the closer the distance and the higher the intensity of the 
interaction, the better the innovation performance. If one of the two factors do not 
appear, it is possible that this company's innovation performance is not desirable. 
 
 
 
Both the inter-stage difference in innovation and the inter-firm difference in 
innovation can be explained by the arguments above. Of the different stages of the 
mining industry, from prospecting to mining, processing and metallurgy, prospecting 
is the furthest from the market. As we saw in the previous chapter, the final product 
of the prospecting stage is a kind of possibility or probability. The prospecting 
company will draw a map which carefully marks the area where there might be 
valuable mines. But the prospecting company cannot translate its achievement 
directly into commercial success. In China, the separation of exploration rights and 
mining rights still restricts the prospecting company to harvesting their own profits. 
Chinese law discourages the participation of privately owned companies in 
prospecting. After nearly four decades’ Reform and Opening-up, the prospecting 
stage goes through the least change compared with other mining stages. Besides, 
scholars and research fellows specialising in prospecting mainly work on theory-
building. This reduces the incentive of prospectors to co-operate with academic staff, 
as these theories can make a contribution to locating a potential mining area, but its 
contribution is limited. The remaining work will be done by staff engaged in field 
prospecting. During this process, experience is still more important than theory, at 
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least in China at present. The lack of both factors makes the prospecting stage the 
least innovative stage in Chinese mining. As for the mining and processing stages, the 
two are always put together; most mining companies do both mining and processing. 
The final products of mining can be directly sold to downstream consumers, as is the 
final product of the processing stage. The distance between the market and 
mining/processing stage is almost zero. Meanwhile, compared with the prospecting 
stage, the restriction imposed on private companies by governments is much less, 
and a great number of private mining companies are active at the mining and 
processing stages. Mining companies also interact intensively with universities and 
research institutes, policies encouraging or even stipulating the necessity of industry-
university co-operation. Neither a mining company nor a university/research 
institute can get government funding if it applies for the funding alone and they have 
to seek a partner in industry or the academic community.56 This kind of requirement, 
though arbitrary, produces some desirable outcomes. If you look at the list of 
awardees of the science and technology advancement competition, you will find that 
most of the awardees include both mining companies and academic organisations. 
The mining and processing stages are considered to be the most innovative stages in 
the Chinese mining industry. The situation at the metallurgy stage is similar to the 
mining and processing stages, whereas the intensity of interaction between industry 
and academia is weaker. When it comes to mining equipment manufacturing, its 
links with academia are even weaker than at the metallurgy stage, leading to 
criticism of its innovation performance. 
 
 
 
The inter-firm difference can also be explained by this theory. For instance, TM's 
achievements in mining equipment manufacturing are impressive, one reason being 
that it used to be a research institute. It can realise an internal interaction between 
 
56 This has not been inscribed in Chinese law, but it has almost become a norm. Some of my 
interviewees told me that, by finding an academic/business partner (depending upon whether 
they work for an academic institute or a company), their success rate can be improved. 
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industry and academia. This kind of internal interaction represent the peak of 
industry-university interaction. In fact, the technological capability of large SOEs such 
as Shenhua and Zhongmei is fostered by their in-house R&D, thus they seldom need 
to seek assistance from outside. The case of Yulin is relevant too. The small semi-
coke production factories have little interaction with the academic community, while 
large companies can seek technological assistance from inside. The other helix, 
namely, the government, is responsible for shaping different types of interactions 
between the other two helices. The future development of Chinese mining partly 
depends upon the adaptation and dissemination of good policies. 
 
 
 
The above chapters depict the situation in China. What of other countries? The next 
chapter will throw some light on this issue. 
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6. A Cross-Country Comparison 
 
In the mining industry, there are several global giants, representing the highest 
technological levels in the world. It is useful to compare their business models, the 
way they do R&D, with their Chinese counterparts. In this chapter, a number of 
western as well as Chinese mining companies and mining equipment companies will 
be selected. The criteria of the choice are their ranking in terms of revenue in their 
own field. It is hoped that this kind of comparison can reveal the differences or the 
gaps between Chinese mining practice and the practice of global leaders, thus 
contribute to a better and deeper understanding of the real innovation process in 
mining companies. 
 
 
 
The most important finding of this chapter is that mining companies and mining 
equipment companies have different innovation patterns. Mining companies mainly 
engage in process innovation. This kind of innovation entails less investment and 
results in either a lower cost or a higher output rather than a new product. Mining 
equipment companies count on product innovation to gain profit. Mining companies 
tend to have close relationships with academic institutions, while equipment 
companies tend to rely more upon their in-house R&D sectors. Meanwhile, western 
companies tend to rely more upon their in-house R&D than their Chinese 
counterparts, Chinese companies have more intensive interactions with academic 
institutions 
 
 
 
6.1 Innovation in mining companies 
 
Ranking Names Revenue（in millions of dollars） 
Profit（in millions of 
dollars）    
    
1 BHP BILLITO 52,267 1910 
    
2 SHENHUA 37,612 1391 
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3 RIO TINTO 34,829 -826 
    
4 VALE 25,609 -12,129 
     
Table 10：Mining Company Revenue Ranking 
 
According to the Fortune World's 500 largest companies, the four mining companies 
above were ranked top four among all mining companies. The following section will 
introduce the innovation process in these companies. Anglo-American will also be 
introduced, as its ranking follows the above four and I conducted an interview with 
one of its managers. 
 
 
 
6.1.1 BHP Billiton 
 
 
 
 
BHP Billiton is an Anglo-Australian multinational mining, metals, and petroleum 
company headquartered in Melbourne, Australia. It is the world's largest mining 
company measured by revenue. In its 2015 annual report, technology and innovation 
were mentioned a number of times. The main context of doing innovation at BHP is 
to protect the environment or, in other words, to meet the environment regulations 
of its hosting countries. The report reads: 
 
Technology and innovation have the potential to significantly reduce global emissions and 
meet long-term climate goals…it is vital that low-emissions technologies (LET) are available 
at scale, lower cost and much faster than the usual commercial time frames to meet the 
challenge of climate change … Since 2007, we have spent over US$400 million on LET 
research, development and deployment across a number of projects ranging in scale and 
complexity. For example, the West Cliff Ventilation Air Methane Project (WestVAMP) first 
piloted at Illawarra Coal's Appin Colliery in 2001, utilises 20 per cent of available mine 
ventilation air to produce electricity. This reduces the site's overall GHG emissions footprint 
by removing the methane from mine ventilation air. 
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BHP also invests a lot in the development and demonstration of carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) technologies and became a founding member of CO2CRC, one of the 
world's leading collaborative research organisations focused on long-term geological 
storage of carbon dioxide. 
 
 
 
There is also a cursory narrative regarding how BHP conducts exploration all over the 
world which runs: 
 
Over the past six years, brownfield exploration has increased our reserve base around our 
portfolio of existing assets in large resource basins, which now provide us with growth 
opportunities…Greenfield minerals (new sites) exploration is focused on advancing targets 
within Chile, Peru, southwestern United States and is organised through our Copper 
Business. Greenfield activities include opportunity identification, application for and 
acquisition of mineral titles, early reconnaissance operations and multi-million-dollar 
delineation drilling programs. 
 
 
 
There is no in-detail description of which kinds of advanced technology BHP utilises 
in exploration and where BHP bought the technology, equipment, or whether BHP 
produces the equipment itself. 
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Figure 8：The expenditure of exploration of BHP Billiton 
 
 
 
 
As for other innovations worth mentioning here, this annual report does not give 
reader a sense that BHP attributes its commercial success to technological innovation. 
Management innovation might be more important. There is a case study in the report 
entitled ‘Increased truck performance at Copper's Escondida Mine’. The approach 
BHP adopts is not technological but through improving operation of its trucks. The 
report reads: “Escondida benchmarked its truck performance and maintenance 
activities, both internally and externally, and reviewed how it conducted truck 
maintenance and shift activities to identify improvement opportunities. A range of 
initiatives were implemented to improve haul truck production time. Less frequent 
and larger blasts were used to reduce interruptions to production. Trucks were only 
taken out of production for preventative maintenance determined by equipment 
condition, rather than by time in service. The mine also implemented new crib huts 
and shift relief, called 'hot seating', to keep the trucks moving”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In short, as the largest mining company in the world, at least by reading its annual 
report and from surfing on its website, we can see that it gives the impression that 
innovation does not occupy a core position and, among the four top mining 
companies, BHP's website is the only one which does not have an independent 
column for technology and innovation. Whether this reflects the true situation at 
BHP remains is unclear. 
 
 
 
6.1.2 Rio Tinto 
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Rio Tinto Group is a British-Australian multinational metals and mining corporation 
with headquarters in London and a management office in Melbourne. Although 
primarily focusing upon the extraction of minerals, Rio Tinto also has significant 
operations in refining, particularly refining bauxite and iron ore. Its website provides 
much more information regarding R&D than the BHP website. 
 
 
 
Regarding, mineral exploration, Rio Tinto Exploration is organised into four regional 
teams, that is, Americas, Australasia, Africa-Europe, and Eurasia. In addition, the 
Project Generation Group (PGG) provides specialist commodity, data, and 
information, technical and orebody knowledge assistance to the regional teams. PGG 
also plays a role in co-ordinating research programmes. Rio Tinto operates the 
majority of exploration programmes itself rather than outsourcing to others. It will, 
however, partner readily with smaller exploration companies if this gives Rio Tinto 
access to attractive opportunities, tenure, local knowledge, or operational skills. 
Again, this introduction does not include the technologies Rio Tinto employ. In its 
annual report, there is one small paragraph which states that orebody knowledge 
and geological expertise are vital in this exploration process and Rio Tinto has a 
strong tradition of developing and applying innovative technologies to resolve 
specific exploration challenges. Apart from this, it mentions a Joint Venture between 
Rio Tinto and Chinalco called The Chinalco Rio Tinto Exploration Company (CRTX)中 
 
铝力拓勘探有限责任公司. 
 
 
 
 
Rio Tinto provides exact figures of R&D and innovation. According to its annual report, 
R&D costs were US$112 million for 2014 (2013: US$231 million), which takes up 0.23% 
and 0.45% of revenue respectively. Rio Tinto has a Technology & Innovation group (T&I), 
and its gross costs in 2014 were US$340 million compared with US$370 million in 2013 
and US$415 million in 2012. This group delivers values through three levers: 1. Project 
shaping and delivery: ensuring the Group "does the right projects" 
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and "does the projects right"; 2. Productivity: focusing upon asset performance, 
technology deployment, and global processes to sustainably improve operations, 
maximise margins, and capture value, and 3. Innovation: creating step-change 
improvements to address the significant challenges facing the mining industry. The 
work of this group is fruitful, and its importance is apparent. Technology and 
innovation is regarded as an independent business which is parallel to iron ore, 
diamond exploration etc. The group’s achievements, which also Rio Tinto’s 
innovation achievements, will now be introduced. 
 
 
 
In 2008, Rio Tinto launched a programme called ‘The Mine of the Future’ which has 
two goals. One is to achieve massive productivity gains in large-scale surface mining, 
the second is extracting more ore from complex orebodies. By launching this 
programme, Rio Tinto hopes to create a pipeline of technological innovations 
through alliances with partners in business, industry, science, and academia. It has 
used these partnerships to establish six research centres and an innovation centre. 
This programme has yielded many successful innovation outcomes. Here are some 
examples: 
 
 
 
A. An autonomous haulage system which makes trucks safer and more fuel-efficient. 
Rio Tinto's iron ore operations in Pilbara, Western Australia manage the world's 
largest fleet of autonomous trucks. These driverless vehicles deliver their loads more 
efficiently, minimizing delays and fuel use, and are driven remotely by operators who 
exert more control over their environment and ensure greater operational safety. 
 
 
 
B. An autonomous Drilling System ensuring more effective drilling and better 
operator safety. Rio Tinto's automated blast-hole drill system enables an operator to 
use a single console at a location remote from the machinery to operate multiple drill 
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rigs designed by multiple manufacturers. It is much safer for the operators and 
maximises precision and equipment utilisation. Other innovations which are worth 
mentioning include AutoHaul ™ (the world's first fully autonomous, heavy-haulage, 
long-distance rail system), PeakFloat ™ (increases the extraction of minerals by 
optimizing operating conditions during the widely-used flotation process using a 
high-performance computer system), a mine automation system (acts like a 
computer's central processing unit, integrating all automated elements of a mine and 
optimizing efficient and effective operation), and RTVis ™ ( software interprets 
complex datasets and creates a user-friendly 3D display of a mine for pit controllers, 
geologists, drill-and-blast teams, mine planners and supervisors). 
 
 
 
C. Excellence Centres and an Operations Centres. Rio Tinto has established several 
excellence centres for data access, expert clusters to enhance productivity etc. 
Excellence Centres unite experts with those from Rio Tinto's partner organisations, 
giving them access to real-time data from operations around the world so they do 
not have to be on-site. These centres enable teams to make better decisions, 
enhance productivity, and reduce costs. They also improve the safety and wellbeing 
of employees by reducing the need to travel to mine sites to share expertise and 
excellence. The Operations Centre is a ‘Mission Control’ for the entire Pilbara iron 
ore network located 1,300km to the north. On this site, more than 400 operators 
analyse data and synchronise an integrated system in real time, managing 15 mines, 
31 pits, four port terminals, and a 1,600km connecting rail network. This increases 
efficiency, improves reliability, decreases variability, and enables the business to 
better identify and improve performance across the supply chain. 
 
 
 
The latest Mine of the Future™ innovation is ‘The Processing Excellence Centre’ (PEC) 
in Brisbane. With the aid of a giant interactive screen, technical data is monitored 
and analysed in real time, enabling processing improvements to be immediately 
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introduced and operational performance to be optimised. A trial phase has already 
led to various procedural enhancements, such as adjusting the flotation process 
which has increased the recovery of copper and gold at Oyu Tolgoi in Mongolia. 
 
 
 
Not satisfied with its own innovation resources, Rio Tinto is currently looking for 
innovation partners. In 2013, The University of Nottingham and Rio Tinto agreed a £6 
million, five-year partnership to deliver the next generation of innovative 
technologies for the mining industry. Engineers at the University have been carrying 
out research focusing upon new ways of separating ores based on the properties of 
individual rocks, meaning that waste material with no valuable minerals contained 
within it can be rejected prior to energy-intensive further processing. 
 
 
 
All in all, innovation at Rio Tinto covers a wider range and plays a more important 
role than that at BHP, at least according to their annual reports and the structure and 
formation of websites. Furthermore, based on the innovation undertaken by Rio 
Tinto, a significant conclusion can be drawn, namely, that innovations in mining 
follow obvious logical trajectories, reduce the unit cost of production, increase 
productivity, and make sites safer. The main tools are automation, computerisation, 
and remote control etc. This trend might represent the direction of development for 
mining companies all over the world. 
 
 
 
6.1.3 Vale 
 
Vale SA is a Brazilian multinational diversified metals and mining corporation and one 
of the largest logistics operators in Brazil. In addition to being the fourth largest 
mining company in the world, Vale is also the largest producer of iron ore, pellets, 
and the second largest producer of nickel. As at Rio Tinto, innovation and technology 
is an independent sector at Vale. 
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Surprisingly, as a mining company in a developing country, Vale leave the impression 
that it attaches more importance to innovation than its counterparts in the 
developed world. This conclusion is borne out by the following facts and figures. 
 
 
 
Primarily, compared with Rio Tinto, the ratio of R&D over total revenue at Vale is 
higher. Revenue in 2010 and 2011 stood at US$46,481 million and US$60,389 million 
respectively, while investment in R&D stood at US$1,136 billion and US$1,986 billion. 
The ratio was 0.28% and 0.33%. In 2014, Vale’s revenue was US$37,539 million and 
R&D investment stood at US$0.9 billion, which accounted for 0.27% of total revenue. 
Its commitment to innovation matches that of Rio Tinto. 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, the Vale Institute of Technology (ITV) is an independent institute 
specialising in innovation It was founded in 2009 with the aim of seeking medium 
and long-term innovative solutions that contribute to improving the operational 
performance of every stage of the company's business, from the mine to the final 
delivery of product to clients. Since it was created, the Institute has entered into 97 
R&D agreements, provided more than 50 research scholarships, and created 
partnerships with 36 Brazilian and international institutions, including Brazil's 
agricultural research institute, Embrapa, the National Council for Scientific and 
Technological Development (CNPq), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
and the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) in Switzerland. The ITV 
operates by integrating research, teaching, and entrepreneurship. Regarding the first, 
the idea is to promote fundamental scientific and technological knowledge in mining 
and sustainable development. Vale has three large laboratories, which are 
responsible for developing technological solutions for its mining projects. Two are 
located in Brazil - the Mining Development Centre (CDM), and the Ferrous Metals 
Technology Centre (CTF) - while the third, Vale Technical Services Limited (VTSL), is in 
 
202 
 
Canada. Established in 1965, CDM was responsible for the first major technological 
advances made by Vale, as it developed new technology for processing low-grade 
iron ore, raising the lifespan of Vale's mines, and assisting the company to arrive at 
its current position as the world's second largest mining company. Vale's oldest 
research centre, VTSL, is a global leader in nickel technology. At CTF, Vale conducts 
research into iron ore-related production processes, from extraction up to the 
manufacture of steel products. Using physical and statistical simulations, VTSL's 
researchers test a wide range of processes, from different ore processing techniques 
to the behaviour of ore in steel mills. 
 
 
 
Regarding the second, VTSL aims to train professionals who are capable of 
confronting the challenges facing global mining in the 21st century in a scenario of 
increased concern for sustainability. In Belém, the ITV offers a professional Master's 
degree in the sustainable use of natural resources in tropical regions, which is 
currently in its third edition. Recognised by the Brazilian Ministry of Education's 
Graduate Education Support Agency (CAPES), this post-graduate course is the first of 
its kind to be offered by an institution linked to a company in the mining sector. The 
aim of the Master's degree is to train professionals to be able to deal with issues 
related to the sustainable use of natural resources and attract and develop talented 
workers with skills in the area of mining. The course lasts for two years. In Ouro Preto, 
the ITV has put together two specialisation courses on open-pit mines and ore 
treatment. Both have been offered to Vale professionals since the second half of 2015. 
The third pillar of the ITV's activities is entrepreneurship, which aims to encourage 
the training of researchers and business owners so they can lead technology-based 
companies in Brazil. 
 
 
 
Some projects developed by ITV can be found on Vale's website. One of them is 
‘Monitoring’. Created by researchers from the ITV's Climate Change Research Group 
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in Belém, the East Amazon Weather Forecast System, or Forecast Network, publishes 
daily weather forecasts that assist in the planning of actions by reducing the impact 
of extreme meteorological events. This tool, which is the first of its kind entirely 
developed by a private company in Brazil, monitors weather conditions and climate 
in the regions where the N4 and N5 iron ore mines are located at Carajás. 
 
 
 
To sum up, Vale is an innovative mining company, as its website demonstrates. 
 
 
 
 
6.1.4 Anglo-American 
 
Anglo-American Plc is a multinational mining company based in Johannesburg, South 
Africa and London, the UK. It is the world's largest producer of platinum, responsible 
for around 40% of world output. It is also a major producer of diamonds, copper, 
nickel, iron ore and metallurgical and thermal coal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9：The home page of Anglo-American 
 
The above picture shows the Anglo-American home page Like BHP, it does not have 
an independent section for R&D or technology or innovation. In its annual report, I 
did not find a section regarding innovation either. 
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Generally speaking, the impression Anglo-American leaves is similar to that of BHP. 
They attach more importance to management innovation in their annual report. 
They seldom mention innovation specifically, which means they do mention 
technology or innovation but only together with other corporate goals. 
 
 
 
In the 2013 and 2014 annual reports, Anglo-American point out that its strategy is 
delivery, which means delivering the returns the company's shareholders expect but 
doing so in a way that creates shared value for all the partners and stakeholders of 
the company. In order to achieve this strategy, Anglo- American propose a 
programme entitled ‘Driving Value' in the hope of reshaping the management 
structure of the company. 
 
 
 
Anglo-American boasts its diversity and its portfolio is diverse in three ways. The 
commodities and minerals they mine, the range of countries they operate in, and 
that the commodities and minerals they mine cover all stages of the economic cycle. 
This approach is designed so that Anglo-American can shield itself through economic 
downturns and industry turbulence and means it has more balanced exposure to 
political and currency risks. Its value chain is also diverse. Anglo-American operates 
across the entire mining value chain – from exploration through to marketing. 
Although it focuses upon resource development, mining, and operations, it is 
developing other areas of the value chain, e.g. its marketing capabilities, where it can 
see opportunities to deliver increased value. 
 
 
 
The two reports also contain figures in relation to the exploration activities 
conducted by Anglo-American. According to the report: “Global exploration activity 
for 2014 concentrated on greenfield projects across a number of mature and frontier 
locations, as well as on adding value, through increasing resources and reserves, to 
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our operations and advanced projects across all our commodities. Exploration 
expenditure for the year amounted to $181 million (2013: $207 million) and spanned 
19 countries”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10：Anglo-American’s exploration expenditure, 2014 
 
 
 
 
Whilst innovation and R&D do not have an independent section in the annual report, 
there are short paragraphs which discuss innovation and technology. 
 
 
 
First, the Chairman's statement in the 2014 annual report mentioned innovation. 
This section is called Developing and Deploying New Technologies. It recalls that, in 
the past, Anglo-American, deservedly, had a reputation for being a leader in mining 
technology, Today, however, no mining company can work wholly within its own silo, 
therefore Anglo-American works with a range of global institutions and universities in 
the Americas, Australia, South Africa, and the UK to support the company in its drive 
to be at the forefront of mining technology. The Chairman states that the company 
seeks to move on to the next phase, with developments such as rock-cutting lasers, 
alongside the deployment of digital engineering that can simulate mine and 
infrastructure conditions prior to the first shovel being put in the ground. In turn, the 
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adoption of the latest construction techniques will greatly reduce the labour 
intensiveness and development risks of projects. 
 
 
 
The three Ps, namely, portfolio, people, and performance, play a pivotal role in 
Anglo-American's business model. Innovation is performed by people, so in the 2014 
annual report, one small paragraph in the introduction to the company's business 
model was devoted to intellectuals. It runs: ‘We aim to drive aggressive innovation to 
support consistent over-delivery on commitments. We link our technical and 
marketing knowledge to ensure we invest our efforts in the key leverage points in 
the “mine to market” value chain.' 
 
 
 
Anglo-American has a programme entitled ‘Future Smart Mining’. The De Beers 
Group is leading a research project that aims to deliver carbon-neutral mining at 
some of the company’s operations in as few as five years. The project aims to 
accelerate what is already a naturally occurring and safe process of extracting carbon 
from the atmosphere and storing it at a speed that could offset man-made carbon 
emissions. The project has seen the creation of the Rapid Mine Development System 
(RMDS), together with Atlas Copco, designed to develop low-profile tunnels in hard 
rock. The company fitted trucks at Sishen iron ore mine in South Africa with tracking 
radars for object detection, in-cab operator display, collision detection alarms, and 
auto-braking technology. The Future Smart Mine programme also tries to harness 
the power of sound and recycle more water. In short, this reflects how Anglo-
American decides to turn to technology to weather economic downturns. 
 
 
 
6.1.5 Shenhua 
 
Shenhua was the second largest mining companies in terms of annual revenue in 
2015. According to Nolan (2001b, p 734): 
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The Shenhua project grew out of several sets of influences. Shenhua’s production base is 
Shenfu Dongsheng coalfield which provides reliable low cost and high-quality coal. 
Moreover, a combination of the large size of the deposits and the high quality of the coal 
provided an opportunity for China to develop a competitive international supplier of steam 
coal. 
 
The main problem is its remoteness. The state has had to invest a large sum of 
money to construct a dedicated rail link and port facilities. Following the completion 
of Shenhua’s construction, it became a flagship company of the Chinese mining 
industry. 
 
 
 
Shenhua Group was founded in October 1995 under the auspices of the State Council 
of the PRC. It is the largest coal-producing company in China. In 2014 Shenhua Group 
produced 437 million tonnes of coal and sold 588 million tonnes of coal. In 2014 its 
revenue was 328.6 billion yuan (US$53 billion), and the company ranked 196th in the 
Global Fortune 500. The same year, Shenhua Group's profit was 64 billion yuan 
(US$10 billion). 
 
 
 
Shenhua's core business can be divided into four parts, that is, coal, power 
generation, coal chemicals, and transportation. These business segments constitute a 
relatively complete value chain. Based on the profits from operations of all business 
segments before eliminations upon consolidation under the International Financial 
Reporting Standards, the percentages attributable to the coal, power, transportation, 
and coal chemical segments were optimised to 41%, 31%, 26%, and 2% respectively 
in 2014 from 50%, 26%, 22%, and 2% respectively in 2013. 
 
 
 
In Shenhua's annual report for the financial year 2014, the Chairman proposed the 
concept of innovative development. In his statement he stated: 'To emphasise the 
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concept of innovative development, the Group's R&D expenditures in 2014 
amounted to US$173.2 million with the dollar versus RMB exchange rate being 6.2, 
with the smooth progress of a series of key scientific and technological innovation 
projects including green exploitation of coal mines as well as the initiation of a series 
of major projects including heavy-haul railway technology, indicating technological 
innovation has become a fundamental support for the development of the Company'. 
 
 
 
Compared with its global competitors, at least superficially, Shenhua attach equal 
importance to innovation. This conclusion is borne out by the following figures. 
 
R&D expenditure in the period 60.5m dollars 
  
Capitalized R&D expenditure in the period 112.7m dollars 
  
Total R&D expenditure 173.2m dollars 
  
Percentage of total R&D expenditure to revenue (%) 0.4 
   
Table 11: R&D expenditure of Shenhua, 2014 
 
Source: http://www.csec.com/uploadfiles/shenhua_china_en/1441961641237.pdf. 
 
The total R&D expenditure of Shenhua Group in 2014 amounted to US$173.2 million, 
which was mainly attributable to the Group further strengthening the clean 
utilisation of coal as well as on green mining, ultra-low emission of coal-fired 
generators, digital mines, comprehensive use of coal ash after combustion, and 
heavy-loaded railways. The increase in R&D investment is consonant with the 
Group's strategic principle of promoting the development of clean energy, which 
enables it to enhance its core competitiveness and its ability to maintain sustainable 
growth. 
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Figure 11: Operational data of Shenhua,2014 exports, imports. 
 
Source: Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shenhua’s capacity to innovate has been advancing progressively. In 2014 a series of 
industrial technologies and scientific research projects, including digital mines, 
critical technology for the protection of groundwater and surface ecology in modern 
coal mining, ultra-low emission of coal-fired power generators and critical technology 
for heavy-loaded railway have achieved significant progress. During the reporting 
period, the group was granted 400 patents, 78 of which were for inventions. 
 
 
 
The number of technical staff at Shenhua is also significant. A figure of 10,083 out of 
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92,738 employees are technical workers, 11 % of the total work force. 
 
 
 
 
Shenhua has been chosen as the operator of a coal liquefaction programme. Coal 
liquefaction is a technology by which coal is transformed into oil under high 
temperatures, high pressure, and hydrogen (Nolan, Shipman & Rui, 2004). This 
project was initially negotiated between the USA and China. Shenhua’s advantages in 
relation to a coal liquefaction project include the excellent condition of its natural 
resources, advanced equipment and management, the location of Shenhua’s 
coalmines in an area of severe oil shortage etc.(Ibid). The coal liquefaction project 
has gained great success. It is the largest coal liquefaction plant in the world and 
every year these plants process several million tons of coal and produce several 
million oil-related products. 
 
 
 
If the four largest mining companies were put together, the two from the developing 
countries are more committed to innovation, while the two from developed 
countries do not publish sufficient information about innovation. 
 
 
 
Combining the five mining companies, we find that western companies choose their 
business strategy based solely on commercial considerations, feeling freer to adopt 
automation and mechanisation. Their Chinese counterparts, however, face 
complicated challenges. The global giants began their global exploration much earlier 
than Chinese companies, and most of the ‘Tier 1' mines have been discovered. Only 
high tier mines can utilise heavy mining equipment. Neither do Chinese mining 
companies have a business environment to implement strategy based on pure 
commercial logic or a proper geological environment to develop heavy mining 
equipment. Consequently, the degree of automation is relatively low in China. Ben 
Fine mentions a phenomenon in 1930s England: “the introduction of the best 
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technology, namely cutting by chain machine, proceeded at a much greater pace 
than mechanisation itself” (Fine, 1990, pp97). China faces the same question. Large 
mines might be able to employ state-of-the-art technology, at the same time, 
however, some small mines are still quite labour- intensive. 
 
 
 
6.2 Mining equipment manufacturing companies 
 
Mining equipment manufacturing companies offer mining companies the tools they 
need to undertake mining. Such companies rely more upon R&D thus invest more in 
technological innovation. As in the previous section, three foreign companies and 
one Chinese company will now be introduced. 
 
 
 
6.2.1 Caterpillar 
 
Caterpillar Inc. is an American corporation which designs, manufactures, markets, 
and sells machinery, engines, financial products, and insurance to customers via a 
worldwide dealer network. Caterpillar is the world's leading manufacturer of 
construction and mining equipment, diesel and natural gas engines, industrial gas 
turbines, and diesel-electric locomotives. Innovation is at the core of Caterpillar’s 
business as can be seen by looking at its website and the figures. The consolidated 
sales and revenues (in millions) from 2010 to 2014 were US$42,588, US$60,138, 
US$65,875, US$55,656, and US$55,184 respectively. Expenditure on R&D can be 
seen in the table below. This ratio is over 10 times those for mining companies. As a 
result, there is more information on innovation on the Caterpillar website. This is not 
surprising, at least in hindsight. After all, the products of mining companies are 
minerals, which are not the direct outcome of innovation, whereas the products of 
equipment companies are mining machinery which must emerge from R&D. The 
differing natures of these two kinds of companies explain the contrasting roles 
technological innovation plays. 
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 R&D(€million) Sales(€million) R&D Intensity 
    
2012 1869 49,928 3.7 
    
2013 1483.6 40,356.8 3.7 
    
2014 1758.5 45,452.6 3.9 
    
2015 1988.6 43,180.9 4.6 
     
Table 12: The ratio of R&D investment at Caterpillar compared with sales 
 
Source: http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/scoreboard.html. 
 
 
 
 
Compared with Rio Tinto and Vale, innovation occupies a more apparent position on 
the Caterpillar website. Innovation only occupies a sub-section of the Rio Tinto and 
Vale websites. One has to choose ‘Our Business' in order to find technology and 
innovation at Rio Tinto or choose ‘Press' at Vale's, while it is at the centre of the 
Caterpillar home page. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The Caterpillar Homepage 
 
Caterpillar's innovation section is divided into four parts, that is, Caterpillar Ventures, 
Technology Licensing, Research & Development and Customer Solution. 
 
 
 
Caterpillar Venture Capital Inc. (Caterpillar Ventures) assists entrepreneurs around 
the world to grow and scale their businesses by leveraging Caterpillar's industry 
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expertise, supply base, and independent dealer network. Caterpillar Ventures 
focuses upon areas of investment including distributed power, analytics, robotics, 
additive manufacturing, and business models that help its customers be successful. 
Caterpillar Ventures is a wholly owned subsidiary of Caterpillar Inc. One of its latest 
investments is in Cottonwood Technology Fund, which focuses upon technology-
related businesses, in particular, chemistry/material sciences, photonics, biosciences, 
and new energy related. 
 
 
 
Technology licencing is about the protection of intellectual property. If a customer 
wants to use Caterpillar's technologies, they apply to Caterpillar to evaluate the ideas, 
become connected with the appropriate group within this enterprise, and develop 
the appropriate agreement. 
 
 
 
Caterpillar employs more than 11,000 engineers and over 350 PhD-level scientists 
and technology experts. It holds more than 15,000 active patents and manufacture 
its products on nearly every continent. It has R&D centres in America, Japan, China, 
and the UK. It also has partnerships with industry, government, and academic 
institutions around the world, such as NASA, DARPA, the European Union Research 
Executive Agency, and Innovate UK. 
 
 
 
In the Customer Solution section, Caterpillar provides three approaches to assist its 
customers. They are technology, data analytics, and autonomy. The technological 
strategy focuses upon four themes - Energy and Transportation, Machines and 
Machine Systems, Automation and Enterprise Solutions, and Factory Technology 
Solutions. Research activities currently underway within these areas include efforts 
to improve fuel consumption and reduce greenhouse gas, reduce owning and 
operating costs, increase uptime, increase operator efficiency, enable remote, 
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autonomous, and semi-autonomous operations, bring novice operators to skilled 
levels, further extend commonality, increase worksite efficiency, increase power 
density, and expand dual fuel and natural gas solutions. On the website, six 
technologies creating customer solutions are introduced. Minestar aims to help the 
customer manage five kinds of challenges from improving productivity to improving 
safety, lowering costs, meeting sustainability goals, and integrating automation. The 
capability sets — Fleet, Terrain, Detect, Health and Command — can be used in 
combination or individually. Many products in this group have something to do with 
automation. As is widely recognised, the increase in mining activity worldwide has 
depleted the existing pool of mining workers. At the same time, up to half the global 
work force is currently over the age of 50 and expected to retire in the next 10 years. 
And as mines move into more remote areas, it becomes even more difficult to find 
qualified people willing to operate equipment in these rugged environments. Under 
such circumstances, automation becomes attractive to mining companies. Caterpillar 
produce various kinds of automation products, e.g. autonomous trucks. Cat Connect 
makes good use of technology and services to improve customer jobsite efficiency. 
Using the data from technology-equipped machines, customers gain more 
information and insight into their equipment and operations. The website introduces 
two ways of achieving this goal. One is through improving efficiency. By monitoring 
production in near real time, the customer gets the information and guidance they 
need to get more work done, in fewer passes and with less guesswork. 
 
 
 
Caterpillar’s acquisition of Bucyrus should not be ignored. Bucyrus-Erie was an 
American surface and underground mining equipment company. It was founded as 
Bucyrus Foundry and Manufacturing Company in Bucyrus, Ohio in 1880. Before the 
acquisition, it manufactured electric mining shovels, hydraulic shovels, drills, walking 
draglines, trucks, and high-wall miners for the surface mining industry. In addition, 
Bucyrus makes Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) parts and provides support 
services for all Bucyrus machine brands. It is also a supplier of solutions for 
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underground coal mining including longwall equipment, and an extensive line of room 
and pillar products. Bucyrus supplies equipment from hydraulic shield supports, 
electro-hydraulic controls, conveyors, ploughs and shearers, to crushers and diesel 
transport vehicles. It maintains a global network of company-owned sales, repair, and 
maintenance centres in key mining regions around the world. The company also 
maintains a continuous presence at certain customer sites internationally. One of its 
star products is the 8200 dragline, one of the biggest draglines in the world. 
 
 
 
There is very little overlap between Bucyrus product lines today. The Bucyrus product 
line is highly complementary to the Cat product line. Caterpillar is known for its 
trucks and earth-moving equipment, while Bucyrus’s draglines and underground coal 
mining machinery are common sight on building sites. 
 
 
 
Caterpillar claims that: ‘The acquisition is based on Caterpillar’s key strategic 
imperative to expand its leadership in the mining equipment industry, and positions 
Caterpillar to capitalise on the robust long-term outlook for commodities driven by 
the trend of rapid growth in emerging markets’. The transaction was valued at 
approximately US$8.6 billion (including net debt). The timing of this transaction is 
worth mentioning. Negotiations began in 2010 and finished in 2011. The world 
mining industry, as well as the Chinese mining industry were at the end of their 
heyday at the time. In hindsight, it can be seen that this acquisition was a means of 
demonstrating Caterpillar’s resolution to expand its product ranges and services in 
mining. The purchase complete, Caterpillar dropped the name ‘Bucyrus’, meaning 
that most of the mining equipment being produced by Caterpillar is in fact 
contributed by former Bucyrus engineers or workers. Another driving motivation for 
the transaction is that Caterpillar predicts that more than US$400 million in annual 
synergies derived from its mining equipment businesses from 2015. Synergies might 
include the following: 1. Market leading sales and support capabilities of Caterpillar 
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dealers and a broad, one-stop shop for global mining customers; 2. Caterpillar 
remanufacturing products and services for Bucyrus equipment; 3. Caterpillar engines 
and components to enhance performance and lower owning and operating costs for 
Bucyrus equipment; 4. Additional scale and cost efficiencies in areas such as 
purchasing and engineering; 5. Deployment of manufacturing best practices through 
the Caterpillar Production System.57 
 
 
 
This transaction, however, was under the shadow of the downturn in the mining 
industry soon after its completion. In 2015 Caterpillar announced that it would cut 
several thousand jobs due to the miserable prospects in the mining industry. It 
remains to be seen whether this acquisition will be fruitful. 
 
 
 
To sum up, as the world's largest construction equipment producer, Caterpillar 
demonstrates its strong motivation and commitment to innovation and produces a 
wide range of technology-intensive products. The videos on the website articulate 
Caterpillar employees' awareness of the pivotal role of innovation in the survival of 
their company. 
 
 
 
6.2.2 Komatsu 
 
Established in 1921, Komatsu Ltd. is a diversified provider of industrial-use products 
and services. While remaining an international leader in the field of construction and 
mining equipment, the company engages in other businesses, such as industrial 
machinery and vehicles, logistics, electronics and other solutions-based operations. It 
is the second largest construction equipment manufacturer in terms of its 
 
 
57http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/caterpillar-to-acquire-bucyrus-creating-mining-eq 
uipment-company-with-unmatched-product-range-unrivaled-customer-support-highly-complem 
entary-combination-expected-to-drive-strong-synergies-108134769.html viewed on 2017-3-24. 
 
217 
 
consolidated revenue and market share. 
 
 
 
 
Komatsu has a business strategy entitled ‘Growth Strategies Based on Innovation'. 
This strategy leads its focused efforts in the ‘Together We Innovate GEMBA58 
 
Worldwide’ mid-range management plan. 
 
 
 
 
On the Komatsu website, innovation is defined as to “create and offer new value 
designed to streamline our customers' business in the domain of solutions by getting 
deeply involved in their jobsite operations in collaboration with their distributors and 
suppliers.” In addition to the domains of products and service, Komatsu proudly 
displays the advanced technology it possesses on its website. Examples include slant-
nosed dozer design, hydrostatic drive and steering in small and mid-size bulldozers, 
hydrostatic transmission, viscous dampers mounted on cabs, trailing arm type front 
suspensions, and the lock-up torque converter. 
 
 
 
Komatsu’s R&D has yielded a number of outcomes:(1) Hybrid technology. Komatsu 
has launched a new product, the HB205-1 Hybrid Excavator. It is environmentally 
friendly; (2) the Intelligent Machine Control (IMC) system. This system is designed to 
let operators focus upon moving material efficiently - from bulk excavation to final 
trim - without having to worry about over-excavation or damaging the target surface 
- resulting in significant improvements in efficiency and productivity compared with 
conventional construction processes. Komatsu’s product PC210LCi-10 truck, designed 
with IMC, won a 2015 Innovation award as it can reduce the construction time to a 
large extent, has an intelligent semi-automatic control system which empowers the 
operator so that they do not have to rely upon people outside the machine to tell 
them whether they are on grade, and they have less tunnel vision than if they 
 
58 Japanese word for ‘the real place’. 
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constantly need to look at a machine guidance monitor. 
 
 
 
 
Komatsu not only provide products but also offer what they call ‘Dantotsu’ (Japanese 
for ‘try to be better than best’) service and solutions. According to Komatsu's 
sustainability report, the driving force of its innovation is “to thoroughly understand 
our customers’ jobsite operations”, the second driving force is: “to capture promising 
technologies for the future, particularly in the field of ICT”. Komatsu created the 
Office of Chief Technical Officer in April 2014. As part of its drive to strengthen 
collaborations with academia and industries, in 2015 Komatsu made itself an equity 
participant in ZMP Inc., Japan's leading company in image processing, sensing, and 
control of the Advanced Driver Assistance System. It also reached an agreement with 
the Tokyo Institute of Technology in a multiple range of fields, such as materials, 
telecommunications, and measurement. 
 
 
 
One Dantorsu service Komatsu offers is the KOMTRAX (Komatsu Machine Tracking 
System) Plus machine management system for mines. This is a fleet management 
system for large equipment for use in mining, which enables the client to obtain 
detailed information concerning the condition of machines via satellite 
communications. Komatsu and distributors can analyse ‘vehicle health’ and other 
operating conditions and provide the information to jobsites using the Internet from 
a remote location on a near-real time basis. As a result, customers can receive 
vehicle maintenance in a timely way to avoid major technical trouble, thus reduce 
their maintenance expenses and downtime costs. As for other solutions, Komatsu 
provide an Autonomous Haulage System for construction equipment, an intelligent 
machine- controlled dozer equipped with automatic blade control functions, to name 
but two. 
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 R&D(€million) Sales(€million) R&D Intensity 
    
2012 532.3 16506.9 3.2 
    
2013 444 13453.2 3.3 
    
2014 482.8 13509.2 3.6 
    
2015 539.2 14158.6 3.8 
     
Table 13: The ratio of R&D investment at Komatsu compared with sales 
 
Source: http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/scoreboard.html. 
 
 
 
 
Komatsu’s mining division designs, manufactures, and supports equipment supplied 
to mining customers. The products include excavators/shovels, dozers, wheel loaders 
electric trucks, and Mechanical trucks. In addition to providing equipment, Komatsu 
America Corp. includes Modular Mining Systems, the capstone of its mining tool 
portfolio. Modular supplies data-driven mine management solutions. It also supplies 
the site supervision system for Komatsu’s Autonomous Haulage System (AHS), the 
world's first commercial autonomous mining haulage system, operating a production 
fleet of driverless mining trucks. 
 
 
 
Like Caterpillar, Komatsu is also considering taking advantage of acquisition to grow. 
Its target is Joy Global, which will be introduced in the next section. This transaction is 
valued at US$3.7 billion. Komatsu’s main mining equipment plant is based in Peoria, 
Illinois, US, which makes it an easy fit with Joy Global. After the acquisition is 
complete, Joy Global will become a consolidated subsidiary of Komatsu. The deal, 
Komatsu’s biggest ever acquisition, is set to boost its ability to compete with Western 
rivals, in particular, Caterpillar. Compared with Caterpillar, Komatsu chose to launch 
its acquisition at the trough years of the mining industry, which could lower the cost 
of this transaction. The new Komatsu company will remain the strongest competitor 
of Caterpillar. Currently, Komatsu only makes surface-mining equipment, while Joy 
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is the largest independent manufacturer of machines used underground. 
 
 
 
 
Based on the information on its website, we can conclude that Komatsu has similar 
innovation content and features as Caterpillar. The amount of money they invest in 
R&D and their products cluster resemble each other. 
 
 
 
6.2.3 Joy Global 
 
Joy Global deserves attention because it specialises in manufacturing mining 
equipment, while other giants in this industry have much wider product menus. 
 
 
 
Joy Global Inc. is a leading manufacturer and servicer of high-productivity mining 
equipment for the extraction of coal and other minerals and ores. It manufactures 
and markets original equipment and parts and performs services for both 
underground and surface mining, as well as certain industrial applications. Its 
equipment is used in major mining regions throughout the world to mine coal, 
copper, iron ore, oil sands, gold, and other minerals. It operates in two business 
segments, that is, Underground Mining Machinery and Surface Mining Equipment. 
Joy Global is a major manufacturer of underground mining machinery for the 
extraction of coal and other bedded minerals and offers comprehensive service 
locations near major mining regions worldwide. It is also a major producer of surface 
mining equipment for the extraction of copper, coal, and other minerals and ores, 
and provides extensive operational support for many types of equipment used in 
surface mining. Its principal manufacturing facilities are located in the United States, 
including facilities in Alabama, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin, and 
internationally, facilities in Australia, Canada, China, South Africa, and the UK. This 
narrative can be clearly seen on the Joy Global website. 
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Figure 13: The homepage of Joy Global. 
 
Interestingly, Joy Global’s website places its Chinese market at such a core position 
that we find an independent China brands section. Joy also runs a Chinese website. In 
fact, all mining companies and mining equipment companies care about the Chinese 
economy very much. Almost all of their annual reports mention China and use 
China's economic downturn as a reason to explain their business recession. 
 
 
 
Joy Global’s underground mining business belongs to Joy Mining Machinery, an 
operating subsidiary of Joy Global Inc. Its products and services include armoured 
face conveyors, battery haulers, continuous chain haulage systems, continuous 
miners, conveyor systems, feeder breakers, flexible conveyor trains, hard rock mining 
products, high-angle conveyors, longwall shearers, powered roof supports, roof 
bolters, shuttle cars, life- cycle management, project management, ‘smart services’ (a 
full-service support that gathers relevant information in real time and uses it to 
deliver services that are pre-emptive and predictive, which enables customers to 
maximise the productivity and value of their assets by providing better machine 
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availability, utilisation, and reduced costs. The services include equipment 
monitoring, predictive diagnostics, service training support and parts management). 
Joy Global’s personnel and distribution centres are strategically located close to 
customers in major mining locations around the world. 
 
 
 
Joy Global’s surface mining business belongs to P&H Mining59. P&H Mining’s 
products and services include blasthole drills, conveyor systems, electric mining 
shovels, feeder breakers, high-angle conveyors, walking draglines, wheel loaders, and 
life-cycle management. In addition, it also offers project management and ‘smart 
services’. P&H’s brochure announces that: “In nine out of ten surface mines you will 
find powerful, smart, highly productive and reliable digging and drilling machines 
bearing a familiar black-and-yellow ‘P&H’ trademark. The sun never sets on that 
trademark”. The company used to produce construction equipment too, but it sold 
its construction equipment product line in 1988. 
 
 
 
Aside from these machines, Joy Global is developing Joy Global Business Systems (JBS) 
to promote competitive advantage throughout the company by implementing 
programmes beyond its factories and service facilities to all company functions. It is 
also taking its JBS Operational Excellence processes and principles to mines to help 
customers eliminate waste, simplify their processes, drive to automation, and ensure 
safety. 
 
 
 
Joy Global has some successful merger and acquisition recently. For example, in 2014 
it acquired Mining Technologies International (MTI), a Canadian company specializing 
in underground hard rock mining machinery. This acquisition is an important 
 
 
59 Pawling and Harnischfeger, the founders of Joy Global Equipment, an operating subsidiary of 
Joy Global Inc. 
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milestone in executing Joy Global’s strategy of expanding into non-coal markets. 
During the fiscal years 2011 and 2012, Joy Global completed a series of transactions 
that resulted in its acquisition of International Mining Machinery Holdings Limited 
(IMM,国际煤机集团), a leading designer and manufacturer of underground mining 
equipment in China. IMM's operations are included in Joy Global’s underground 
segment. Actually, Joy Global conducted this acquisition in order to expand its 
Chinese market. Under the title ‘China brands’ on Joy’s website four locations, 
namely, Huainan, Jixi, Jiamusi, and Qingdao used to be part of IMM. Joy Global 
acquired IMM's business in these cities by purchasing IMM itself. In 2015 its 
acquisition of Montabert gave Joy Global a solid portfolio of leading rock breaker and 
drill products as the company accelerated its growth in the hard rock and industrial 
mineral markets. 
 
 
 
Innovation plays a vital role in Joy Global’s business success. In its annual report, 
writers use the expression ‘move the needle' to describe innovation and, naturally, 
the company includes an independent chapter for innovation. In the annual report for 
2015, Joy introduces its innovation achievements: “Our new P&H® Hybrid 
Excavator/Shovel offers shovel operators mobility and precision in the bank while 
lowering cost of ownership by 15%. Our proprietary Switched Reluctance (SR) Hybrid 
Drive technology significantly reduces fuel consumption and is featured in the hybrid 
excavator/shovel. It is also in our new Joy family of underground loaders, enabling 
faster acceleration and more tons moved for the hard rock market. We're also 
deploying our transformational DynaCut technology that mechanically cuts hard rock, 
eliminating the need for explosives”. 
 
 
 
When it comes to the general figure regarding sales and R&D, Joy Global is even 
more notable. Including revenues from maintenance and repair services, diagnostic 
analysis, fabrication, mining equipment and electric motor rebuilds, equipment 
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erection services, training, and sales of replacement parts, service sales account for 
74%, 69%, and 55% of Joy Global’s consolidated net sales for the fiscal years 2015, 
2014, and 2013 respectively. As a class of products, sales of original equipment for 
the mining industry accounted for 26%, 31%, and 45% of Joy Global’s consolidated 
net sales for each of those years. The increased percentage of service sales is due to 
the deterioration of mining industry conditions during the period. 
 
 
 
Fiscal year Nov - Oct.  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 
       
Joy  Global  Net  Sales  or 
3.78B 5.01B 5.66B 4.4B 3.52B 3.6B 
Revenues (US dollars) 
 
       
        
 Table 14: Revenue of Joy Global.   
 
Joy Global is strongly committed to pursuing technological development through the 
engineering of new products and systems, the improvement and enhancement of 
licenced technology, and related acquisitions of technology. R&D expenses totalled 
US$40.6 million, US$49.0 million, and US$47.8 million for the fiscal years 2014, 2013 
and 2012 respectively. These figures are striking for Joy Global invested 10.7%, 9.18%, 
and 8.45% of its revenue in R&D. What is more interesting is that, as total sales 
decreased, Joy Global allocated a larger proportion of money for R&D. 
 
 
 
6.2.4 Sany 
 
For the purpose of undertaking comparative studies, I visited one Chinese company's 
website. Two Chinese companies ranked top 10 in the construction equipment 
ranking; one is XCMG or Xugong (徐工), the other is Sany or Sanyi(三一). The second 
was chosen because it produces more mining equipment than construction 
 
 
 
225 
 
equipment60. 
 
 
 
 
SANY Group is a global company in the construction machinery industry with a vast 
product range of concrete machinery, excavators, hoisting machinery, pile-driving 
machinery, road construction machinery, port machinery, and wind turbines. It is the 
sixth largest heavy equipment manufacturer in the world, and the first Chinese 
company in this industry to enter the FT Global 500 and the Forbes Global 2000. 
 
 
 
Sany emphasises R&D. It constantly works in technology innovation. Its post-PhD 
working centre has become one of the country's top technical development centres. 
Through its expertise, Sany has also obtained over 3,600 authorised patents and 
hundreds of key technologies. 
 
 
 
The General Research Institute of Sany Group, which leads over 30 research 
institutes, is the primary R&D department for technical research and technical 
management. The Institute owns eight sub-departments, including the Director's 
Office, the Research Management Department, the Technical Standardization 
Department, the Intellectual Property Right Department, the Product Data 
Management Department, the Experiment & Testing Centre, the Industrial Design 
Centre, and the Human Resources Department, and it is in charge of the 
management of the Post-Doctoral Research Station and the Academician and Expert 
Workstation. The Institute is also responsible for developing technology applicable to 
all Sany products, conducting forefront technical research on new products and 
setting standards, researching vibration, impact, noise, hydraulic technology, power 
matching and energy saving, new materials and control systems, creating innovative 
 
60 It is difficult to find a mining equipment manufacturer ranking. Meanwhile, most mining 
equipment manufacturers also produce other machinery. The largest coal mining equipment 
manufacturer in China will be introduced in the sixth chapter as one case study. 
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technologies and conceptive products, and building up a network-based special and 
generalized platform for experiments and tests so as to share general experiment 
and test results. Each year, Sany invests 5%-7% of sales revenue into R&D. This figure 
matches those for Caterpillar, Joy Global, and Komatsu. 
 
 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
From the above summaries, some innovation patterns for mining companies and 
equipment manufacturing companies may be discerned. Mining companies mainly 
engage in process innovation, defined by OECD as: “A new or significantly improved 
production or delivery method. This includes significant changes in techniques, 
equipment and/or software”61. This kind of innovation entails less investment and 
results in either a lower cost or a higher output rather than a new product. The 
dynamics of undertaking process innovation in the mining industry are often 
endogenous, as this might be the most effective way for a mining company to 
enhance its profits. After all, the quality gap between different mining companies is 
not wide enough to make a specific company stand out. Mining companies seldom 
create something which does not exist but extract something which has been buried 
under the earth’s surface for a long time, therefore valuable mines are almost all the 
same. Meanwhile, many other industries’ innovation dynamics emerge from fierce 
product competition. Mining equipment companies are a case in point. Reducing 
production costs is also a way to make profits, but their customers’ increasing 
requirement for the quality of the equipment puts more pressure on these 
equipment manufacturers. Product innovation is defined by the OECD as “A good or 
service that is new or significantly improved”. Meanwhile, “This includes significant 
improvements in technical specifications, components and materials, software in the 
product, user friendliness or other functional characteristics”62 play an important 
 
61 http://www.oecd.org/site/innovationstrategy/defininginnovation.htm viewed on 2017-1-21. 
 
62 Ibid, viewed on 2017-1-21. 
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role. 
 
 
 
 
Mining companies tend to have close relationships with academic institutions, while 
equipment companies tend to rely more upon their in-house R&D sectors. While, 
western companies tend to rely more upon their in-house R&D than their Chinese 
counterparts, Chinese companies have more intensive interactions with academic 
institutions. This is because Chinese policies encourage this type of technological co-
operation. In the previous chapter, I argue that Chinese mining equipment 
companies lag far behind their international counterparts. This is due to the fact that 
they neither build close relationships with relevant academic community nor do they 
have strong in-house R&D capabilities. While for Chinese mining companies, their 
academic partners’ technological assistance has narrowed the gap with western 
mining giants. 
 
 
 
If viewed through the optic of the Triple Helix, this phenomenon can be explained 
thus. The mining equipment manufacturers have internalised the ‘university’ helix, 
which means they can produce useful knowledge within their own companies, and at 
the same time they have rendered governments’ direct participation in their 
innovation process unnecessary. It is helpful to return to the two kinds of Triple Helix 
which were discussed in the previous section, namely, the institutional Triple Helix 
and the functional Triple Helix. The institutional Triple Helix takes into account the 
features of the mining companies’ innovation process, while the functional Triple 
Helix better reflects the equipment manufacturers’ innovation process. Mining 
equipment firms in developed countries count on their in-house R&D to perform 
novelty production functions, while the highly developed rule of law system and the 
company’ s administrative hierarchy perform the public control function. As a result, 
the functional Triple Helix still works here although nowhere could one find the 
institutional Triple Helix in this case. For mining companies, on the other hand, the 
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first Triple Helix model, namely, the institutional or explicit model, is often found, 
especially in Chinese mining companies. That is to say, in this field the division 
between functions is still a dominating factor. 
 
 
 
How have the two kinds of Triple Helix models been formed? Von Hippel’s work 
offers one possible theoretical explanation for the two Triple Helix models in mining 
and equipment manufacturing respectively. He discusses the relationship between 
the stickiness of information and the locus of problem-solving. In his 1994 article he 
defines the stickiness of a given unit of information in a given instance as: “the 
incremental expenditure required to transfer that unit of information to a specified 
locus in a form usable by a given information seeker” (Ibid, p. 430). The technical 
problems a mining company needs to solve do not require the company to 
internalise all the relevant resources as they tend to be less sticky. These problems 
can be solved by inviting academic staff from an institute or a university. The 
problems include the design of a new mining method, improvement of a processing 
method or mineral dressing chemicals, while the academic staff can go to the site 
several times to familiarise themselves with the situation and conduct research in 
their own organisation by utilising their own facilities. This can help the mining 
company minimise the cost and maximise the benefits. In China, the cost of this 
process can be further reduced by the communication channel established in history, 
that is, the policy which encourages co-operation between mining companies and 
academic organisations. When it comes to the equipment companies (not only 
mining equipment companies), their technical problems are more complicated and 
the information needed to solve them is stickier. Therefore, the fewer the locus of 
problem-solving, the better. The best way is to use inside resources, which means an 
in-house R&D department. The Triple Helix in this field actually becomes an intra-
firm Triple Helix. The product innovation has higher requirements of capital and the 
relevant facilities are often more expensive. Moreover, these facilities are more 
generic as they can be used in different situations. In mining companies, once and for 
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all solutions are rare. Companies need to cope with a variety of situations. If they 
prepare equipment for all these situations the cost would be unbearable, thus it is 
more economic for them to seek external partners. 
 
 
 
From the above three chapters, the factors that determine the success and failure of 
innovation in Chinese mining industry have been displayed. The ensuing chapter will 
discuss the policies which might have contributed to some of the undesirable 
innovation results. 
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7. Policy Implications 
 
Based on the systemic analysis of the Chinese mining industry, this thesis also seeks 
to suggest some policy implications, although these implications will not only focus 
upon mining, but try to cover a larger industrial system. To begin with, the ideal 
perfect market does not exist and will not be innovation-friendly. As a result, it is 
useless to argue whether the government should play a role in a System of 
Innovation or Ecosystem of Innovation. A question worth pondering is how the 
government could play its role well in a (eco)System of Innovation. 
 
 
 
I firmly believe that a strong industry system is one of the critical requirements of a 
healthy economy and innovation is to this healthy and sustained economy what fuel 
is to an engine. Policy could and should plays a catalytic role to encourage innovation. 
In this chapter, some stylised facts will be presented, then a theoretical analysis of 
these facts will be provided. Finally, a few policy implications will be proposed. These 
facts and theories will be closely linked to the former chapters of the thesis though 
not confined to them. The case studies and theoretical framework introduced in this 
thesis will be used to illustrate some arguments. The situation in Chinese mining as 
well as some other industries will be looked at. 
 
 
 
7.1 Some stylised facts about Chinese innovation. 
 
7.1.1 Insufficient investment in basic research by enterprises 
 
It is common knowledge that the proportion of R&D investment over GDP has 
improved recently. Governments have designed various policies to encourage R&D 
investment, and if evaluated from the aggregate figure, these policies have yielded 
good results. However, complaints about the weak innovation ability of Chinese firms 
are still not rare. Of course, a number of years might be needed if the increase in 
R&D investment is to be transferred into an enhancement of technological capability, 
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but this aforementioned contradiction can also be partly explained by breaking down 
the general R&D investment into different categories and comparing the change in 
quantity and proportion between each category or comparing it with the 
corresponding figures in developed countries. 
 
 
 
According to international routines, R&D investment is usually divided into three 
parts, namely, basic research applied research and experimental development. The 
most authoritative definition of these three kinds of R&D activities is given by 
Frascati Manual (2002, p77-79): 
 
Basic research is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new 
knowledge of the underlying foundations of phenomena and observable facts, without any 
particular application or use in view. 
 
 
 
Applied research is also original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge. 
It is, however, directed primarily towards a specific practical aim or objective. 
 
 
 
Experimental development is systematic work, drawing on knowledge gained from research 
and practical experience, that is directed to producing new materials, products and devices; 
to installing new processes, systems and services; or to improving substantially those 
already produced or installed. 
 
After breaking different countries’ R&D investment down into these three categories, 
it can be found that, recently, most of the increased Chinese R&D investment 
belongs to the third category, experimental development. In terms of proportion, the 
first category, basic research, even suffered declining investment. In developed 
countries such as America, Germany, and Japan, the contrary happened, that is, the 
proportion of basic research in total R&D investment has increased, and this figure in 
those countries is several times higher than that of China. 
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More specifically, in the American R&D system, the federal government, enterprises, 
and some non-profit organisations increased their investment in basic research, 
which kept the proportion of American basic research investment between 13% to 
20% in the past half century. The ratio between basic research, applied research, and 
experimental development remained 1:1.4:3.9 between 1981 and 2009. The figure 
for 2009 was 1:1:3 (Liu et al, 2014, p83). The relatively stable ratios and proportions 
reflected American characteristics and the demand for the three kinds of R&D in a 
mature System of Innovation. If we look at who are sponsoring basic research, it can 
be found that American universities are the most important sponsors. Approximately 
half of the basic research investment in America came from universities. The 
concrete figures were as follows. In 1979 the figure was 48.9%, in 1989 46.7%, and 
after the Cold War, this figure slowly increased to 54% in 1999, 57% in 2004, and 53.4 
in 2009. This is partly due to the end of an era of military confrontation leading to a 
decline in government funding in basic research (Ibid, p85). Meanwhile, American 
industry investment in basic research also increased. In 1979 American firms 
contributed 13.5% of the total American basic research, while in 2009 this figure had 
been raised to 19.5%. During that period, there were some fluctuations but the 
general trend was that American firms invested more in basic research (Ibid, p.85). 
Compared with universities and firms, federal laboratories and R&D centres cut their 
basic research investment after the end of the Cold War. In 1979, they accounted for 
28.9% of the total basic research investment and this percentage then decreased 
slowly. In 2009 this figure was 14.9% (Ibid). A further breakdown of American firms’ 
R&D investment will make things clearer. During the period 1981 to 1990, American 
firms’ average annual R&D investment on basic research was about 3.45%. During 
the 2000s this figure was 4.02% (Ibid, p.88). It is obvious that both the basic research 
among the three R&D investment categories and the investment of basic research by 
firms has ascended over the past 20 years. During the same period, American firms 
invested less in applied development. This figure used to be a bit over 20% but in 
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2009 it fell to a bit less (Ibid). As for American firms’ investment in experimental 
development, it has risen from 75% to 80% (Ibid). To sum up, the two ends of R&D, 
namely, basic research and experimental development, have received more funding, 
while the middle part of this chain, i.e. applied research, received less and less 
funding in terms of proportion of total R&D. By and large, that a firm invests more in 
experimental development is not strange as this stage is close to the final 
commercialisation stage, whereas the increase in basic research investment by a firm 
is interesting since basic research is further away from commercialisation. We can 
shed some light on this by analysing the content of firm-conducted basic research 
and its relationship with a firm’s revenue. This will be analysed later. American firms’ 
increasing investment in basic research is to some extent a guarantee of their 
technological edge in this information epoch. A number of American innovations can 
be attributed to American firms’ strong basic research ability as they apply entirely 
new technology rather than improving already existing technology, firms without 
strong enough basic research ability cannot conduct this kind of innovation. 
 
 
 
Germany demonstrates similar trends. Germany industry boasts of its tradition of 
attaching importance to basic research; no wonder the research university and the 
in-house R&D agency were invented by the Germans. One of the key characteristics 
of German science and technology policy is that it keeps its basic research at a high 
level in order to remain at the cutting edge. Basic research usually occupies about 
20% of total German R&D investment. As for German firms, their investment in basic 
research has also risen. In 2001 German firms’ investment in basic research took up 
4.7% of total R&D investment, this figure rose to 4.96% in 2007, and further 
increased to 5.42% in 2009. As for the other two parts of R&D, the investment in 
applied research suffered a slight decline in terms of its total proportion of total R&D 
investment, dropping from 51% in 2001 to 48.4% in 2009. Regarding experimental 
development, it increased to 46.2% in 2009 from 44.3% in 2001 (Ibid, p.91). The 
three categories of R&D investment display the same trend as their American 
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counterparts, that is, the two ends increased while the middle sank. 
 
 
 
 
Japan’s situation is almost the same as Germany’s and America’s. From the 
perspective of Japan’s R&D investment, in the industry community the ration 
remained stable at 1:3:12 (basic research: applied research: experimental 
development), while the whole country’s R&D investment structure remained at 
1:2:4. As for Japanese firms, their investment in basic research suffered a slight 
downturn in the 1990s (rainy days for the Japanese economy), then returned to its 
1980s level in the early 2ist century and remained stable at 6.5%. Again, Japanese 
firms’ investment in applied research decreased and their investment in 
experimental development increased (Ibid, p92-93). 
 
 
 
The Chinese situation, however, is quite different. Increased investment in R&D mainly 
occurs in the experimental development category. In terms of absolute quantity, all 
three categories enjoyed dramatic increase after 2006. But if measured in relative 
proportion, only investment in experimental development increased, while both of the 
other two categories suffered a decline in investment, especially applied research. The 
ratio between these three categories’ investment was 5.2:26.4:68.4 in 1995, while the 
corresponding figure was 4.6:12.7:82.8 in 201063 (Ibid, p110). As for Chinese firms’ R&D 
structure, investment in basic research can even be ignored compared with investment 
in experimental development. The former first slightly increased from 0.74% of total 
R&D in 1998 to 1.2% in 2004, which was also the peak year, then plummeted to 0.1% in 
2010. The latter rose from 88.77% in 1998 to nearly 98% in 2010 (ibid, p.120). Chinese 
firms’ investment in R&D increased during these years, the proportion it occupied 
doubled, but a great majority of this investment was poured into development s. 
According to China Statistical Yearbook on Science 
 
63 In between 1995 and 2010 there were fluctuations but the general trend is that more 
importance was given to development than research. 
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and Technology, in 2010 the average number of R&D staff in charge of basic research 
in each Chinese firm has was 0.12, which means most Chinese firms did not engage 
in basic research at all (Ibid, p122). 
 
 
 
In summary, despite the increase in R&D investment, Chinese firms still pay little 
attention to basic research. 
 
 
 
7.1.2 Universities and Research institutes’ overengagement in patent application 
 
Universities and research institutes all over the world do apply for patents, some 
universities are quite good at this, but in most developed countries, firms are the 
main applicant of patents. In 2006, universities and research institutes put together 
accounted for 4.28% of all patent applications (universities accounted for 2.61% 
while research institutes accounted for 1.67% respectively), six years later the two 
put together accounted for 8.8% of all patent applications (universities accounted for 
5.69% while research institutes accounted for 3.11% respectively (Zhang,2015, p86). 
The general trend is an upturn one, which reflects that knowledge production 
agencies are increasingly shouldering knowledge application functions, just as the 
mode-2 knowledge production model describes. 
 
 
 
The date from China expose a different patent application structure compared with 
the developed countries. The contribution of Chinese universities and research 
institutes make to domestic patent application is far greater than their western 
counterparts. In China, the number of patents produced by universities and research 
institutes equals 40% of that of firms. In developed countries, only in France and 
America do universities make a significant contribution to domestic patent 
application, the number of patents produced by universities and research institutes 
in those two countries equals roughly ten percent of that of firms. Besides, if we 
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break down the different category of patents into invention, utility model and 
industrial design, the result is that from 1994-2013, universities produced 49.97% of 
all the inventions, research institutes accounted for 45.77, the remaining 11.62% 
belonged to firms, which means Chinese firms mainly specialise in industrial design 
and utility model patent (Ibid, p60). The question is that it is the invention patent 
that represent one’s real technological capability. 
 
 
 
There are also divergences among different sectors. Universities and research 
institutes are relative active in the following sectors’ patent application: bio-
technology, pharmaceutical technology, materials, medicine, and nanotechnology. 
But even in these sectors, universities in developed countries applied less than 10% of 
the whole patents. In China, however, universities and research institutes have much 
stronger patent application ability. In pharmaceutical industry, the ratio between the 
number of patents produced by Chinese universities, research institutes and the 
number of patents produced by firms is 83.93%, in environment technology this ratio 
is 90.87%, bio-technology,229.1%, nanotechnology, the highest ,371.77%(Ibid, p92). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apart from that, the quality of the patents produced by Chinese universities and 
research institutes have also got the praise of the largest patent operation company, 
Intellectual Ventures64. It has established close co-operation with dozens of Chinese 
universities. 
 
 
 
Then, how to explain the two seems peculiar phenomena? This is the task of the next 
 
 
64 Intellectual Ventures is a private company that centres on the development and licensing of 
intellectual property. Its business model has a focus on buying patents and aggregating them 
into a large patent portfolio and licensing these patents to third parties. Please see 
http://www.intellectualventures.com/ 
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section. Some theoretical framework include the Triple Helix and System of 
Innovation will be used, the influence of some policies will also be analysed. The case 
study about mining industry will be used as factual argument to support this analysis 
as it is one of the most regulated industries. 
 
 
 
7.2 Theoretical and policy analysis 
 
The two Phenomena depicted in the previous section have something to do with 
many factors, but the most important reason might be the false faith in the 
innovation linear model. 
 
 
 
This model has been mentioned once in this thesis, it sticks to the doctrine that basic 
research comes first, as the outcome of basic research represents the knowledge 
frontier of mankind, these outcomes are usually some ground-breaking theory or 
some new to the universe understanding towards some natural phenomena. Basic 
research helps people better interpret the world but has little connexion with 
changing the world, since at the very beginning, even the most gifted researchers 
cannot completely comprehensive these new understandings, let alone the technical 
staff and engineers. Then comes the applied research. As time goes by, more 
experiments and research will be conducted to improve people’s understanding 
towards the new discoveries in basic research stage. With the accumulation of 
knowledge regarding the practical usage of the fruits of basic research, some 
research results which have potential commercialisation opportunities will be filtered 
out. The main task of this stage is not to understand the world better but to find 
useful tools to change the world, this task has to be based on the achievement of 
basic research, since without knowing the world better it will be impossible to 
change the world effectively. The former two stages’ work are mainly undertaken by 
university scholars and the researchers in research institutes. The third stage of this 
innovation chain is development, some firms’ in-house R&D began to take part in this 
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stage as the outcome of development could be their products. The last stage is 
operation and production, the prime business of firms. According to the supporters 
of linear model, most innovations have to go through such a complete linear process, 
an innovation starts with a discovery in basic research and finally it is the firms that 
get the largest share of the profit. This chain has strict chronological requirement, 
the earlier stage must come predate the later stage. 
 
 
 
Eloquent this theory sounds to be, it cannot be justified by a study of industrial or 
technological history. This thesis has mentioned Stokes’s study, he first challenged the 
categorisation of research, he created a 2*2 matrix based on two dimensions, namely 
whether this research has practical concerns and whether it has understanding 
concern. If the linear model is correct, we should find that most innovations 
originated from Bohr quadrant (with only understanding concern, without practical 
concern, name after the Danish scientist Niels Bohr), in fact it is the research in 
Pasteur quadrant (with both practical concern and understanding concern, name 
after the French scientist Louis Pasteur) that produced most innovations. In history, 
we can also find loads of inventions that created a new scientific discipline, which is 
the reverse order of the linear model. This linear model was proposed by V 
Bush(Bush,1945), he was thinking about how to make the best use of the migrant 
scientists and keep America’s leadership in science after the war. The Bush report did 
help American’s basic research, which can be reflected by the rocketing investment of 
the federal government in basic research and the soaring number of American Nobel 
prize laureates. Unfortunately, American’s innovation performance was far from 
desirable. The linear model’s negative influence should be responsible for this. Of 
course, it is not to downplay basic research’s significance here, the aim is to point out 
that increasing investment in basic research will not automatically lead to an 
improvement of innovation performance, innovation policies hope to encourage 
innovation by spurring scientists doing basic research to commercialise their 
discoveries is like climbing a tree in order to find fish, in a 
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Chinese proverb. 
 
 
 
 
The linear model deeply influences policy makers’ thinking pattern. Just because of this, 
the policy makers believe in linear model design and implement policies which cause the 
above mentioned strange phenomena. The logic of these policy makers is as follows, in 
Chinese System of Innovation, universities and research institutes are in charge of 
conducting basic research, as a consequence the funding for supporting basic research 
granted by government will be allocated to them. The industrial laboratories have close 
links with industry, they also have well-trained researchers, therefore they will 
undertake applied research. Firms are at the front line of production, they will be 
responsible for commercialising the outputs of applied research. As is clearly shown that 
each subject shoulders specific obligation, they are only expected to finish their own task. 
This logic is helpful in pursuing the cause of these phenomena. Innovation policies do not 
deem it necessary for a firm to do basic research, as it is considered as the universities’ 
turf. In fact, a firm directly face the society and ought to be an ideal place to produce 
research fall into the Pasteur quadrant. If the ability of doing basic research of a firm was 
discouraged, when the firm encounter problems, it will be unable to solve the problem, 
especially when the problem-solving requires the ability to understand the reality. Under 
such circumstances, the firm has no choice but to turn to university or research institutes 
for help. This will only further marginalise the firm in the future problem-solving activity. 
In short term, this choice might be rational, but in the long run it will undermine the 
firm’s technological capability, the additional and distinct resources needed to generate 
and manage technical change. A firm without this capability will be vulnerable during a 
transitional era, to make matters worse, if the whole countries firms are encouraged by 
this country’s policy to give up basic research ability, it is the whole country that in 
danger. Meanwhile, policies tend to have a narrow sense of innovation in mind, 
innovation is the commercialisation of invention, which is true, but according to System 
of Innovation, innovation has multiple sources and is a 
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collective outcome. Not only the production and operation stage is innovation, the 
whole process of innovation is very complicated, current policies only encourage firm 
to participate in the last stage of the innovation chain, thus isolate firms with other 
innovative activities, let alone this stage is based on the linear model. Firms are the 
subjects of innovation, innovation in a wider sense, they should be allowed or even 
pushed to take part in every part of innovation, otherwise firms could not become 
real subjects of innovation. Actively participate in innovation process and orchestrate 
innovation activities also entails a strong technological capability, then a mutual 
enhancing circle can be formed. 
 
 
 
The second phenomena, i.e. the over engagement of universities and research 
institutes in patent application can also be explained by the policy practice of linear 
model. In this model, basic research is regarded as the origin of all innovation, an 
underlying logic is that if one wants to have more innovation, policy should focus on 
universities and research institutes, only when they keep producing useful basic 
research outcomes, could the downstream players take turns to do the remaining 
work. Consequently, numerous policies forcing academic institutes commercialise 
their outcome have been designed and implemented. 
 
 
 
This linear model also influences some policies in relation to mining industry. One 
policy which has been mentioned is that mining companies and academic institutes 
have to co-operate with each other in order to get national funding. This policy 
assumes that academic institutes possess theoretical knowledge and they need to be 
put into practice, whereas mining companies understand the reality better but they 
lack theoretical guidance. This assumption locates academic institutes and firms at 
the two ends of the innovation chain, it does yield desirable result these years, but 
one lurking danger might also be caused by this policy, namely firms would not 
choose to strengthen their own technological capability when they have easy access 
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to outside technological resources. Another policy is worthy to be discussed here, 
recently China is establishing some intermediary institutions, the logic is apparent, 
these institutions will conduct applied R&D task, downstream firms can contact these 
institutions when they are interested in some technologies, they will be playing at 
the middle of the innovation chain. Again, these intermediary institutions will be 
helpful in short term, but they are only transitional institution, policy makers should 
bear this idea in mind: policy’s ultimate goal is to make a contribution to the 
fostering of a firm’s own technological capability. 
 
 
 
7.3 Discussions 
 
The phenomena proposed in the first section of this chapter can be linked with some 
policies, in order to stop this distortion more proper policies are needed. 
 
 
 
Above all, treating firms as the subjects of innovation cannot only be a propaganda 
slogan but has to penetrate into every innovation policy. This is not a useless repeat, 
the question is that a number of policies only claim they regard firms as the subject 
of innovation. Actually, they just perceive innovation in its narrow sense, and only 
pay attention to firms at the production and operation stage. This philosophy merely 
treats firms as a production unit rather than the core actor of innovation. More 
appropriate policy should encourage firms to engage in every part of innovation and 
build capacities which will be required by innovation. The policies trying to improve 
the interactions between firms and academic institutes could be remained only at 
the premise that firms’ endogenous ability to innovate should be the prime concern 
of such policies. Besides, establishing funding for firms to do basic research, this 
funding could be independent from the funding for academic institutes. The 
intermediary institutions should also be paid attention in order to direct their impact 
to facilitate firms to build in-house R&D rather than impair firms’ motivation to 
internalise the outside R&D institutions. 
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Secondly, the accuracy of innovation policies should be increased. Government 
cannot replace firms to do innovation but it can design policies to reward the firms 
doing indigenous innovation. There are no perfect measurements about innovation, 
the best way to identify such a firm is interviews and visiting in person. Government 
can use public procurement policies to support the firms doing indigenous innovation. 
Other firms which infringe indigenous innovation firms’ intellectual property rights 
should be severely punished. 
 
 
 
Last but not least, the strong patent production abilities of Chinese academic 
institutes should not be ignored. Government should help these institutes find 
Chinese partners to realise the potential commercial value of these patents. 
Academic staff should not be forbidden to take commercial work if they can fulfil 
their basic academic tasks. Firms should also be encouraged to seek high quality 
patents, government can build platforms to bring them together. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
In contemporary China, even the rank-and-file care about how to improve China’s 
science, technology and innovation performance. Solving this problem is imperative 
for the successful promotion of the Chinese economic structure. In order to narrow 
the reach of this research, mining is chosen as the research target. It is a strategic 
industry as it is indispensable for China's future energy security and some materials 
produced by the mining industry can be used and have no equivalents when it comes 
to manufacturing a constellation of high-tech products. In the foreseeable future, 
mining will not disappear in China. As long as the country maintains a GDP annual 
growth of around 7%, the products of the mining industry will be necessary for its 
development. It is also timely research as at the very beginning of this research, the 
mining industry was in its heyday while as the research ended, this industry, not only 
in China but across the world had seen a slump. This is not lucky for people working 
in the mining industry but it is fortunate for me as an outside observer to see what 
kind of decisions each Chinese mining company and mining equipment 
manufacturing company made, and to witness the responses of the Chinese 
government. These actions are essential in determining the vision of Chinese mining 
and the case studies presented here map a panorama of this transition period. 
 
 
 
The mining industry is also a hard case for an innovation study, as it is often regarded 
as a sunset and labour-intensive industry, but if only one industry can be studied the 
hardest should be more persuasive. By and large, mining is not considered as a high-
tech industry as most examples belong to manufacturing. Mining itself is all about 
digging up something which has already existed for tens of millions of years, rather 
than creating something that does not exist. Compared with manufacturing, mining 
mainly focuses upon the innovation process, which locates it at the middle part of 
the industry chain. Both the early part of the industry chain, namely, mining 
equipment manufacturing and the late part of the industry chain, namely, metallurgy 
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or material manufacturing, have a better image as regards innovation. As a result, 
this research does not seek to prove that there is more innovation in the mining 
industry but to demonstrate how the mining industry has improved not only its own 
innovation performance but its upstream and downstream industry simultaneously. 
The mining industry per se might not be an innovative industry according to the 
standard definition of high-tech industry (the percentage of R&D investment in total 
revenue), but it can, and in some cases does, help the industries linked to it enhance 
their technological capabilities. 
 
 
 
As far as development studies is concerned, innovation is a useful and powerful tool 
for a country’s development, but it is only a means not an end. Consequently, the 
relationship between innovation performance and economic development has huge 
significance. Mining is an ideal industry for conducting such research, especially in 
China. The reason is obvious. In China mining is not only an industry following pure 
commercial logic, but can be viewed as an extension of the Chinese state. Most of 
the largest mining companies and equipment companies are state-owned, so the 
development of the mining industry is a typical political economy phenomenon. After 
the term ‘indigenous innovation’ became popular, mining had been influenced 
intensively by relevant policy. Numerous policies implemented by the Chinese 
government, such as the environmental protection policy, the domestication policy, 
the R&D encouragement policy, have to some extent altered the course of the 
mining industry. Most of the mining SOEs have no choice but to follow government 
instructions. This research also looks at the impact of the innovation policy or science 
policy on mining companies as this also reflects the state’s capacity. 
 
 
 
There are a number of ways to approach innovation. This research adopts a 
qualitative method. I believe that the quantitative method is appropriate to identify a 
correlation between different factors. Whereas the aim of this research is to find the 
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mechanism through which innovation outcomes can be determined, the qualitative 
method is beneficial in presenting such a mechanism clearly. 
 
 
More specifically, this research is first illuminated by the System of Innovation(SI) 
theory. SI views innovation as the outcome of a system of innovation. It is contended 
that this framework is very useful for development scholars other than for innovation 
scholars. The System of Innovation theory is not a visible system with a certain 
boundary. On the contrary, it is based on the perception of a researcher, thereby 
leaving space for individual interpretation. Development scholars can choose some 
‘components of the System of Innovation’ which they regard as significant for both 
innovation and development to construct a personalised ‘System of Innovation’. In 
other words, this is a flexible framework which is inclined to change and evolution. 
This framework is especially apt for this research as, although the theme of the 
research is innovation, it only regards innovation as an indispensable tool for China’s 
development. By incorporating many multi-functional components (such 
components play a role not only in creating or diffusing innovation but also in other 
fields) into the System of Innovation, the significance of this research will not be 
confined to innovation alone. The System of Innovation is a perfect tool to combine 
the study of innovation with that of the economic development of a country or a 
region. 
 
 
The System of Innovation is quite useful in providing insights, but it is not a very 
practical framework as it is a rather grand theory. This research adopts the Triple 
Helix (TH) approach to organise interviews and conduct fieldwork. The two 
frameworks have different focus points. The SI approach attaches more importance 
to firms, whereas the TH approach emphasises the role of universities in knowledge-
production. As innovation can be viewed as knowledge-production activity, the TH 
approach can also be used to study innovation. In theory, the SI approach 
incorporates more potential innovation contributors but in practice the TH approach 
offers more feasible guidance to researchers due to its more concentrated focus. 
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These two approaches do not contrast with each other; they are just different lenses 
for researchers. The TH approach focuses upon the interaction of universities, 
governments, and industries. These three core players are also the most significant 
contributors to a System of Innovation. The case studies here are also conducted 
according to the Triple Helix approach. The main targets of the case studies are 
different, some focus upon one company, some focus upon a regional industry. 
Regardless of these differences, I attempt to demonstrate whether there are Triple 
Helix interactions in play in these cases, if so how does this interaction contribute to 
any innovation output, and if not, why. 
 
 
A newly proposed theoretical Innovation Ecosystem is also used throughout the 
research. It was designed with the aim of bringing more dynamics to a relatively 
stable System of Innovation framework. It also scrutinises the functions rather than 
the institutions of a system, shedding new light when combined with the Triple Helix 
approach. 
 
 
These three theoretical frameworks inform all the case studies. Case studies are used 
to demonstrate the details of real innovation processes. To give all the case studies 
enough structure, the three theories were used to organise the writing up. Even the 
cross-country comparison study was analysed through the lens of the Triple Helix and 
the System of Innovation. The results of this coherent analysis will be presented 
below. To sum up, the empirical study component of this research consist of case 
studies with a theoretical analysis using the System of Innovation, the Triple Helix, 
and the Innovation Ecosystem. 
 
 
Based on the foregoing, this study looks at innovation in the Chinese mining industry 
through a systemic approach and attempts to answer the question: What factors 
determine the success and failure of innovation in Chinese mining? It is expected that 
these factors are also useful in explaining the innovation performance of other 
industries in China, as these constitute elements of a National System of Innovation. 
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This research owes its academic originality mainly to the National System of 
Innovation, and whilst it is not intended to be a study of the Chinese National System 
of Innovation, it is to some extent a study of the Sectoral System of Innovation in the 
Chinese mining industry. The purpose of this research is to find an entry point into 
China’s System of Innovation. A more ambitious goal is to identify the weak point of 
the system and make a contribution to its improvement. 
 
 
The research yields two main conclusions, one empirical, the other theoretical. 
 
 
 
The most important empirical finding of the research is that divergence of innovation 
performance across the different part of the mining industry chain has been 
identified. More specifically, compared with the prospecting and manufacturing 
stages, the mining and mineral processing stages are more innovative. I would argue 
that the divergence of innovation performance across the different stages of mining 
is caused by two factors. First, the distance between its final products and market or 
commercialisation and second, the intensity of the interaction between the mining 
company (including the prospecting company and the equipment manufacturer) and 
the university or research institute. To be more specific, the closer the distance and 
the higher the intensity of the interaction, the better the innovation performance. 
One can find numerous laws in China which encourage the co-operation of mines 
with universities and academic institutes. This is a vivid positive example of the Triple 
Helix; all three parts are actively engaged in this interaction. By contrast, as firms 
specialising in machinery manufacturing do not co-operate intensively with other 
components of the innovation system with which they are involved, this leads to 
relatively poor innovation performance. Moreover, in China policies create a man-
made gap between prospecting per se and its potential commercial contribution. As 
the innovators and the practitioners at the prospecting stage are neither the same 
group of people nor have they collaborated as they do at the mining stage, this 
separation obstructs interaction between the innovators and the customers, which is 
vital for innovation in a knowledge economy. The policies 
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regulating prospecting also make no contribution to bringing universities and 
industries together. In fact, policy-makers are very reluctant to create a prospecting 
industry in China. The status quo is by no means formed in an institutional vacuum, 
history matters. The current situation is a natural extension of that in the past. 
Intensive interaction between mines, universities, and research institutes was 
established in the pre-reform era, policy-makers stipulating that universities focus 
upon basic research, research institutes focus upon applied research directly linked 
with production, while mines co-operated with academic institutes. Whilst for 
prospecting and machinery manufacturing, companies were not encouraged to 
communicate with their downstream or upstream customers, they mainly talked to 
superior authorities. Consequently, nowhere can one find a positive Triple Helix in 
the two areas. A positive in this explanation is that history can shape something, 
history can also change something. The status quo can be changed for a brighter 
future and this change is occurring. 
 
 
One possible theoretical contribution of this research is that the Triple Helix appears in 
different forms under different circumstances. The development stage of a country, the 
various growth stages of a firm, the different feature of an industry, all have impacts on 
the shape of a specific Triple Helix. In order to grasp the core of a real innovation process, 
I propose a dichotomy of Triple Helix, institutional Triple Helix, and functional Triple Helix. 
The functions of university, industry, and government in the Triple Helix are novelty 
production, wealth generation and public control respectively. The former can be 
regarded as three kinds of institutions, therefore we can dub the university-industry-
government Triple Helix as an institutional type. The question is that, in reality, in some 
successful innovation stories one or even two helices might be missing. For instance, 
universities have little direct impact on equipment manufacturing. Under such 
circumstances, the functional Triple Helix works. This Triple Helix focuses upon the three 
functions of novelty production, wealth generation, and public control. As long as these 
functions can be performed, a complete Triple Helix interaction can be finished. The case 
studies in this research 
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cases, one cannot discern the direct impact of government or universities on innovation. 
Only firms can be accounted for. This discovery, however, will not make the Triple Helix 
framework obsolete. When an institutional Triple Helix does not exist, a functional Triple 
Helix comes into play. One strong helix might be able to absorb or internalise another 
helix’s or even the other two helices’ function, hence the other two helices as visible 
institutions disappear but their functions will not disappear. In this research, firms are 
always seen the strong helix, as this research is about innovation and firms are the 
subject of innovation. But there are some situations in which it is difficult to distinguish 
different helices, especially in the Chinese context. This has something to do with the 
context in which the Triple Helix was constructed. This framework is constructed within 
Western context, even in the western world it is cannot be expanded to study all 
countries.From early on, American Universities shoulder a number of responsibilities of 
bolstering local development, as a result the University helix in America is not a pure 
academic helix. For Germany, the birthplace of research universities, this kind of mutual 
task accomplishing between universities and firms might be a phenomenon worth 
contemplating. When it comes to China, the system of innovation,especially the higher 
education system of China is increasingly resemble that of America, with the extant 
policy which encourage the interaction of universities and firms the Triple Helix 
interactions are becoming more and more significant in China. But TH still face a problem 
the boundaries of the three helices are not as clear-cut as those in the west. Two 
examples can be offered here. First, the Founder Group, a Peking University-run 
company. Is it fair to say in the Founder Group’s case it is the university that absorbs the 
firm’s functions? Second, the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS). This is a research 
institute that runs a lot of companies. Moreover, it is a public institution thus it can be 
regarded as branch of the Chinese state. Is it fair to say in this case that the three helices 
merge with each other? Under different circumstances, the importance of the three 
helices is prone to change. This situation remind the scholars that when use TH, history 
and context matters.The TH should be regarded as a dynamic description about the 
situation in a 
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country or during a specific period of time, it is a framework which is conducive to 
condense the complicate data, it is by no means a perfect benchmark for all the 
countries. It sometimes can be deemed as a philosophical tool for researchers to 
push forward their work, but whenever use it in whichever context, its flaws should 
not be ignored, the situation it depicts should not be taken for granted or be set as a 
model for others to mimic. This research finds that it is not always useful in 
explaining the innovation stories in China,especially the institutional TH, as the 
institutional setting in China is quite different from the west.The functional 
TH,however, is more useful as it focus on the abstract functions instead of the 
concrete institutions. By proposing such a new form of TH model, this research can 
expand the application field of Triple Helix. 
 
 
In fact, as Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff point out, the obvious trend is that the three 
helices shoulder tasks which used to be the domain of others. Is this a good thing or a 
bad thing? Can we find laws or rules for this kind of mutual penetration? This 
preliminary finding also paves the way for future research in this academic vein, 
asking, for example, is there an optimum form of Triple Helix, what features 
determine the form of a Triple Helix, can one achieve better innovation performance 
by actively changing the Triple Helix interaction of an industry or a country, does the 
evolution of a Triple Helix demonstrate similar patterns in the industry/country this 
Triple Helix pertains to, and how do we evaluate the difference? 
 
 
 
 
Actually, China has achieved a great many improvements in innovation in a wide 
variety of fields. Taking mining as an example, if one wants to learn some mining 
methods such as top coal caving, China is definitely the first choice. Although the 
reason why China is the best teacher of some mining methods is that, due to the 
geological requirement of these mining methods, not every country can use them, 
the advancement and effort Chinese technicians have made are still significant. This 
situation partially proves that the current System of Innovation in China is efficient in 
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some ways, although it is far from perfect. Most innovations are linked with practical 
needs, at least at the mining stage. the Chinese System of Innovation has been 
effective in transferring these needs into technical language and finally 
commercialising the technological breakthroughs. This research provides some 
explanation of the admirable innovation performance of some parts of the mining 
industry. It also offers a brief analysis of Huawei’s case. Huawei adopted R&D to 
make itself excel over its competitors while meeting the market demand, while 
mining companies in China tend to establish technological relationships with 
universities and research institutes. Taking the constraining political and geological 
factors into consideration, it is not fair to regard the mining industry as an innovation 
failure. China still lags behind the West in many scientific and technological areas but 
it is also catching up in a lot of fields. The future of Chinese innovation is still 
uncertain, whereas to say it is prospective is not groundless. 
 
 
China has entered a so-called ‘new norm’. During this period, economic growth has 
slowed and the annual GDP growth rate is about 7%, which is high compared with 
other countries but rather low compared with China in the past 30 years. In fact, 
there was no old norm. After the Reform and Opening-up, China’s economy suffered 
several rounds of fluctuation, each wave lasting for roughly 10 years, and the 
downturn as well as the upturn can be explained by the implementation of new 
policies. In some years the GDP growth rate was even lower than it is now. The 
difference between this era’s economic ‘recession’ and the earlier experience is that 
China’s current economic structure is increasingly similar to that of developed 
countries, and innovation has played an important role. Actually, an ideal new norm 
should be one in which technological innovation becomes ordinary, will be the norm 
for most firms, and the quality of GDP will improve due to the significance of 
innovation. 
 
 
 
Mining’s role in China’s economic growth is also going through a transition. The 
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astonishing economic growth of the past three decades would have been impossible 
without a high level of coal use. In 2015 the share of coal in the energy mix fell to 
64.4%, which has characterised a fundamental shift in the Chinese economy’s 
relationship with coal, one that has gone largely unnoticed until the recent peak in 
consumption (Qi et al,2016, p564). The extensive use of metals is also becoming 
impossible both economically and politically. The notorious pollution around Beijing 
has led the government to impose strict regulations on firms. A more environment-
friendly economy is in formation. During this transition period, technological 
innovation will be critical to its success. Those so-called ‘high-tech’ industries only 
take up a minority share of industrial output. Only by realising the diffusion of state-
of-the-art technology throughout the whole economy could the economy be 
promoted, and as a material provision industry for all other industries, mining is 
qualified to be a testbed and lay the foundation for the Chinese economy. Actually, it 
is common practice to adopt information and automation technology in mines all 
over the world, some mines operated by global mining companies are quite 
technology intensive. 
 
 
 
The coming decades are essential for China’s development, the same goes for the 
Chinese mining industry. The latest statistical data suggest that in 2016 the mining 
industry’s profits amounted to 182.5 billion yuan (US$27 billion), a 27.5% decrease, 
while profits from coal mining enjoyed a 220% increase, non-ferrous metal 
metallurgy’s profit also increasing by 42.9%65. These figures show that mining will 
continue to be an important industry, but it is likely to weather fluctuations and 
intra-industry divergence. The fate of mining cannot be separated from the 
development of China. Successful late developers will serve as guideposts for 
successors so their experiences are precious. The impact of China’s development, be 
it a success or a failure, will be huge for the rest of the developing world. Its way of 
 
 
65  http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-01/26/content_5163619.htm viewed on 2017-2-17. 
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dealing with innovation will determine the trajectory of this development, which will 
 
keep to be an attractive myth for generations of scholars and practitioners. 
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